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Abstract
During the 1980's, unemployed schoolleavers were encouraged to undertake a period of
government sponsored training as a potential stepping stone into work. One such pro-
gramme was the Youth Training Scheme (YTS), which operated from 1981 to 1994. The
effectiveness of such schemes has long been questioned. This work presents an inves-
tigation into YTS scheme effectiveness in which we compare estimated labour market
elasticities of people with YTS experience against those without. We acknowledge the
existence of inherent differences between the two groups which could act to bias our
conclusions, then attempt to account for these using matching methods.
In an experiment designed to assess a treatment effect, "independent" individuals who
do not receive the treatment are usually used as a control group. Econometricians seldom
have such experimental data due to the interference of self selection. One way to allow
for the bias introduced by self selection is to use a matching algorithm. The purpose of
the matching algorithms we employ is to produce a synthetic control group of individuals
who have not experienced training but who are similar to the YTS participants. Having
produced various matched datasets, we recalculate the elasticities of an optimal job search
model to ascertain whether there is still evidence of a treatment effect when comparing
like with like. In contrast to previous research, we also make allowance for the changing
nature (heterogeneity) of the YTS scheme over time.
We compare different matching methods and assess their relative performance. Obser-
vations lying beyond the region of overlapping support are shown to cause a degradation
in nearest neighbour matching performance. Kernel based procedures are employed using
the full range of the bandwidth parameter on which they rely.
In the final part of this work we widen our field of vision to include the unemployment
to work transition process. We present results which support the hypothesis of different
YTS treatment effects in each generation of YTS.
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Chapter 1
Introd uction
Up until the 1970s, UK employers made provision for training the many of their young
employees via the apprenticeship scheme. During this decade, the numbers of young
people undertaking a traditional apprenticeship began to fall as employment in manufac-
turing declined. At the same time UK participation rates in full-time further education
lagged well behind those of similarly developed nations. Governments acknowledged that
an increasingly skilled work force was needed, to compete on international markets. The
skill shortage, compounded by rising youth unemployment, could not be met without the
introduction of a systematic vocational education and training provision for the majority
of school leavers.
During the first term of Mrs Thatcher's Conservative Government plans were brought
forward to replace the active labour market policy known as the Youth Opportunities
Program (YOP) with a more ambitious scheme. In consequence, 1981 saw the announce-
ment of a new one year Youth Training Scheme (YTS). By 1983 the scheme was fully
operational. Since their introduction supporters and opponents of active labour market
policies (ALMP's) have argued about the effects of such schemes on those who participate.
This research attempts to address some of the difficulties which lie behind a study of
this question. At the same time some of the empirical methods which have been forwarded
as possible solutions to them are compared.
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1.1 The Youth Training Scheme
Youth unemployment was a significant problem for the UK Government throughout the
1970s and 80s and the problem persists to the present day. The problem has prompted
direct active labour market policies designed to provide state funded training in an at-
tempt to alleviate the difficulties experienced by young people facing the transition from
school to work. In this thesis we examine the effect of state training schemes in changing
the labour market expectations of young people. We suggest that the different forms of
the government schemes, which have been implemented over the years, have had quite
different effects.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s the UK Government introduced the Youth Oppor-
tunities Program (YOP) in an attempt to address what was generally considered to be
a temporary excess supply of youth labour. It was suggested that school leavers were
receiving high relative wages and as a result were being priced out of the jobs market.
It was hoped that the low training allowances, which YOP offered, would act to depress
youth wage expectations and thereby increase their chances of finding employment post
scheme. The view that high youth unemployment was a temporary phenomenon led to
an emphasis on work experience, whilst the training component of YOP was neglected,
see Bradley (1995). In the early 80's, with the economy continuing to under perform and
the job prospects for the young in decline, the number of persons on the scheme grew
rapidly. At the same time the fraction of those who successfully made the transition to a
permanent job after the scheme dropped to around a quarter, this led to widespread con-
demnation of YOP by participants, parents and trade unions. In 1981 the New Training
Initiative addressed the perceived shortcomings of YOP with its proposals for the Youth
Training Scheme. Under the first version of this scheme (YTSI), all 16 and 17 year olds
were given the opportunity to either continue on to further education or proceed to a
YTS placement for a period of planned work experience and three months compulsory off
the job training at a college of further education. The young were encouraged to learn
general transferable skills that employers might find of use.
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In the mid 1980s there was recognition of a continued skills shortfall in the labour
force, which was viewed as a hindrance to the Government's attempts to produce stable
economic growth. This led to YTSI being superseded in April 1986 by a new version of the
Youth Training Scheme (YTSII). The funding structure of which encouraged employers to
recruit trainees as first year apprentices with employed status and allowances topped up
to levels closer to the average for young workers. The scheme's duration was lengthened
to two years for 16 year olds. There was increased emphasis on the scheme's vocational
training elements (rising to 20 weeks) with the opportunity to gain qualifications. The
introduction of YTSII coincided with a fall in the numbers of young people leaving school
and an economic boom; these changing conditions would have enhanced the scheme's
prospects of being labelled a success.
The late 1980s and early 1990s saw the Government increasingly concerned by the
skills gap between the UK work force and that of it's international competitors. A need
for yet higher levels of meaningful training amongst the young was identified. In May 1990
Youth Training (YT) replaced YTSII. A main objective of the scheme was to help school
leavers attain qualifications of at least NVQ level2 (a vocational qualification). There was
an emphasis on scheme flexibility and with this in mind the length of YT placements and
the amount of off-the-job training was tailored to the needs of each placement. YT saw
the inception of the Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs) whose aim was to stimulate
employer led investment in training", As YT matured the economy experienced a cyclical
down turn, which affected the prospects for schoolleavers during this period, and so the
performance of YT may have suffered. Detailed surveys of the historical background of
these schemes can be found in a number of studies Chapman and Tooze (1987), Dolton
et al. (1993), Deakin (1996).
lThis was not the first time that this had been attempted. ITB's tried to do something similar in
1964.
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1.2 Traditional Approaches
Government sponsored training schemes have been introduced in a variety of countries
with the intention of improving the labour market prospects of young people. Four sep-
arate labour market effects of training schemes have been identified in recent research.
These include the 'wage effect' Ashenfelter (1978), Ashenfelter and Card (1985), and the
'employment effect' Card and Sullivan (1988) have been measured using data on individ-
ual workers. The 'deadweight loss' and the 'substitution effect' have been measured using
data on firms. Studies in the USA have used both experimental and non-experimental
data. UK studies have exclusively used non-experimental data since no alternative data is
available. One potential economic effect of these schemes, which has been systematically
ignored, is their impact on the wage expectations and search elasticities of the job seekers.
As stated, one political view around the time of inception of YTS held that young peo-
ple were pricing themselves out of jobs by holding unrealistic wage expectations. Hence,
successive schemes have had the objective of lowering young people's reservation wages
and make them more responsive, in their search behaviour, to changing labour market
conditions. The major aim of this thesis is to test this hypothesis and examine the extent
to which different forms of Youth Training Schemes may have had different effects.
If we consider that Government training participants receive a treatment effect as a
result of their time on a scheme, then the size of this effect is of considerable importance.
Most of the empirical work in the literature on evaluating active labour market training
programs focuses on average effects and in particular the mean of the direct effect of
treatment on the treated. This refers to the average effect of treatment to some outcome
measure (such as post scheme labour market state). In contrast to this approach we mea-
sure treatment effects as the differences between the outcomes on a number of elasticities
of unemployment for those who experience YTS and those who don't.
4
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1.3 Recent Developments
Unfortunately differences are likely to exist between the YTS participants and those who
did not experience the scheme. Theory would suggest that those who undertake a period
of government training would, on average, have a lower skills base than the rest of the
labour market (because the more highly skilled will already be in jobs or higher education).
This skill shortage, as well as a number of other factors such as the placement of persons
that careers officers considered needed the assistance which YTS might deliver, could act
to bias any conclusions which we hope to draw from our analysis of the treatment effect.
We address this problem using various methods of matching. Datasets are recast in such
a way that members of the control group (non-participants) are deemed to be suitable
matches for YTS participants if they have "similar" observed characteristics as measured
by a propensity score computed using a probit model for YTS participation.
These methods, for which Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) developed a theoretical frame-
work of assumptions, have in recent times grown in popularity amongst empirical re-
searchers wishing to correct for selection bias into a labour market state. The topicality
of the matching approach has highlighted the need for rigorous assessment of the perfor-
mance of these methods. Our analysis extends beyond simply applying these methods
and encompasses a full appraisal of their relative strengths and weaknesses. We go still
further in an attempt to uncover a procedure for identifying whether a given method
when employed with a certain dataset will produce a "good quality" matched dataset.
The matching methods studied include a nearest neighbour matching estimator similar to
that used by Lechner (1999) as well as the kernel based methods described in Heckman
et al. (1997).
1.4 Thesis Structure
Before describing the research proper, it is necessary to outline some preliminaries. The
next Chapter facilitates this analysis by considering much of the background to our study.
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It begins by outlining the various datasets, which we will use. Emphasis is placed on the
power which panel data gives us when considering such things as duration within a specific
labour market state. Section 2.1.1 describes the Youth Cohort Survey (YCS) cohort data
from the 1984-94 period, which we use in our estimations. The data contains information
on key variables such as unemployment duration, reservation wages and expected wages
that enable us to provide estimates of the effect of all YTS variants over the period of
survey. Later we examine the National Online Manpower Information System (NOMIS)
dataset and discuss its value when linked to the YCS data. Section 2.2 introduces the
optimal search model. The structural parameters derived from this model are the focus
of our empirical estimations. We demonstrate the ways in which Lancaster and Chesher
(1983) derive various elasticities from this model in section 2.3.
Section 2.4 outlines a method for modelling outcomes with and without training
scheme experience. This discussion moves on to highlight the problems of self-selection
into YTS. A brief demonstration of the power of randomised experiments and the ways
in which they allow us to identify counterfactual outcomes is given. It is suggested that
methods of matching might allow us to recast our dataset so that it more closely mirrors
that which a randomised experiment would have produced. The underlying assumptions
of traditional matching methods are introduced. The work of Rosenbaum and Rubin
(1983) is shown to be crucial. They were able to show that, when attempting to match
treatment and control individuals to one another, a propensity score for treatment (in this
case a spell on YTS) may substitute for the group of variables used to model it. We then
move on from matching in general to three specific examples of matching algorithms, the
nearest neighbour, kernel and local linear matching methods. The penultimate section of
Chapter 2 concludes by defining stochastic dominance and examining its use to assess the
suitability of a given dataset for nearest neighbour matching. We conclude by considering
the statistical procedure of bootstrap sampling.
The analysis within Chapter 3 attempts to assess the overall employment effects of
various YTS incarnations. In turn we consider: models of the potential effect on the
6
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elasticities of unemployment following any spell on any form of YTS scheme; the effect
when we allow for YTS scheme heterogeneity; the effect of any YTS scheme having nearest
neighbour matched individuals with YTS experience to non-YTS persons in an attempt to
create a synthetic control group of non-participants to account for the inherent differences
between those people who participate in YTS training and those who don't; the effect of
each form of YTS scheme having again used nearest neighbour matching to account for
the inherent differences. Section 3.2 compares the estimates of the structural parameters
obtained using the non-parametric approach developed by Lancaster and Chesher (1983)
for both "all men" and "all women" 2 to those obtained in previous studies. Section 3.3
presents estimates of the search elasticities for men and women and by whether they expe-
rienced any form of YTS training. Subsection 3.3.1 makes allowance for the evolution of
YTS over the sample period and estimates the structural parameters for each incarnation
of the scheme. Section 3.5 contains an appraisal of the economic climate in which each
incarnation of the YTS scheme operated. Knowledge of which allows us to interpret our
findings. In Section 3.6 we consider our findings on the effectiveness of YTS in assisting
young people to make the transition from school to work.
Chapter 4 begins with reference to the assumptions of matching methods, as defined
in Chapter 2. We note that these methods may only produce "high quality" matches if
these assumptions remain valid. We then propose to investigate the relative performance
of the nearest neighbour method against the, kernel and local linear methods. We suggest
that versions of the nearest neighbour algorithm with exclusions when matches are found
to be poor are flawed. Elasticities as calculated using datasets generated with the kernel
and local linear methods are presented. We identify the need to develop a method for
selecting the bandwidth parameter, which these algorithms require. Our solution is to use
a bootstrap iterative procedure to generate a value for the bandwidth. Results are then
interpreted using synthetic control group elasticities and wage rates, generated using our
2Without regard to the differences between the three YTS types, those who participate in YTS and
those who don't.
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estimated bandwidths. We suggest, without the introduction of new bias, that a series
of random exclusions from the treatment group could allow us to adjust for common
support.
We move on to consider the YTS treatment effect for labour market state transition
rates. Chapter 5 introduces the 3-state labour market model. We estimate a series of Cox
proportional hazard models for the unemployment to work transition using unmatched
and matched datasets of various types. The specification includes indicators for whether
individuals experienced a spell on YTSI, YTSII or YT. Results complement those of
previous chapters, revealing the implications of the various movements in reservation
wages and the job search elasticities for those with YTS experience. Chapter 6 concludes
the work by considering our attempts to answer the twin questions of matching algorithm
performance and YTS performance. Conclusions are drawn and suggestions for future
work are considered.
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Chapter 2
Preliminaries
Before we present the results our research has uncovered, it is necessary to review some
of the theory behind the analysis of active labour market policies, which we shall make
use of throughout this work. Those wishing to draw a series of conclusions from what will
follow must first have an understanding of the data. As such we begin this chapter by
outlining the initial design of the Youth Cohort Survey and its evolution over the period
we chose to investigate. Later we will introduce the search theory framework for exit from
unemployment, which Lancaster and Chesher (1983) used to derive a series of elasticities.
The values of these elasticities cast light on the job search process and which we rely on
during the early part of our analyses.
Next we introduce the concept of matching and its use as a solution to government
training scheme evaluation problems. Motivation for the procedure is given by way of a
model for labour market state outcomes. Having demonstrated how the use of randomised
training scheme exclusions can facilitate the evaluation of such schemes, we then outline
the theory of matching methods. We then explain how they can allow us to uncover the
effects of training schemes from panel data in the absence of a randomised control group.
We then introduce three matching methods of increasing complexity and propose
to employ them in an analysis of the YCS datasets. Starting with nearest neighbour
matching, we describe a complex variant of the group of such methods. Much as Lechner
9
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(1999) did, we employ a variable width calliper whilst matching actual non-participants
to persons with any form of government training scheme experience. Next we illustrate
the kernel density and local linear regression methods of matching, which make use of all
non-participants to create a single synthetic non-participant for each scheme participant.
We move on to present a brief outline of the probit model specification, which led to
our propensity scores for YTS participation. The ways in which the various matching
methods make use of these score predictions when creating matched datasets are crucial
to our interpretation of the results from any analyses of them.
The penultimate section of this Chapter deals with the concepts of first and second
order stochastic dominance and their use when attempting to gauge the suitability of any
dataset for the application of a matching method. We conclude the Chapter with a brief
outline of the method and statistical basis behind bootstrap sampling.
2.1 Data
The main body of data used in this study consists of sweeps one to three of cohorts one to
six of the Youth Cohort Study (YCS). We were also able to make use of extra exgonenous
local labour market information from the NOMIS (National Online Manpower Information
Service) database. The subsections, which follow, outline these two datasets and include
some discussion of their sampling framework and final survey samples.
2.1.1 The vcs Dataset
The Youth Cohort Survey (YCS) is a Department for Education and Skills (DfES)1 funded
longitudinal programme of surveys and was originally designed to facilitate an exploration
into the behaviour, decisions and routes of transition from school into a labour market
state of a representative sample of young people aged 16 to 17 at the time of initial postal
contact in England and Wales. The survey was intended to be the government's main
1Formally the Department for Education and Employment (DfEE).
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source of information on the school to work transition process. It is a national survey of
the experiences of 16 to 19 year olds on YTS, in and out of work, at school and further
education, and in other forms of training. Cohorts 1-6 were re-surveyed on each of the
first three years after individuals reached their year of minimum school leaving age.
The structure of the YCS is presented in Table 2.2. Only a random sample of those
eligible for survey was selected for each new cohort. Not all persons who where selected to
be surveyed were contacted or returned their questionnaires. The sample size was therefore
affected by survey non-response. When interpreting the results of Table 2.2 numbers in
parenthesis relate to the percentage of respondents to a given sweep as a proportion of
those who responded to the previous sweep. The subsequent sweeps are hence a subset
of the respondents to sweep 1. Final response rates are recorded in the last column. This
was the sample design for cohorts 1-4. For cohorts 5 and 6 an attempt was made to
contact the whole target sample of sweep 1 at both subsequent sweeps. For the purpose
of this investigation information used during the course of our study from cohorts 5 and
6 has been made comparable to that of cohorts 1-4 since information obtained at sweeps
subsequent to an individual's non-response are removed from the dataset. An example of
this structure can be seen using cohort 3. With reference to the YCS design of Table 2.2,
Cohort 3 (YCS III) began with a postal survey dated March 1987 of young people who
completed their compulsory education during the school year 1985-6. Respondents were
sampled again in March 1988 and March 1989.
Usually, the levels of response for postal surveys of this kind are low. However this is
not the case for the YCS dataset. Those who oversaw the surveying procedure undertook
a number of actions in an attempt to minimise the levels of non-response. As well as the
questionnaire, persons also received four separate reminders as certain dates elapsed. The
middle two reminders included replacement questionnaires and succeeded in capturing
most late respondents, whilst the final one involved a telephone call (where a person's
phone number was available) which only managed to increase the final response rate by
1%- 2%.
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Since YCS cohorts 1-6 cover such a large passage of time it is not unsurprising to
discover that the questionnaires used underwent a number of revisions. The resulting
differences between cohort datasets mean that only a limited number of variables can
be used when appending all six cohort datasets together. Differences in the sampling
techniques between cohorts may also introduce bias into our analyses. Although the main
sampling features on which the original cohort was founded remained in place over the
course of the subsequent cohort samples, some variations were inevitable. Sample size
is one area, which was allowed to develop within later cohort samples. Cohorts 1 and 2
sampled 10% of the individuals from a selected set of representative schools whereas later
cohorts took a sample of 20%. The sample size variations should not in themselves reduce
the representative nature of all cohorts to their respective populations; yet the larger
samples of cohorts 3 to 6 may lead to smaller variations in the variables of interest which
may in themselves then lead to the discovery of significant results within the analyses of
such samples or a domination by these larger populations within YCS 1-6 when taken as
a whole.
To summarise the YCS underwent two major changes over the period covered by
cohorts 1-6. We saw that the sample size as a percentage of the population of interest
increased from 10% to 20% after cohorts 1 and 2. Hence we would expect that those
individuals within cohorts 1 and 2 would resemble each other most, as would those of
cohorts 3, 4, 5 and 6. It will be interesting to see whether this prior belief about the
structure of the data manifests itself in our analyses.
A publication from the Government Statistical Service (GSS) (1996) covers the data
within YCS cohorts 1 to 6. Several of the findings in that work are relevant when in-
terpreting the results, which we present. The GSS work suggests that YCS reflects a
number of trends highlighted in official Government figures for areas such as educational
attainment. Estimates during the period covered by cohorts 1 to 6 show a growth in
the proportion of young people participating in education, training and achievement of
qualifications. Asian youths were particularly likely to remain in full-time education for
12
2.1. Data
Un-Mtchd Un-Mtchd Matched Matched
Males Females Males Females
Regressors Description Mean Mean Mean Mean
Reservation Wage Responses to the question: 'What is the 96.16908 88.6961 98.75319 88.61614
lowest weekly take home pay you would (0.49596) (0.42353) (0.65870) (0.52228)
consider for a full time job?'
Expected Wage Responses to the question: 'How much 126.1087 115.8429 126.8414 114.2719
weekly take home pay do you expect to (0.66737) (0.54831) (0.90866) (0.69372)
earn in your next job?
Ethnic Origin White: Respondent is white, 0.081128 0.073842 0.066863 0.069749
Other: Respondent belongs to another (0.27306) (0.26154) (0.24985) (0.25477)
ethnic group.
Education Score at 16 These are education scores calculated from 8.084804 8.861285 4.265487 5.339342
a persons GCSE (or equivalent) results. (9.72350) (9.66383) (5.51636) (6.40732)
The scores are computed as A=5 points,
8=4 points, C=3 points, 0=2 points and
E=1 point.
Maths GCSE 1 Respondent held a GCSE (or equivalent) 0.215931 0.188986 0.086529 0.107367
in Maths at grade C or above, (0.41152) (0.39154) (0.28121) (0.30964)
o Otherwise.
English GCSE 1 Respondent held a GCSE (or equivalent) 0.256618 0.325824 0.139626 0.206505
in English at grade C or above, (0.43682) (0.46873) (0.34668) (0.40488)
o Otherwise.
No. of Siblings The total number of siblings (not a dummy). 1.807843 1.858156 2.073255 2.023119
(1.559901 (1.628531 (1.69402 (1.72236
Career Service Interview 1 Respondent attended a career service 0.141667 0.111181 0.174041 0.142633
interview, (0.34875) (0.31439) (0.37924) (0.34977
o Otherwise.
Live With Parents Respondent lived with parentis). 0.977696 0.952232 0.97296 0.939655
(0.14769 (0.213301 (0.16224 (0.23817
YTSI Respondent had a spell on the first 0.083333 0.075511 0.167158 0.14185
incarnation of YTS. (0.27642 (0.264241 (0.37321 (0.34896
YTSII Respondent had a spell on the second 0.116667 0.131206 0.234022 0.246473
incarnation of YTS. (0.321061 (0.337661 (0.42349 (0.43104
YT Respondent had a spell on YT 0.053922 0.06237 0.09882 0.111677
(0.22589 (0.241851 (0.29849 (0.31503
Pred. Training allowance An estimate of the respondents training - 3.998719 3.952304
allowance. (-I (-I (0.165671 (0.14224\
Regions North, Yorkshire & Humberside, East - - -
Midlands, East Anglia, Greater London, (-) (-) (-) (-)
South East, South West, West Midlands,
North West and Wales. North of England is
used as a reference crouo.
Cohorts Dummies for Cohorts 1 to 6. Cohort 1 is - -
used as a reference group. (-I (-) (-I (-)
Exogenous Variables
Youth Unemployment These variables were collected by region and come from 0.064805 0.064578 0.076662 0.075117
Regional Trends. Wages are adult figures and are dis- (0.03561) (0.03562) (0.04027) (0.03982)
Regional YT Places
aggregated by gender, so females in the database are
0.083314 0.083677 0.090544 0.090273assigned mean female wages for their home region In the
relevant time period. Regional training place figures BrB (0.02429) (0.02434) (0.02228) (0.02213)
Average Wages normalised by using the population of 16-19 year olds in 233.1733 159.0188 220.9955 150.5093
the region for each year. Population figures provided by (32.5365) (24.2911) (24.4659) (19.6396)
the Office for National Statistics (ONS).
LEA Unemployment Using the National on-nne Manpower Information 10.01333 9.922007 11.11412 10.96832
System (NOM IS). unemployment figures were collected (4.13270) (4.14132) (4.36587) (4.31522)
for each month for each Local Education Authority (LEA).
Rates were then calculated by dividing through by
Census population figures of the number of individuals In
the labour market for each LEA. The 1981 Census Is
used for the period to 1991 and the 1991 Census Is used
thereafter.
Sample Size 4115 4770 2034 2552
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics of the Four yeS Subsets Used in this Study
all ages of study and young people from all ethnic minority groups were more likely to
be in full-time education than those who classified themselves as white. In 1994, as the
final sweep of cohort 6 drew to a close, 87% of Asian 16 year olds and 66% of Asian 18
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year olds were in full-time education. Compare these to figures of 72% of all 16 year olds
and 40% of all 18 year olds. At the same time there were increases in the proportion in
full-time education among 16 year olds from groups with traditionally low levels of edu-
cational continuity. These groups included those with lower GCSE attainment, parents in
unskilled manual occupations and those who stated that they had truanted during year
11. The key activity at age 18 continued to be full-time education. In 1994, 40% of 18
year olds responded that this was their main labour market state. Young men were more
likely to be in a government sponsored training scheme at all sweeps compared to women.
Table 2.2: The Cohort Design Structure of the YCS Survey
As the non-response literature would suggest, see Taylor (2000), those with higher
achievement, both educationally and with respect to their labour market outcomes are
more likely to have responded to the survey. Hence these groups are over represented,
whilst those in other activities are under-represented in sweeps 2 and 3. In an effort to
counter this effect, those who administered the survey applied weightings. However the
attrition present in sweeps 2 and 3 re-introduces the bias. As a result, data from sweep 1
is more reliable than that from sweep 2, which is in turn mor reliable than that of sweep
3. Variables used in the weighting process were population variables for sex, school type,
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region, year 11 attainment and participation in full-time education at 16. The weighting
methods differ for each cohort to reflect changes in sample selection.
Having weighted the initial sample, some bias still remained once the data was col-
lected. This was the result of differing response rates among different groups of young
people. At sweep 1, the data were weighted to education census figures for participation
in full-time education. As an example of the need to weight the initial sample to bring it
into line with population estimates, as well as the bias which remained post survey, Table
2.3 contains estimates of how the main labour market activity taken from YCS compares
with administrative estimates of those in full-time education and on government sup-
ported training for cohorts 5 and 6. As this table demonstrates, YCS consistently over
represents those in full-time education, whilst under predicting the proportion in Gov-
ernment supported training. It should be noted that YCS included a sub-sample from
independent colleges of education, which the DfEE excludes from its figures.
The yeS is a clustered dataset, because it's school-based. This work does not consider
the implications for the design effect which clustering can have. Throughout this work we
do not estimate robust formulae for standard errors, nor do we attempt to identify any
school effects.
Some questions, which we considered of high importance to our study, were only put
to a subset of those sampled. For instance, questions regarding reservation/expected
wages were only put to those who were unemployed at the time of survey, whilst training
allowances were only available for those persons participating in a training scheme at the
time of the survey. We follow other work in this area (such as the research presented in
papers by Lynch (1983), Lancaster and Chesher (1983), Main and Shelley (1988), Jones
(1988), Gorter and Gorter (1993), and Dolton and O'Neill (1995)) and use as a measure
of the reservation wage denoted (, the individual's response to the question 'What is the
lowest weekly take home pay you would consider for a full time job?', To measure the
expected wage denoted x, we use responses to the question 'How much weekly take home
pay do you expect to earn in your next job?
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Of course all the usual caveats apply to the use of this typ of question to construct
information of the kind we seek. The details of the derivation of th se variables are
provided in Table 2.1. The distributions of these variables are graphed in Figure C.3. It
is reassuring that these graphs look reasonable and that the joint distribution of the two
variables provided in Table 2.4 throws up only 5% of young people in the sample who are
irrational, in the sense of having either ~ > x, or ~ < b or x < b,. where b equals the
unemployment benefit level. This proportion is very low for studies of this kind".
16 Year Olds 1992 1994
DfEE vcs DfEE yes
FT education (not
on Government
65.1% 66.0% 71.4% 72.0%
14.0% 13.6% 12.0%
16.0% 16.5% 15.0%18.6%
7.0%
Table 2.3: Comparison of YCS R sults with DfEE Estimates
2This proportion is also consistent with people who did not understand the question or who made a
mistake with their response.
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2.1.2 Duration and Dated Variables
Much of the analyses, which we present towards the end of this work, are concerned
with labour market state durations and transition processes. yeS provides two separate
sources of information about dated events, which we use to define our duration and
transition variables. In the first, respondents are asked to complete a diary for the year
prior to each sweep (6 months for sweep 1) in which they recall their labour market status
in each month. Although respondents could include a large number of labour markets
states, we have chosen to aggregate the classification of labour market states into a single
consistent classification over time: (i) unemployed; (ii) on YTS (or other government
training scheme); (iii) in full time employment; (iv) in full time education; (v) other.
yeS gives each individual's state for around 30 months over the period when they were
between 16 and 19 years old. Taken together the first six cohorts in the yeS survey cover
the 114 months from September 1984 to February 1994. Every person within our dataset
has a fully completed labour market state diary. This data is fully described in Dolton
et al. (1999). Short Fortran programs were written to derive variables such as total
time spent unemployed during the survey period or individual labour market state spell
length from this invaluable and rich dataset. The code used to extract unemployment
durations for those who then exited to a full time job is reproduced in Appendix A.1.
The second source of dated information comes from the responses to particular questions
on the survey questionnaire at each sweep. Both sources of information were used to
construct the variables in this study.
In order that we might maintain the sample size when estimating models for labour
market state transition processes it was necessary to predict the reservation/expected
wages and training allowances of those who did not report them before we could include
them in the model. Descriptions of the specifications for these estimations are provided
during the presentation of our empirical findings.
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2.1.3 The NOMIS Dataset
Variables such as the unemployment rate by the Local Education Authority (LEA) within
which individuals undertook their secondary education, youth unemployment rate by re-
giorr' of individuals residence and available youth training places as a proportion of the
population by region of residence were constructed from the National Online Manpower
Information System (NOMIS) data resource. Summary statistics for all the NOMIS de-
rived variables are included in Table 2.1.
LEA and youth unemployment measures were selected due to their relevance to our
dataset, also youth labour force unemployment rates were not available at the national
level. These measures were believed to improve on national unemployment rate figures
in that the disaggregation of each by LEA and region would reflect the real state of em-
ployment prospects for individuals due to the wide variations in labour market conditions
between such regions.
It was hoped that a measure of Youth Training Places might allow us to capture a
greater part of the extent to which 16 and 17year old schoolleavers were unemployed. This
was of concern to us following the law change of September 1988 when such persons were
no longer eligible for unemployment benefit (Job Seekers Allowance) and so disappeared
from the unemployment register as defined as those actively seeking work. Youth Training
Places might also capture the affluence of a region. Wealthier regions with more healthy
employment prospects for the young can at the same time afford a higher level and quality
of training scheme provision which in turn might increase the long-term employment
prospects of scheme recipients.
3The Survey took as its population all persons of school leaving age in the relevant years within
England and Wales. This was divided into regional areas as follows: North, Yorkshire and Humberside,
East Midlands, East Anglia, Greater London, South East, South West, West Midlands, North West and
Wales.
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Reservation Wage
Expected Under 100 125 150 175 200 225 250 Over Total
Wage 27.5 250
Under 27.5 3 10 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 16
100 21 3305 84 35 11 3 4 1 2 3466
125 2 2539 797 16 9 0 1 2 0 3366
150 0 583 832 210 2 4 1 0 1 1633
175 0 133 390 216 85 2 2 0 1 829
200 0 75 135 101 49 29 0 0 0 389
225 0 15 34 49 27 18 11 0 0 154
250 0 18 26 20 40 22 9 10 0 145
Over 250 0 7 16 9 13 12 8 17 18 100
Total 26 6685 2316 657 236 90 36 30 22 10098
Table 2.4: The Joint Distribution of Reservation and Expected Wages within the yeS
Dataset
2.2 The Search Theory Framework for Exit from Un-
employment
This section briefly outlines the standard model of optimal job search. Job offers arrive
at random intervals. In particular it is assumed that risk neutral agents receive job offers
according to a Poisson process with arrival rate A. The length of an interval between
any two successive job offers is therefore random. The implication of this is that the
probability of obtaining an offer in any short interval of time is directly proportional
to the length of the interval. These risk neutral agents seek to maximise the expected
present value of their income, discounted to the present over an infinite horizon at rate
p. Income maximisation is not crucial to the general implications of the model. However
its use leads to simpler derivations than if we were to assume the more realistic situation
of utility maximisation. The probability of receiving at least one job offer within a short
interval of length t is At + o(t), where o(t) is the probability of receiving more than one
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offer in the interval and o(t)/t -+ 0 as t -+ O.
On receiving a wage offer w, an individual has to decide whether to accept that offer
and earn w forever, or reject the offer and search for a better offer next period. Once
rejected an offer cannot be recalled. Under the assumption we have made a recall option
would never be exercised, as with a constant reservation wage, an offer, which is unaccept-
able now will be unacceptable at any time in the future. What is important is that the
value of occupying a job forever is an increasing function of the wage rate, w. Successive
job offers which arrive during a period of unemployment are independent realisations from
a known wage offer distribution with finite mean and variance, cumulative distribution
function F(w) and density f(w). Each individual faces a wage offer distribution, which
reflects his or her status in the labour market. Knowledge of this distribution allows them
to follow an optimal search strategy.
While searching the individual may receive non-labour income in the form of a benefit
level, b. Let Vu denote the value of searching during the next period, i.e the present value
of future net income given that the optimal strategy will be pursued in the future and Vw
the present value of stopping, accepting the offer and working forever at that wage."
Since a person's net income flow during a spell of unemployment is constant, job offers
are independent and identically distributed and assuming stationarity for both F(w) and
.A, it follows that Vu will be constant over the entire spell. We can characterise the problem.
1.At 1
Vu= 1 bt + Ew[max{Vu, Vw}] + (1 - At) 1 t Vu+ o(t} (2.1)+pt l+pt +p
4It is straightforward to allow for job loss, with probability say, s, in a given period in this model.
However the inclusion of job loss in this fashion does not alter the basic results presented below. A fixed
date retirement may also be included, but as the length of a working life is long and the persons within
our dataset young, the practical implications of this change are negligible. (see Lynch (1983)).
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The first term on the right side of the equation translates as the discounted present value
of net income whilst unemployed over the short time interval t. The second represents the
probability of receiving an offer in the interval t multiplied by the discounted expected
value of following the optimal policy if a job offer of w is received, where Vw denotes the
present value of accepting the offer. The third term is the probability of no offer in the
time interval t multiplied by the discounted value of optimal job search ever after. The
final term signifies the returns to job search when more than one wage offer is received.
o(t) is the probability of receiving more than one offer and K is the value of the optimal
job search policy given that more than one offer is obtained. Assuming the Poisson arrival
rate, then o(t)/t -+ 0 as t -+ O. Vw is therefore the present value of expected lifetime
income at wage rate w. This is characterised by the equation
w
Vw=-.p (2.2)
Given that Vw is continuous and strictly increasing with wand Vu does not depend on w,
it follows that the optimal strategy is a stationary reservation wage policy. The individual
accepts the offer if w ~ ~, where the reservation wage ~ is a minimum acceptable wage
offer as defined by equating the expected present value of employment and the expected
present value of continued optimal search. Therefore
(2.3)
Ifwe substitute equations (2.2) and (2.3) for Vw and Vu in equation (2.1) we get
~= 11 bt+ At Ew[max{w,~}l + (~-At)~+u(t).
p +pt l+pt pp +ptp
(2.4)
For an individual faced with the above problem the optimal strategy is to choose a reser-
vation wage ~, such that the individual will accept the first wage offer greater than or
equal to~. When rearranging terms and taking limits, equation (2.4) translates to
Alex>~=b+- (w-~)dF(w).
p e
(2.5)
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The rate at which individuals accept job offers and exit is equal to the hazard
h = 'x[1 - F(e)]. (2.6)
From equation (2.6) we see that the probability of exiting unemployment depends on
the rate at which job offers arrive and the probability that an individual will accept an
offer, which in turn is a function of the reservation wc;tge. It can be shown that under
certain regularity conditions: a reduction in b, a reduction in e or an increase in ,x will all
lead to an increase in the probability of exiting from unemployment; see Van Den Berg
(1994).
2.3 Derivation of Job Search Elasticities
Lancaster and Chesher (1983) have shown that by differentiating both the reservation
wage given by (2.5) and the hazard function given in (2.6) with respect to b and ,x one
can obtain estimates of the responsiveness of the reservation wages and re-employment
probability to changes in the offer arrival rate and the level of unemployment benefits.
The advantage of this approach is that by combining the restrictions implied by the
optimal job search model with information on reservation wages and expected wages we
can deduce many of the structural parameters of the model without specifying the nature
of the unknown wage offer distribution. The procedure also facilitates a comparison of
the magnitudes of the estimates obtained in this fashion, with those obtained using more
standard parametric procedures.
Using the restrictions embodied in reservation wage equation (2.5), Lancaster and
Chesher (1983) show that the elasticities of the reservation wage with respect to the
benefit level and the arrival rate of offers can be written as
dlogE b (x - E)
d log b = ~ (x - b) (2.7)
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and
dloge
dlog,x
(e - b) (x - e)
e (x - b) (2.8)
where b, ,x and e are as defined above and z is the expected wage given that this wage is
accepted, that is
z = E[wlw ~ eJ.
Using these equations and information on b, x and e we can determine the extent to which
the reservation wage is affected by changes in the benefit level and the offer arrival rate. In
order to determine the impact of these variables on the hazard rate h (the probability of
leaving unemployment given that a job has not yet been found) we need to specify a form
for the wage offer distribution. Lancaster and Chesher adopt the Pareto Distribution,
with density
I
awOl
__ 0, w> Wo
f(w) = wO!H -
0, otherwise
(2.9)
where Wo and a are the lower bound and scale parameter of the distribution, respectively.
The Pareto distribution is characterised by a long tail. If a > 1, the expected value of a
wage offer, w is awo/(a - 1) if a > 2 the variance is aw3j{(a - 1)2(a - 2)}. Although
this distribution is often used in analyses of this kind, economic theory does not present
a compelling argument for its use. As such the choice of this wage offer distribution is a
potential source of lack of fit or misinterpretation of results. Having made this assumption
the elasticities can be written as
dlogh b x
dlogb = -~ (x - b) (2.10)
and
dlogh
dlog,X
dlog~
dlogb
(2.11)
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To examine the robustness of our estimates to the Pareto assumption we also estimate
these last two elasticities assuming that the wage offer distribution has an exponential
rather than Pareto distribution. Under the exponential assumption it can be shown that:
dlogh
dlogb
b (2.12)
(x - b)
and
dlogh (x - ~)
d log A - (x - br (2.13)
Given information on the individual's level of b, ~ and z we can calculate the above
elasticities for each individual using that individual's value of b, ~ and x. The results we
report represent the mean values of these elasticities across individuals.P
2.4 Matching: A Solution to the Government Train-
ing Scheme Evaluation Problem
Having outlined the theory behind the derivation of the job search elasticities we hope
aim to produce estimates of these indicators for the datasets used throughout this work.
Early work focuses on the YTS treatment effect for scheme participants. We suggest that
those who experienced YTS were subject to a process of self-selection and as such our
measurements of the effect of treatment on such individuals and their job search methods
will be biased. Having acknowledged the existence of an effect, we will make use of
several matching procedures to correct for such bias. This section outlines the nature of
experimental datasets and details how matching can allow us to employ non-experimental
datasets when asking experimental questions.
5We have also computed these elasticities by taking the mean values of b, ~ and x, for the sample
first and then applying the formula. This is the method used by Lancaster and Chesher (1983). The
qualitative results are not sensitive to this method of calculation.
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The evaluation of Government Training Schemes is a problem of missing data. The
attempts we make to isolate the mean treatment effect of YTS participation are com-
plicated by the simple fact that persons can exist in either one of two "scheme states"
(Participating or Non-participating) but not both at the same time. This would not be
such a problem if those who had not experienced YTS were a suitable control for YTS par-
ticipants. However one must consider that self-selection into government training schemes
will exist and as a result non-participants will form a biased control group. The following
argument helps to explain the nature of our predicament.
When we compare the outcome of people with YTS experience against the outcome
for those without our conclusions will be biased by the inherent differences between those
who need to spend time on such schemes and those who don't. It seems reasonable to
expect that on average, persons in the non-treatment group would possess different per-
sonal and labour market characteristics compared to YTS participants. These enhanced
characteristics may have an effect on the outcome of treatment. If this were the case then
it would not be sensible to compare people with YTS experience to such a group as we
may erroneously be attributing the estimated differences to a treatment effect when in
fact it is merely due to the different types of people who undertake YTS and not.
In a well designed experiment we would expect the non-treatment group (or control
group) differed only from the treatment group in the sense that they lacked treatment.
One way to approximate such an experiment is to use a matching algorithm. The purpose
of the matching algorithms described below are to produce a synthetic control group of
individuals who have not experienced training but who are similar to the YTS participants.
Ideally we would like to generate a control group who possess identical values for a given set
of their labour market characteristics to be used as dependent variables when measuring
the YTS treatment effect as experienced by those of the YTS treatment group. As we
will demonstrate, the assumptions, which underpin the methods of matching which we
describe, allow us to analyse our non-experimental data set in such a way that it identifies
the same parameters as an experimental analysis.
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2.4.1 Modelling Outcomes
A formalisation of the problem helps us to understand its nature and at the same time the
way in which matching allows us to overcome it. We begin by introducing the notation
of Heckman et al. (1997). Let
D={ 1 if a person participated in YTS,o otherwise,
and
{
Yl denotes the outcome for participants,
Y=
Yo denotes the outcome for non-participants.
Also, X denotes the other characteristics which we use as conditioning variables, and
P(X) = Pr(D = 1IX). Using this notation we can define the outcome for any given
individual as the sum of the observed outcomes, Yi. and Yo such that
Y = DY1 + (1- D)Yo. (2.14)
Outcomes are then a function of observables, X and unobservables, (UI, Uo):
Y1= 91(X) + Ut
Yo = 90(X) +Uo (2.15)
where E(Ud = E(Uo) = O. We assume that 91 and 90 are non-stochastic functions. The
evaluation of the treatment effect can concentrate on the construction of many features
of the missing data. In other words, Y1 and Yo can take many forms. However the main
parameter, which researchers often seek to identify from non-experimental data, is "The
Mean Impact of Treatment on the Treated" .
This gain from participating in the program is defined conditional on the set of personal
and labour market characteristics X as
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E(Yi - YoIX, D = 1)
= E(6IX, D = 1)
= gl(X) - gO(X) + E(U1 - UoIX, D = 1) (2.16)
where ~ = Yi - Yo. Using the matching methods described below we can estimate an
averaged version of (2.16) over a subset of the support of X, Sx, using:
Is E(6IX,D = l)fx(XID = l)dX
.:lD~l = Sx (fx(XID = l)dX
i:
(2.17)
where /x(XID = 1) is the density of X.
If we could simultaneously observe Y1 and Yo for the same person, there would be
no evaluation problem and the need for matching would be removed, since one could
construct 6D=1 for everyone. This parameter may be interpreted as the gross gain from
treatment experienced by participants.
2.4.2 Randomisation as a Solution to the Evaluation Problem
A randomised experiment with random attrition from the YTS program would allow us
to recover the conditional distributions of Yo and YI, Fo(YoID = 1,X) and FI(ydD =
1,X) respectively, by randomising at the point of enrolment so that some of those who
would normally have been accepted for the scheme would be refused a placement. Our
evaluation problem is the result of the non-experimental nature of our yeS data set.
Such a randomised experiment would append our data with the necessary information to
construct the missing counterfactual, E(YID = 1,X) and thereby calculate (2.17).
If, having applied and been accepted for a position on the YTS scheme, partici-
pants had then been randomly refused entry, then randomisation would exist on the
sub-population for whom D = 1. Let us define a new variable R such that
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{
I if a person from the D = 1 population is randomised into YTS,
R=
o otherwise.
It is not assumed that E(UlIX) = 0 or E(Uo IX) = 0, therefore X is not required
to be exogenous. In the presence of a randomisation and using the notation of previous
sections observed outcomes, Y as defined in equation (2.14) is now
Y = D[RYi + (1 - R)Yo] + (1 - D)Yo (2.18)
and as a result
E(YID = 1,R = 1,X) = E(Yi ID = 1,X) = gl (X) + E(UlID = 1,X) (2.19)
E(YID = 1,R = 0,X) = E(YoID = 1,X) = go(X) + E(UoID = 1,X). (2.20)
It is from equation (2.19) that we are able to estimate the outcomes for YTS partici-
pants. Equation (2.20) allows us to obtain the counterfactuals for these outcomes. Ifwe
then subtract equation (2.19) from (2.20) we arrive at
E(YID = I,R = I,X) - E(YID = I,R = OX)
= gl (X) - go(X) + E(Ul - UolD = 1,X)
= E(~ID = I,X). (2.21)
If the yeS data set was the result of such a randomised experiment then we would be
able to estimate the treatment effect via the above. In general E(Ut, UolD = 1,X) i- O.
As we will show the methods of matching which we have used assume that given X
E(YoID = I,X) = E(YoID = O,X). (2.22)
In essence we are assuming that there exists no group of variables Z which D depends on
and which are not independent ofYIX. A randomised experiment would remove the need
for this assumption when attempting to calculate the treatment effect for participants.
However the absence of randomisation means that the distributions of the X variables
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for participants and non-participants may well be different. Whenever the support of the
distribution of X conditional on YTS participation is different to that for X conditional
on non-participation equation (2.22) will not hold and so we cannot retrieve information
regarding the outcome Y. Since estimation of ~D=l (gross treatment effect on the treated)
requires that the support of XID = 1 is equal to that of XID = 0 it is often necessary to
examine the effect of treatment on a single variable of interest.
2.4.3 The Underlying Assumptions of Traditional Methods of
Matching
As we have already touched upon, there exist several key assumptions which underpin the
methods of matching we have employed. If these assumptions hold then it is possible to
use matching to generate counterfactual estimates from which we may derive ~D=l even
if the data is generated in a non-random setting.
Firstly we assume that having conditioned on X, the outcomes (Yi, Yo) are orthogonal
to D, that is
(Yl! Yo) j_ DIX. (2.23)
As long as this assumption holds we may infer that
F(YoIX, D = 1) = F(YoIX, D = 0), (2.24)
which may be interpreted to mean that, conditional on X, persons who do not participate
in the scheme (D = 0) attain outcomes (Yo) with the same distribution as the outcomes
which those who participated (D = 1) would have received if they themselves were non-
participants. Since we are already able to measure the outcome, Yl for participants it
follows from equation (2.14) that
E(YoIX, D = 1) = E(YoIX, D = 0). (2.25)
Secondly we assume that
0< Pr(D = 11X) < 1 V X (2.26)
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Figure 2.1: Relationship Between P(X), the choice of D and the Outcome Y.
so that (2.16) can be defined for all X.
If these assumptions hold, non-experimental data sets such as our yeS data can iden-
tify the same parameters as an experimental data set with randomised scheme exclusions.
In fact, for estimation of (2.16) it is enough to assume
Y..lDIX. (2.27)
Assumptions (2.23) and (2.26) which Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) refer to as "strong
ignorability" are all that is required to allow us to match on X. However, in reality X may
consist of many variables which would lead to problems of dimensionality in large data
sets. Fortunately Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) demonstrate that assumptions (2.23) and
(2.26) together imply
(YI, Yo) ..l DIP(X) (2.28)
and hence
Yo..l DIP(X) (2.29)
where P(X) = Pr(D = 11X) and is a propensity scor 6 for scheme participation. Fig-
ure (2.1) illustrates the nature of the relationship b tw n P(X), a per on' choic of D
and the outcomes Y. Simply put, if we have two persons with th sam P(X), on with
6See section 2.6 for a description of propensity scores.
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treatment and one without, then the diagram suggests that the outcome Yo for the non-
participant is the counterfactual for the outcome Yi for the treatment person and that the
fact that their choices of D differ has no effect on this relationship. Thus matching may
be performed on P{X) alone and the problem of highly dimensional X is replaced by a
one-dimensional solution. Under conditions (2.28) and (2.29), we can use the estimate
nl
~D=l = nIl L Yli{Xi) - E{YOiIP(Xi), Di = 0)
i=I:D;=1
(2.30)
where ni are the number of participants with X values that satisfy assumption (2.26).
2.5 Estimating Elasticities using Matched Samples
Having examined the underlying theory and the reasons behind the use of matching to
correct for the non-experimental nature of many datasets we now present three algorithms,
which can be used to perform such procedures.
2.5.1 The Nearest Neighbour Matching Protocol
We begin by introducing the simplest and most intuitive method, which is often referred
to as nearest neighbour matching. The method of matching, known as Mahalanobis
matching with propensity score callipers, is broadly similar to that described in Lechner
(1999), and an advance on simple propensity score nearest neighbour matching, an early
example of which is used by Cochran and Rubin (1973). An individual from that section
of the population who did not participate in YTS, which we denote as the control group,
is deemed to be similar to a given treatment person if their covariate structure is near to
that of the treated individual.
Although our version of the nearest neighbour algorithm mirrors that of Lechner (1999)
we choose to present it using the notation of Heckman et al. (1997). This ensures a consis-
tency of argument when taken together with the theory from proceeding sections. Hence,
we denote labour market variable responses for treatment or non-treatment (controls) as
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Yii and Y()i respectively. Variables which remain unaffected by treatment we label Xi and
D, is defined to be an indicator of YTS participation, taking value D, = 1 if individual
i receives treatment and Di = 0 otherwise. The difficulty in estimating the treatment
effect is highlighted by this notation. If an individual, i, receives treatment then we can
observe Y1i, however it is then impossible to observe YOi• If we make certain assumptions
then it may become possible to determine the average causal effect of treatment, D..D=l,
as
D..D=l = E(YI - YoID = 1)
= E(YIID = 1) - E(YoID = 1), (2.31)
where E(·ID = 1) is equal to the population mean for all those who participated in
YTS. To determine th~ causal effects of treatment Lechner (1999) introduces the Stable
Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA). SUTVA must be satisfied for the whole
population. The main implication of which is that values of Y1i and Yoido not depend on
the treatment of individuals other than i.
We are unable to identify D..D=l due to the unobservability of the second term in (2.31),
E(YoID = 1). If the assignment into YTS participation was random, then outcomes would
be independent of assignment, in which case E(YiID = 1) would equal E(YoID = 0) and
non-participating individuals could form a control group. However analysis of the data
suggests that it is unreasonable to assume that assignment is independent of final outcome.
As we showed in subsection 2.4.3, the work of Rubin (1977) and Rosenbaum and Rubin
(1983) suggests a weaker condition known as the Conditional Independence Assumption
(CIA), which they call "random assignment conditional on a covariate". They assume
that assignment is independent of potential training outcomes conditional on a covariate,
that is
Yo j_ DIX = x. (2.32)
Equation (2.32) is assumed to be valid in all the support of x. Under CIA, E(YoID =
1, X = x) = E(YoID = 0, X = x). The probability of participation in YTS conditional
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on z [P(D = llX = x)] is called the propensity score which we denote P(x). Given that
o < P(x) < 1 holds, then E(YIID = 1) = E[E(YoID = 0, X = x)ID = 1]can be estimated
for large samples. If equation (2.32) holds, then Yo is also independent of D conditional
on P(X) = P(x) and so
E[YoID = 1,P(X) = P(x)] = E[(YoID = 0, P(X) = P(x)]. (2.33)
Hence estimation is possible using
E(YoID = 1) = E{E[YoID = 0, P(X) = P(x)]ID = I}. (2.34)
Thus the dimension of the estimation has been greatly reduced, however the price to
pay for this simplification is the need to estimate the assignment probability for each
individual using a probit model.
To begin with we select variables, which are to be used to gauge similarity. These
variables, defined as V, are the independent variables in a probit model estimation for
YTS participation. So that we might examine the differing effects of YTS on both men
and women the data set is split before matching to prevent persons being matched to
individuals of the opposite sex. This leads to a need to run the matching procedure twice.
We then compute v/3 and its conditional variance var(V,BIV = v) for each observation in
the dataset. Persons are split into a treatment vector (people with YTS experience) and
a control vector. The order of individuals within these two vectors is then randomised.
The first person in the randomised T vector is selected. A calliper is constructed (see
Appendix C.I, Matching Algorithm) so that it forms a 90% confidence interval around
the propensity score, vnt/3 of this individual. Members of the C vector who lie within
this caliper are denoted j. If j ~ 1 then we select the observation j which minimises the
distance
(2.35)
If j = 0 then it is necessary to calculate the distance for all members of the C vector and
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match to the one with the minimum ,(j). The matched individual is then removed from
the C vector and the matching process is repeated for the next individual in the T vector.
This is repeated until all individuals from the treatment vector T, are matched with a
control from the C vector. The algorithm can be adjusted so that matched controls are
not excluded from the dataset and as a result may appear more than once in the matched
dataset. This may lead to an over dependence on a few controls. Hence we choose to
employ a method with matched control exclusions.
2.5.2 The Kernel Regression Matching Estimator
Unlike the "nearest neighbour" matching protocol described in subsection 2.5.1, kernel
regression matching uses the whole comparison sample. A kernel regression estimator
assigns each member of the control group a weight so that the control observations closer
in terms of distance between propensity score, IP(Xli) - P(Xoj)l, to a treatment person
receive greater weight. These weighted people are then fused together to form a synthetic
control person.
Let W (i, j) be the weight placed on observation j in forming a mean synthetic com-
parison individual for treatment observation iwith
NoL W(i,j) = 1 and 0 s W(i,j) s 1
j=1
(2.36)
where No is the total number of control group individuals. Then the weighted mean
synthetic comparison individual for treatment person i is
No
YOi =LW(i,j)YOj'
j=1
(2.37)
Using this equation we can obtain "synthetic" control responses for each person in the
treatment group using the propensity scores. This can be done for all variables required
for analysis. During this work we refer to collections of synthesised variables generated
to match those of a treatment person as a "Synthetic Control Person". Repetition of this
process for the whole of the treatment group produces a "Synthetic Control Group". The
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weights are calculated using a kernel method as
(2.38)
where K is a kernel and b« is the bandwidth (smoothing parameter). A commonly used
kernel function is the biweight kernel of the form presented in equation (2.39)
(
165 (X2 - 1)2 if [z] < 1
K(x) = 1
o otherwise.
(2.39)
This function weights and combines all persons in the control group differently for each
person in the treatment group with a unique P(Xi)' The impact of treatment is then
estimated by way of the mean difference across all treated individuals as
1 NI ( _) 1 NI ( No ., )
m = Nl tt Yli - YOt = Nl tt Yli - f;W(z,))Yoj . (2.40)
2.5.3 Local Linear Regression Matching Estimator
Here we present a method of matching which is similar in nature to that of kernel match-
ing. The weights, which the local linear method assigns to non-participants, are again a
reflection of their similarity to the participant of interest and take the form
where
and K(.) is the biweight kernel function as defined in equation (2.39). Heckman et al.
(1997) recommend the weights that the above function delivers over those produced by
the kernel regression method due to their high rate of convergence at boundary points. In
fact, the order of the bias of local linear regression weights is the same at the boundary
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points as elsewhere. The ability to adapt to differing design densities is also a strong
feature of this estimator since its bias does not depend on the density of P(X). As with
the kernel regression matching estimator, the weights from equation (2.41) are used to
calculate the treatment effect via equation (2.40).
2.6 Calculation of the Propensity Score
An individual's propensity score is simply the probability of them having a certain char-
acteristic or doing a certain activity, given their personal set of characteristics and that
they have been exposed to a particular series of external factors. Since they are in fact
predicted probabilities, all propensity scores lie between 0 and 1.
All three of the matching methods, which we have outlined during this chapter, require
us to have already calculated a series of propensity scores for YTS participation. When
using these propensity scores we will rely on the result of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983),
section 2.4.3, where we showed how, through a series of assumptions, they arrived at result
2.29, which implied that a propensity score constructed from a model containing a series
of relevant variables could be matched upon and that problems of highly dimensional X
were then replaced by a one dimensional solution.
We can estimate propensity scores for a group of individuals using one of a number
of models. Heckman et al. (1997) choose the conditioning variables in X such that
the logit model they employed to estimate each individuals propensity to participate in
YTS produces the highest number of correct participating state predictions. We elected
to make use of probit models for the construction of our YTS participation propensity
scores. A probit model is defined to be
P(Di =1= 0) = F(X B) (2.42)
where F(.) is the cumulative distribution function, and X B is the probit score. Those
wishing to interpret the coefficients from the model should bear in mind that since X B
has a Normal distribution, each unit increase in a dependent variable with a coefficient
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of, say 0.8, implies an increase in the probit score of 0.8 standard deviations. However,
interpretation of the results of our probit model is not the main focus of this work. The
scores, which we obtain, are needed for use in the matching procedures we have described.
With the scores defined to be P(Yi =1= 0) we are generating probabilities for persons having
the outcome Yi = 1, which in this case is the probability that they took part in YTS.
Probit models are employed when the dependent variable that you wish to run a
regression for takes binary discrete values. Our dependent variable took the value 1 if a
person indicated that they had undertaken a period of YTS training and 0 otherwise. The
results of our propensity score estimations by gender using these models are presented in
Table C.4. A wide variety of labour market characteristics, personal (education level etc.)
and locational (regional and cohort dummies) were included in the model. See Table 2.1
for a description and summary statistics of the variables used. Notice that the female
sample consists of around 700 more individuals than the male sample. This is consistent
with the higher response rate amongst females for the whole of the YCS dataset. See
Table 2.2 for an outline of the YCS cohort design structure as well as response rates per
sweep for each cohort.
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2.7 Stochastic Dominance
Imagine that we have generated a set of propensity scores for YTS participation. We can
separate the persons for whom these scores were predicted into two groups, treatment and
control. All those in the treatment group experienced YTS; all those in the control group
did not. When attempting to match on these scores we will be assuming that there are
sufficient high propensity control persons to match to those who received treatment. All
this despite prior knowledge suggesting that those from the treatment group would, on
average, have higher propensities. Hence we shall need a control group sufficiently large
in number to offset this lack of high propensity controls. This poses the problem, how do
we know if our control group is large enough to supply us with the persons we need?
We begin by introducing the notion of stochastic dominance and explain what we mean
when we say that one distribution dominates another. Next we investigate whether, by
only observing the properties of the cumulative distribution functions of the treatment
and control propensity score distributions, we can say if F(P(X1)) dominates C(P(Xo))
or not? The concepts of first and second order stochastic dominance can help us to form
a conclusion as to whether our dataset will produce good matches. We conclude this
section with an explanation of how to achieve this goal.
2.7.1 First Order Stochastic Dominance
If for any propensity score there is more chance of there being a person with that score
from population F than population C, then we can say that, on the whole, F dominates
C.
If a propensity score distribution has a lot of probability mass skewed towards higher
propensities then it is more likely to contain high propensity persons than a distribution
which has a lot of probability mass skewed towards low propensities. If this is the case,
then we have what is called "first order stochastic dominance". This is defined as follows.
Definition 2.1 First Order Stochastic Dominance: F is said to dominate G on [a, b]
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according to first order stochastic dominance if and only if F(p) :::;G(p) for all pE [a, b].
This is denoted F 2:vl G.
Figure 2.2 demonstrates this more clearly. When comparing the cumulative distribu-
tion function H with either F or G. Specifically, note that for any pE [a, b], F(p) :::;H(p)
and G(p) :::;H(p) as H lies uniformly above F or G. Considering any p E [a, b]' then we
see immediately that there is more "area" under the curve between a and p than there is
under the F or G curve between a and p. Thus, there is a greater probability mass under
H(p) than F(p) or G(p) for any p E [a, b], i.e. the probability that any t is less than p
under H is greater than the probability that any t is less than p under F or G. Thus
both F and G dominate H.
However, note that this criterion fails when comparing the cumulative distribution
functions F and G with each other. Obviously, neither F nor G are uniformly above each
other thus it neither F dominates G nor G dominates F. In particular, note that below
F(x) 14-__ F_>_D_G_>_D_H__ ...... I- __G_>_D_F_>_D_H__ ...
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Figure 2.2: First and Second Order Stochastic Dominance
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point v, F(p) ::; G(p), whereas above point v, F(p) ~ G(p), or [1- G(p)] ::; [1- F(p)]. As
we cannot compare F and G according to the first order stochastic dominance criterion,
then ~Dl is only a partial ordering on the space of cumulative distribution functions.
The purpose of the first order stochastic dominance is to enable us to order (if only
partially) distributions according to the degree to which the distribution is skewed towards
the right and high propensities: in other words, F ~Dl H implies that F is unambiguously
likely to contain more high propensity persons as a percentage of its total, than H because
it deposits the bulk of its probability mass amongst higher propensities, and thus will have
a higher expected mean propensity. But, as we see in Figure 2.2, we cannot compare F
and G by this criterion. If v is the mean, then F and G have the same expected mean
propensity. However, in Figure 2.2, it also seems as if the probability mass of F is "less
dispersed" than G. An alternative criterion, then, would be to argue that a particular
distribution contains more high propensity persons than another as a percentage of its
total if it has an unambiguously higher expected mean propensity. This is the purpose of
the second order stochastic dominance criterion.
2.7.2 Second Order Stochastic Dominance
Second order stochastic dominance helps us rank distributions in terms of the spread
of the probability mass of the cumulative density functions. Let us define A as the area
between the two curves F and G in [a, b], specifically A = J:[G(t) - F(t)]dt. In Figure 2.2,
we can notice that everywhere below v, G is above F, thus the area in between the curves
below v is Al = J:[G(t) - F(t)]dt > O. However, above v, G is below F, thus (negative
of) the area between the curves above v is J:[G(t) - F(t)]dt < O. But notice that A
is cumulative, Le. A = J:[G(t) - F(t)]dt + J:[G(t) - F(t)]dt for all p E [a, b], thus we
add up the areas where G is above F and subtract from it the areas where G is below F
(note: we can allow G and F to rise above and dip below each other several times over
the range). Thus, in Figure 2.2, A(w) = JaW[G(t)- F(t)]dt is the sum of the areas Al and
A2 where, Al > 0 and A2 < O.
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If A 2:: 0 for all a, b p is undefined here., then the cumulative area where G is above F
is greater than the area where F is above G, Le. the probability mass of G is more spread
out than the probability mass of F, which with reference to Figure 2.2, implies that Gis
dominated by F. Conversely, if A ~ 0 for all pE [a, b], then the mass of F is more spread
out than G. We want to "rank" distributions F and G according to whether A is positive
or negative over the entire range. Thus, we now define the following:
Definition 2.2 Second Order Stochastic Dominance: F dominates G according to second
order stochastic dominance, or F 2::D2 G, if A = J:[G(t) - F(t)]dt ~ 0 for all pE [a, b].
Notice in Figure 2.2 that it is quite probable that F ~D2 G by this criterion, thus
F dominates G according to second order stochastic dominance. Notice also that if A
compares H with F or G, then it is indeed true that F ~D2 Hand G 2::D2 H. Thus, first
order stochastic dominance implies second order stochastic dominance, but not vice-versa.
2.7.3 Judging whether a Dataset will produce Good Matches
Ideally we want to develop a set of rules for good matching practice. A dataset whose
properties are deemed to adhere to these rules would then be judged to be suitable for
matching to occur. The method we propose is more ad hoc than constituting a universal
solution. Knowledge of the nature of the dataset which we are interested in is the basis
from which we develop a test. Hence, although our method may be adapted to test for
suitability amongst other datasets an understanding of the difference in propensity score
distributions between treatment and controls must be obtained before considering the use
of the concept of stochastic dominance.
Prior understanding of the nature of YTS participation leads us to expect that those
who undertake a period ofYTS training will produce a propensity score distribution which
is skewed to the right whilst those from the non YTS grouping will have lower average
YTS propensities. Hence, it is at the right side of the distribution that we are likely to
find too few controls. We are searching for fragments along the propensity score range
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(0 ~ P(x) ~ 1) for which, given that both treatment and control groups contain the same
number of individuals, the control group would have insufficient numbers to match to
those from the treatment group. Formally we test for second order stochastic dominance
of the control group propensity scores verses the treatment group scores. If the control
group does not stochastically dominate the treatment group then we may conclude that
the treatment group has more high propensity persons as a percentage of it's total, leading
to the need for us to sample a larger number of controls to offset the shortfall.
A plot of both the treatment and control group CDFs allows us to visually identify
areas of concern. Any section of the treatment curve with a gradient in excess of that
corresponding section of the control group will, in samples of equal size lack support for
high quality matching. As already observed, it is the high propensity end of the dataset,
with which we are likely to uncover a lack of support.
When attempting to identify whether data will produce a well matched dataset there
are three criteria which must be met. Ifwe can prove that a pair of treatment and control
propensity score distributions meet all three, then we can say that there are enough control
group people whose propensity to participate in YTS is sufficiently similar to those from
the treatment group over the full range of propensity scores (0 ~ P(x) ~ 1) to produce a
well matched dataset.
1. Maximum and Minimum Values of the Propensity Score Distributions.
The control group propensity score distribution must sit to the left and right of
the treatment group propensity score distribution. It is possible that the control
group propensity score distribution can stochastically dominate the treatment group
propensity score distribution whilst still producing a series of poor (perhaps very
poor) matches. Figure 2.3 presents an example of a pair of propensity distributions
which would fail to produce good matches. If we imagine that F(P(x)) repre-
sents the treatment group propensity score distribution and G(P(x)), the control
group propensity score distribution, then we see that the control group distribution
stochastically dominates the treatment distribution. Hence, the control group has
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Figure 2.3: Maximum and Minimum Values of the Propensity Score Distributions
a large number of high propensity individuals. However, in this case there are in-
sufficient low propensity persons to match with the treatment group. To counteract
this we begin by ensuring that the propensity score distributions obey the following
rule
min(Pli(x), POi(X)) = min(Poi(x))
max(P1i(X), POi{X)) = max{POi(X))
(2.43)
(2.44)
where Pli is a sample point from the treatment group and POi is a sample point
from the control group.
2. Establish the Nature of Dominance. The above ensures that the control group
distribution spans the range of the treatment group distribution. We still need to
uncover the relationship between the treatment and control group propensity score
distributions. If the treatment group propensity distribution is found to 1st order
stochastically dominate that of the control group (our prior belief), then we can say
that if no = nl the treatment group contains more high propensity individuals as a
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percentage of its total than the control group.
If after plotting the cumulative distributions of the treatment and control groups we
discover that, over the full range of P(x), neither distribution 1st order stochastically
dominates the other, then we must consider second order stochastic dominance.
When investigating second order stochastic dominance relations the question of
whether one distribution dominates another depends on what range of the variable
you are considering. Returning to the pair of distributions, G and F, from Figure
2.2 then we can say that if v represents the halfway point in the range of P{x)
then F 1st order stochastically dominates G in the range a to v and that GIst
order stochastically dominates F in the range v to b. If we were to substitute the
control group propensity score distribution for distribution F and the corresponding
treatment group distribution for G, then we could say that for distributions of equal
size the control group would not contain sufficient numbers of individuals in the tails
of its propensity score distribution to match to those from the treatment group.
Since we are interested in discovering any fragments of the propensity score range
for which we lack sufficient control persons for matching it makes sense to consider
the distributions in fragments of infinitely small size. Hence we note the areas for
which the gradient of the. control group CDF is less than that of the treatment
group.
A full investigation of the nature of the dominance relations between the treatment
and control group distributions will facilitate an understanding of the ranges of
propensity scores for which the control group will lack sufficient numbers to perform
high quality matches when using groups of equal size. The YCS dataset contains
far more control than treatment individuals.
3. Account for the Relative Size of the Treatment and Control Groups. The
discovery of a range of propensity scores over which the treatment group stochas-
tically dominates the control group does not necessarily indicate that there will be
insufficient control persons to perform a full series of high quality matches. Instead
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it indicates that for treatment and control groups of equal size there will be insuf-
ficient high quality matches. Hence, we must also examine the ratio of treatment
and control group sample sizes. Since if No > NI, this may be sufficient to offset
the shortfall, in the control group.
To summarise, the definitions of first and second order stochastic dominance, combined
with the relative sizes of the treatment and control groups, enable us to predict whether
a dataset will produce a series of good matches when using a nearest neighbour matching
algorithm. If these concepts reveal a lack of high propensity controls, then we could
randomly exclude some persons from our treatment group. The number of exclusions
needed being a function of the degree to which the treatment group propensity score
distribution stochastically dominates that of the control group and the relative size of the
two sub-samples. We will return to this issue in Chapter 4. Cochran and Rubin (1973)
examine the degree of concordance of key variables between pre-match and post-match
datasets. This research does not contain a detailed examination of concordance. We
focus on YTS treatment effects and the sensitivity of matched datasets to the matching
procedure being used.
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Chapter 3
Investigating the YTS Treatment
Effect
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter we shall present some early results from our investigations into the rela-
tionship between YTS and the job search process for YCS school leavers. We calculate
the job search elasticities as derived by Lancaster and Chesher (1983) (see section 2.3)
for the men and women of the YCS dataset in an attempt to uncover the ways in which
a spell on YTS affected their job search strategies. The introduction of a series of impor-
tant considerations leads us to refine the model further and present alternate estimations.
The need to allow for self selection into YTS necessitates use of the nearest neighbour
matching algorithm for the first time.
3.2 Comparisons with Previous Studies
We begin by calculating elasticities of the structural search model as set out in Lancaster
and Chesher (1983) and described in section 2.2 for males and females in the YCS dataset.
For purposes of comparison various population elasticities estimated from previous studies
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that used this approach are included in one table. Our sample size of 4,115 young men,
compares favourably to those used in many previous studies (the sample sizes in Gorter
and Gorter (1993), Jones (1988), Lancaster and Chesher (1983), Main and Shelley (1988)
and Lynch (1983) were 213, 845, 639, 838 and 52 respectively). The relatively large sample
size should allow us to get quite precise estimates of the structural parameters. Comparing
our results for all young men and women in the final two columns of Table 3.11 with those
of the other studies we find that while our results are within the range of estimates from
the previous studies, there are some differences.
One reason for the relative difference between our estimate and that of the other studies
is that our data consists solely of young people. In contrast the sample in Dolton and
O'Neill (1995) consisted of workers who were unemployed at least 6 months, the Lancaster
and Chesher (1983) estimates refer to a sample from the stock of all unemployed workers.
As a result the reservation wage reported by the individuals in the other studies may
already be at the minimum level necessary to insure a positive payoff to work. To the
extent that the reservation wage may become more rigid in a downward direction the
longer the unemployment spell continues and the older the sample is, we might expect
changes in benefits to have more of an effect on reservation wages in our sample of young
people than in other studies.
Our estimate of the elasticity of the reservation wage with respect to the offer arrival
rate is 0.1776 for men and 0.1754 for women which again is higher than the estimates of
0.11, 0.15 and 0.14 reported by Lancaster and Chesher (1983), Lynch (1983) and Main
and Shelley (1988) respectively. This may be due to the responsiveness of young people to
an exogenous change in labour market circumstances. It is possible that older job seekers
and the longer term unemployed are less responsive to a changing offer arrival rate.
The third row shows the elasticity of re-employment with respect to unemployment
benefits under the Pareto assumption, while the fourth row reports the estimate under
the Exponential assumption. Our estimate of the elasticity for men is close to -0.41
IThroughout this work figures in parenthesis are standard errors
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Jlog; 0.11
Jlogb (0.002)
J]og; 0.11 0.09
J log). (- ) (-)
JJog h + -1.0 -0.91 -2.89 -0.4891
Jlogb (- ) (0.03) (-) (0.0043)
Jlogh ++ -0.96 -0.56 -0.3405
Jlogb (- ) (-) (-) (0.0061 )
JJogh ++ 0.24 0.21 0.2897
J Jog). (- ) (-) (0.004) (0.0030 (0.0028)
Sample Size 639 52 338 112 3520 4115 4770
+ Pareto Assumption, ++ Exponential Assumption
Table 3.1: Elasticities for Previous Studies
under the Pareto assumption and -0.33 under the exponential.f Th corresponding two
elasticities for women are -0.48 and -0.38 indicating that, with r gard to th hazard of
leaving the state of unemployment, women may w 11be more s nsitiv to a hang in the
b nefit level than men.
The fifth row of Table 3.1 reports the lasticity of r - mploym nt probability with
respect to changes in the offer arrival rat, und r th Expon ntial as umpti n.3 Th
20ur figure is substantially lower than the stimate of -2.89 obtain d in Gorter and G rt I' (1993).
However using parametric procedur s Gorter and Gort r (1993) ar unabl to find a signifi ant ffect of
eith r benefits or reservation wages on duration.
3In the Table we present the estimates reported by Lancast r and Ch sher (19 3) and by Lyn h
(1983) in their papers. However, these authors s em d to hav ov rlooked th fact that under th Par to
assumption these elasticities should be equal to the lasticity of th r s rvation wag with resp et to th
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results suggest an estimate around 0.27 for men and 0.28 for women. An alternative
interpretation of these figures can be obtained if one assumes the hazard function for a
given individual is constant over time. In this instance an individual's completed un-
employment duration has an exponential distribution, with mean 1/h. The elasticity of
mean unemployment duration with respect to the offer arrival rate is then the negative of
the estimates given in rows 1 and 5. Our results imply that a 10% fall in the mean time
between offers is associated with around a 1% to 3% reduction in the average length of
unemployment duration.
It is particularly interesting to consider the extent to which our results mirror those of
Lynch (1983). Her dataset was collected from a survey of young people living in Greater
London during March of 1979 who planned to leave school that summer at the minimum
legal age of sixteen. Individuals who remained in the labour force were swept every
six months after departure from school. Although the original sample consisted of 1922
individuals, the dropout rate was substantial. The results which we reproduce here were
calculated using the sweep of November 1980, by which time only about 70%of the original
sample remained in the labour force. Beyond the obvious similarities between the YCS
and Lynch's datasets, she also used responses to questions such as "What is the lowest
weekly wage you would accept before tax and other deductions?" to represent reservation
wages, "How much do you expect to earn before tax and other deductions?"for expected
wages and "How do you manage for money while you are out of work and how much
does that amount to each week?" as a measure of benefits received; All of which mirror
the questions which were put to YCS respondents. It is a source of some encouragement
that her results are so similar to ours, in both sign and magnitude for all five elasticities
of interest. Perhaps the differences between our results and those of Lynch (1983) when
compared to those of Lancaster and Chesher (1983), Main and Shelley (1988) and Gorter
and Gorter (1993) are in fact a reflection of the nature of the datasets employed.
All of these studies, whose authors based their calculations on the measurement of
benefit level.
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reservation and expected wages as responses to questions at interview, present vid ne
which broadly supports the existence of a number of relationships which the job search
model of section 2.2 predicts. Results suggest that higher benefit levels I ad to higher
reservation wages, whilst higher job offer arrival rates lead to an upward pressure on
reservation wages. At the same time the hazard of exiting from unemployment into work
falls when benefit levels rise.
3.3 Search Model Elasticities
0.18646
(0.00176)
alogh +
alogb
logh ++
alogb
Table 3.2: Job Search Elasti ities and Wag for M n and Worn n
Examination of the different government training sch m s whi h xi t d v r th
1984-94 period reveals important differences with resp et to th ir durati n, training n-
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tent and how they were perceived by employers. In addition the various incarnations of
the scheme operated against different background unemployment rates and training al-
lowances. These background factors are graphed in Figures C.5 and C.6. Without losing
sight of the historical economic environment, it is interesting to examine whether different
YTS schemes induce different job search behaviour and expectations on behalf of their
recipients. In Table 3.2 we estimate the elasticities for and by whether or not men and
women have ever been on YTS. This allows us to compare the parameters across sub-
groups. The first column of Table 3.2 reports the estimates for all men, while the next two
columns compare elasticities of those young men who have had a spell on youth training
with those who have not. The last three columns report the corresponding estimates for
young women.
If we assume that both reservation and expected wages are normally distributed then
the computation of elasticities for the different subgroups facilitates a direct statistical
test of the differences in the means between the comparison groups. A two sample t-test
with null hypothesis of Ho : J..Ll = J..L2 verses a two tailed alternative was performed, where
J..Ll and J..L2 were the mean values of a given elasticity or expected/reservation wage for
those with YTS experience and those without. Test results are presented in Table 3.2.
Throughout this work all emboldened elasticities are significantly different to the corre-
sponding elasticity of their alternate specification at the 10% level; those which are shaded
are significant at the 5% level.
The same statistical test is used to investigate differences in the means of the reser-
vation and expected wages between subsamples. The difference between the reservation
wages of men who had some experience of YTS and those who didn't was significantly
different from zero at the 5% level whilst the expected wage was significant at the 10%
level. Tests on the exit status mean values failed to reject the null hypothesises",
Tests on elasticities for the "YTS participation" subgroups led to some interesting
4Comparisons between the elasticities of those who exit from unemployment before the end of the
survey and those who don't prove inconclusive and are not reproduced here. None of the elasticity
couples between these two subgroups proved significantly different from each other.
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conclusions. Young men who spend time on YTS have reservation wage elasticities with
respect to both the benefit level and the arrival rate of job offers which are significantly
lower than for those with no YTS experience. Under both the Pareto and Exponen-
tial wage offer distributional assumptions we see that young men with YTS experience
have an unemployment leaving hazard elasticity with respect to the benefit level which
is significantly lower than for individuals without YTS training. The hazard elasticity
with respect to the arrival rate of job offers under the Exponential assumption is also
significantly less for male YTS participants.
These findings taken together suggest that those young people who are more employ-
able, have better qualifications and hence higher reservation wages, and those who have
been on YTS, have lower wage expectations. It would seem that the propensity to change
one's reservation wage following a benefit change or a change of the offer arrival rate is
affected by whether one has been on YTS.
Tests on the mean reservation and expected wages of the female participants in the
YCS Cohort survey indicated that differences for both wage types were significantly dif-
ferent from zero at the 5% level if the women had a spell on YTS5. Elasticity estimation
produced rather mixed results. The elasticity of the reservation wage with respect to
the job offer arrival rate was significantly different between women with a spell on YTS
and those without. The unemployment leaving hazard elasticity with respect to the ar-
rival rate of wage offers under the exponential wage offer distributional assumption was
significantly different with YTS participation.
When comparing the results for males and females in Table 3.2 one could conclude
that there is some evidence to suggest that for females, the experience of YTS lowers
reservation and expected wages but that experience of YTS has a more marked effect on
the sensitivity of the elasticities for men than for women.
5As with the male subsamples, mean values for the exit status subsamples were not significantly
different from one another.
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3.3.1 Heterogeneity of YTS Treatment Types
Up until now our examination of the YTS treatment effect has allowed for the difference
between the male and female experience of YTS. However there is another potential bias
in the data which casts a shadow over the validity of our conclusions thus far. In this
section we attempt to account for our second area of concern, that of heterogeneity of
YTS treatment types.
In Table 3.2 the grouping together of all YTS types obscures the differences between
these schemes. The literature points to the considerable differences existing between these
schemes, prompting us to consider the estimation of separate elasticities for different
training regimes. Table 3.3 contains elasticities for men and women by YTS scheme
type. Taking men and women separately we investigate the treatment effects participants
received from the three YTS schemes. We compare the shaded cells contain elasticities and
mean reservation/expected wages which are significantly different to the corresponding
elasticities and wages of Table 3.2, (YTS=O), at the 5% level.
The expected wages of men on YTS I and women on types YTS I and YTS II were
significantly different from their YTS=O mean values at the 5% level. The mean for men
with YT experience was significant at the 10% level. Reservation wages were significantly
different from their YTS=O equivalents at the 5% level for YTS II and YT men and
significant for YTS I and YTS II women at the 5% and 10% levels respectively.
The elasticity of reservation wages with respect to a change in the benefit level was
significantly different to that of men with no YTS experience for all versions of YTS and
for women who had spells on YT. The elasticity of the reservation wage with respect to
the arrival rate of wage offers was significantly different to the elasticities of YTS=O for
YTS I and YTS II for both sexes.
The elasticities of the unemployment exit hazard with respect to changes in the benefit
level were significantly different to those of YTS=O for both sexes for all but men with
YTS I experience under the exponential assumption and women with YT experience under
both assumptions. The elasticities of the hazard with respect to the wage offer arrival
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alog~
alogA.
alogh +
alogb
alogh ++
alogb
alogh ++
alogA
Table 3.3: Job Search Elasticities and Wages for Non-Match d Men and Women by
Training Type
rate was significantly different for men and women of all YTS experienc types xcept
women with a spell on YT.
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3.4 An Application of the Nearest Neighbour Algo-
rithm
It is at this point that we acknowledge that there may be a degree of self selection into
YTS, which could cause a bias in the results thus far presented. In an attempt to adjust
for this effect we apply the Nearest Neighbour matching algorithm to the dataset. For
a motivation and description of matching in general and Nearest Neighbour methods in
particular see section 2.4.
3.4.1 Heterogeneity of YTS Treatment Types in Matched Sam-
ples
Having obtained two full synthetic control groups for the male and female samples; each
containing a single matched individual for every member of the YTS treatment group
we re-estimated the elasticities for all men, all women, those with YTS experience and
those without. Table 3.4 contains the computed elasticities for the new matched sample
of males for both the YTS treatment and synthetic control groups. Base numbers differ to
those of Table 3.2 where persons could not be matched with sufficient quality to te smaller
treatment groups. In contrast to our non-matched male sample (see Table 3.2) there now
appears to be no significant difference between the expected and reservation wages of
those men in the YTS=O control group and those with YTS experience (YTS=1).
The effects of a YTS spell on the search elasticities of men seem to follow much of
the pattern we saw for the non-matched male sample. There are significant reductions
in the elasticities ..of ~, reservation wages, and h, the hazard, with respect to a change
in b, the benefit level, under both the Pareto and Exponential wage offer distributional
assumptions for men with YTS experience at the 5% level. The elasticity of h with respect
to A, the arrival rate of job offers under the Exponential assumption, is also significantly
lower for males with YTS experience, although only at the 10% level.
The last three columns of Table 3.4 present the estimated elasticities for the female
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ologb
olog 0.177601
ologA (0.002513)
ologh + -0.4131
ologb (0.0043)
logh ++ -0.32491
ologb (0.003739)
Table 3.4: Job Search Elasticities and Wages for Matched Men and Women
matched sample of the YTS treatment and control groups. As with the mean reported
expected and reservation wages of the last three columns of Table 3.2 ther is a significant
fall (at the 5% level) in values for those women with YTS experience.
The elasticities of ~ and h (under the Exponential assumption) with respect to a hang
in ). are significantly higher for the YTS exp rienced women than for women without YTS
experience. This is also true for the elasticity of the reservation wag with r sp ct to a
rise in the benefit level.
As with our analysis of Table 3.2 the effects of YTS participation whi h w may inf r
are coloured by the inherent difference betwe n those with YTS xp ri nce and tho
without. As before it is likely that this difference will act to inflate the p rceiv d ff ts
of a spell on YTS. Therefore Tables 3.5 and 3.6 present these elasticiti s r al ulat d
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using the male and female matched datasets of Table 3.4 respectively.
alog~
alogb
alog~
alogA.
alogh +
alogb
alogh ++
alogb
alogh ++
a log A.
Table 3.5: Job Search Elasticities and Wages for Matched Men by Training Type
The elasticities for the synthetic control groups of ach variant of YTS are report d
in the columns to the right of each YTS treatment group. Treatm nt ffects are d m d
to be significant if the YTS treatment group elasticities diff r from th corr sponding
synthetic control group elasticities.
Unlike the non-matched male half of Table 3.3, where there was a marked tr atm nt
effect for young males who had participated in YTSI, Table 3.5 shows no ignificant
differences between those with YTSI experience and those without. As with Tabl 3.3
results for men with a spell on YTSII indicate that there is a significant tr atm nt ff t
which acts to lower all five of the elasticities under consideration here. Th final two
columns of Table 3.5 indicate a moderate YT treatm nt effect. Only th elasticiti s of th
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alog~
alogb
alog~
alOgA
0.166186
(0.005528)
-0.51265
(0.029877)
Jlogh ++
Jlogb
logh ++
JIOgA
Table 3.6: Job Search Elasticities and Wages for Matched Women by Training Type
hazard with respect to the benefit level under both wage offer distributional assumptions
are significantly different to the corresponding mean values for th synthetic control group.
Table 3.6 presents the female matched dataset YTS treatment effects by s h me typ
and takes the same form as Table 3.5. Results suggest that, oth r things being qual,
women with experience of YTSI will on average hav lower xp cted and r rvation
wages than those without. This result mirrors that found in Table 3.3. How v r unlik
Table 3.3 these results do not support the hypothesis that participation in YTSI has an
effect on any of the five elasticities. Table 3.6 indicates that, on average YTSII training
has no effect on the wages or elasticities of women who enter into it. Wh r a Tabl 3.3
contained only one significant treatment effect for women on the third schem , YT, Tabl
3.6 contains results which point to a treatment effect for many of the indicators under
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consideration. The mean value for the reservation wage of YT participants is significantly
lower than that of the synthetic control group. The elasticities of ~ and h (under the
Pareto wage offer distributional assumption) with respect to a change in the benefit level
are significantly higher for those with YT experience. The elasticities of ~ and h (under
the Exponential wage offer distributional assumption) with respect to A are also higher
for YT participants.
3.5 Context and Implications of Results
In this chapter we have presented evidence indicating the presence of some YTS treat-
ment effects on wage expectations and search elasticities. Section 3.3 Table 3.2 suggested
the existence of a marked change in the mean values for the structural parameters and
expected/reservation wages of individuals who had undertaken a period of YTS training.
However human capital theory would suggest that there may well be some fundamental
differences between those who sought YTS training and those who had no experience of
such schemes.
Our results support the heterogeneity of YTS treatment types. We allowed for the
schemes' evolution by subdividing our male and female samples into the three groups of
YTS (YTSI, YTSII and YT). We then re-estimated the structural parameters and ex-
pected/reservation wages for the non-matched dataset. Table 3.3 suggested that YTS
participants of both sexes could expect to experience large treatment effects for all three
YTS variants; the early scheme(YTSI) having a largely detrimental effect. However the
estimates by scheme type for the matched datasets presented in Tables 3.5 and 3.6 cast
a shadow over the results of Table 3.3. They offer little evidence of a YTSI effect on the
structural parameters and some evidence for a reduction in expected/reservation wages
following a spell on YTSI. YTSII appeared to have a marked effect on male participants
but there was no evidence to support the hypothesis of a female treatment effect. Evi-
dence for the third variation, YT, suggested that female participants experienced a marked
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treatment effect for both their structural parameters and reservation wages. Males who
undertook a period of YT training exhibited an effect only through a drop in the magni-
tude of the elasticity of the hazard of exiting unemployment, h (under both the Pareto
and Exponential wage offer distributional assumptions), with respect to a change in the
benefit level, b. The explanation of these results must lie in labour market factors. An
examination of the economic climate over the period of YTS evolution provides some clues
for the explanation.
To understand the implications of these results we need to examine the labour mar-
ket conditions experienced by different generations of government training recipients and
compare our unconditional estimates with the conditional ones which may be estimated
controlling for regressors. Table C.5 contains regression model estimations for reservation
and expected wages by gender for both control and treatment individuals. Notice the fact
that all three YTS types have a positive effect on both wage types for men whilst only
YT has any effect on the wages for women. This result would indicate that experience
of YT /YTS actually increases wage expectations. Presumably because YTS recipients
would feel that their human capital had been enhanced. Training allowances and the
average wage rates for under 18's also have a significant role in determining reservation
and expected wages. Both youth and Local Education Authority (LEA) unemployment"
are negatively significant for both sexes, indicating that adverse local labour market con-
ditions can lower expected and reservation wages. Women who live with their parents
have much lower wage levels. Perhaps due to the fact that living costs are lower whilst
they remain at home and so jobs offering lower levels of pay become acceptable to these
women.
Appendix Figures C.5 and C.6 contain plots of various economic indicators over the
time span of interest, some personal to the persons being studied, some regional and
some national. In 1986 when cohort 1 sweep 2 and cohort 2 sweep 1 people were ques-
tioned and YTS took the form of YTSI the unemployment rate (which has been scaled to
6The unemployment rate for the area in which an individual finished his/her schooling.
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overlay the wage data) was high (14%). After the introduction of YTSII unemployment
fell steadily until 1990 when it bottomed out (8%). As the third YTS variant YT was
introduced unemployment was again on the rise and had climbed back up to around 11%
by 1994. This trend coupled with the result from Table C.5 that unemployment rises led
to falls in reservation and expected wages" which. might account for the YTS treatment
effects uncovered in Tables 3.5 and 3.6 if the unemployment rate affected those with YTS
experience differently to our control group.
Male expected wages followed actual average male wages closely for the whole period
of study. It is interesting to note that the male school leavers in our sample returned
expected wage levels which were above the average rate of pay for males under 18 in the
years 1986 and 1994. Female under 18's expected wages were much lower than average
female wages for most of the period of interest. Young women appear to have expectations
for wages below the female average. Minimum training allowances were all but frozen for
all six cohorts and as a result the gap between reservation wages and training allowances
had widened considerably by 1994.
An important respect in which young men and young women are different is that
over the 1980s and 1990s girls in school were out performing boys in terms of educational
scores", Our results may be consistent with the view that although human capital has been
rising among young women their labour market expectations have not risen accordingly.
Another explanation for the differences which we observed between the treatment
effects for men and women is the existence of gender discrimination by employers. This
long recognised phenomenon could be causing female job seekers to revise down their
wage expectations in the light of poor wage offer distributions. After the introduction
of YT and as the unemployment rate rose it appears that women with YT experience
revised downward their expectations and their search elasticities. This indicates that for
7Remember that reservation and expected wages are scaled by changes in the Retail Price Index (RPI)
relative to 1998 prices.
8See Dolton et al. (1999) who examine the average GCSE exam score difference between boys and
girls.
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female school leavers the later YTS schemes had the effect which the government sought.
The fact that there was not a similar effect for their young male counterparts (except for
the elasticity of h with respect to b) might well be due to the high proportion of women
(relative to men) who enter the service and leisure sectors, which were growth areas in
the mid 1990s.
3.6 Conclusions
There are two principal empirical findings of this Chapter. Firstly, that the different
types of youth training have distinct effects on expected and reservation wages and search
elasticities. Secondly, that the effect of government training on males and females seems
to be radically different. The effect on the former is to enhance optimistic expectations for
men, but modify those of women. The implications of these findings are that in empirical
analysis of the labour market outcomes of young people it is necessary to consider men
separately from women. In addition it would also appear to be wrong to categorise all
government training as the same".
On a wider methodological level our estimation strategy also suggested that erroneous
conclusions could be reached if non-comparable groups, those receiving treatment and
those not receiving treatment, had been compared. Our approach of using a matched
sample suggests that one may reach less dramatic comparative conclusions, but ones we
may have confidence in. We suggest that the matching methodology has wide applications.
However, there are a number of performance issues relating to the nearest neigh-
bour algorithm. In the next chapter we will investigate the performance of the Nearest
Neighbour algorithm as used above. This investigation will lead us to consider alternate
matching solutions, methods whose performance will also be discussed.
9The much of the literature has treated YTS as a single unchanging entity. See Mealli et al. (1996)
62
Chapter 4
Matching Estimator Performance
and its Bearing on Our Conclusions
As we were able to demonstrate in section 2.4.3 the performance of any given matching
algorithm is dependent on the validity of the assumptions, which underpin it. In this
chapter we investigate the performance of the differing matching algorithms, which we
have employed and attempt to assess the validity of the conclusions we might draw from
subsequent statistical tests on our matched datasets. The concept of Stochastic dominance
is used to assess the region of overlapping support. Several plots are used to highlight the
weaknesses which are inherent within traditional matching methods.
4.1 Nearest Neighbour Matching Protocol Performance
The "Nearest Neighbour" matching protocol described in subsection 2.5.1 matches an
individual from the control group to a person from the treatment group by selecting
the control whose propensity score is closest to that of the said treatment person. The
control is then removed from the population of unmatched controls and is unavailable
for matching to a subsequent treatment person. This method has the advantage that it
matches real people to each other facilitating any further investigation we may wish to
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perform".
Such an approach can be expected to produce close matches for as long as the propen-
sity score distributions take a form similar to that of Figure 4.1 Case 1. Here we depict
a pair of stylised propensity score distributions. The yellow distribution represents the
propensity score distribution for the treatment population, whilst blue represents that of
the control population. Notice how the blue distribution completely envelops the yellow
distribution. This is a highly desirable property for data, which we propose to perform a
"Nearest Neighbour" matching procedure on as it follows from this that for any treatment
individual there exists a control whose propensity score is similar to theirs. However, if
the propensity score distributions of the treatment and control populations take the form
of Figure 4.1 Case 2, we can expect the algorithm to produce some poor matches with
respect to propensity score.
Area A represents the portion of the treatment propensity score distribution, which
is not enveloped by the blue of the control group. At some point during a run of the
"Nearest Neighbour" algorithm all the controls with a propensity score, which lies within
Area B, will have been matched and removed from the unmatched control group. However
there will still exist treatment individuals who possess a propensity score within this
range. These treatment persons must then be matched to individuals from the remaining
unmatched control group who reside to the left of Area B and therefore possess propensity
scores, which are poor matches. That is to say that when we match on data which has
the form of Figure 4.1 Case 2, we can expect that as successive treatment persons are
matched to controls the remaining unmatched control population will look less and less
like the remaining unmatched treatment population.
Having described the "Nearest Neighbour" matching algorithm in subsection 2.5.1, we
then performed it in section 3.4 for males and females of the YCS dataset, cohorts 1-6.
The extent to which the conclusions that we drew are valid depends on the degree to which
1Since our matched controls are actual people and not synthesised, they retain their full set of covari-
ates post match.
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Case 1: Data Sets Which Produce Good Matches
Theoretical DistributionI
of the Propensity Score
for Non-Partcloants
Theoretical Distribution
of the Propensity Score
for Participants
o
Area A
)
Case 2: Data Sets Which Produce Some Bad Matches
\ AreaS
o YTS Propensity Score
Figure 4.1: Theoretical "Nearest Neighbour" Matching Algorithm Performance
the propensity score distributions of the YTS participants and non-participants overlap.
Figure 4.2 contains the actual propensity score distributions for the male sub-populations.
Notice how the YTS non-participants propensity distribution (blue) envelops all of the
left side of the YTS participants' propensity distribution (yellow). However, the right tail
contains a number of YTS participants for whom there will be no close matches. This is
true whenever the blue columns are smaller than the corresponding yellow columns.
In Figure 4.3 each pair of points represents the average distance between the propensity
scores of a matched couple for every twenty matches. An examination of Figure 4.3
reveals how the effect of this lack of high propensity control group persons causes the
mean distance between matched propensity scores to widen as the algorithm proceeds.
Notice how the algorithm produces consistently good matches until those of the 43rd
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Figure 4.2: Propensity Score Distributions for both YTS Participants & Non-Participants
(Males)
average distance point, after which treatment persons are matched to controls of lesser
propensity.
Any conclusions drawn from analysis of this matched dataset will be tainted by the
existence of these poorer matches within it.
One solution, which the literature suggests for the above problem, is to drop any
treatment individual from the dataset for whom the algorithm fails to find a match of
sufficient quality. Cochran and Rubin (1973) suggest a version of "Nearest Neighbour"
caliper matching which makes a match to person i only if there exists a person j, from
the control group such that,
(4.1)
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Figure 4.3: Matching Performance from First Match to Final Match (Males)
where E represents the caliper boundary. In fact our version of caliper matching could
be easily adapted to perform a more advanced variation of this method if we only made
a match to person i when there was some control person j, whose propensity score lay
within the caliper of person i, I.e:
(4.2)
See Appendix C.l for a description of the full matching protocol we used". There is
however a major flaw in the caliper rejection approach in that it remove per on from
the treatment group non-randomly. Under such a scheme w would lose people from the
right tail of the treatment group propensity score distribution, causing us to generat a
biased matched sample containing too few high propensity treatment-control matches.
In our attempt to remove one potential bias we would have introduced another. This
point is of crucial importance when an investigation is concerned with something such as
2Based on Lechner (1999)
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Figure 4.4: Propensity Score Distributions for both YTS Participants & Non-Participants
(Females)
measurement of the YTS treatment effect. People with high YTS propensities are likely
to be part of the self-selection phenomenon. Indeed, it is these people who the scheme was
designed to help. As such they must remain in the dataset for us to accurately evaluate
the YTS treatment effect. Previous studies often overlook this fact when choosing to
drop poorly matched persons. Although, the recently released" STATA 7 .do program
"psmatch", automatically excludes those persons whose propensity scores lie beyond the
region of support when performing it's version of matching it is possible to override this
feature.
Figures 4.4 and 4.5 depict the female versions of the plots presented in figure 4.2
and 4.3. As with their male counterparts we again see a shortage of high prop n ity
control persons with which to match. This leads to a reduction in match quality after th
forty ninth-point average. Too many poor quality matches for high prop en ity treatment
3Barbara Sianesi, University College London and Institute for Fiscal Studies, Jun 2001
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Figure 4.5: Matching Performance from First Match to Final Match (Females)
individuals may therefore bias conclusions we draw from work on the female matched
sample.
4.2 Minimising the Number of Poor Matches
4.2.1 Overlap of the Propensity Score Distributions
Ideally we would wish to possess a method of calculating orne statistic, which we could u e
to judge whether a given treatment and control data et would produce good matche wh n
employing the method of nearest neighbour matching. Todd (1999) pr sents a method of
discriminating between data, which will produce potential good and poor matches. Sh
terms the support of P(X) for which both ix(P(X)ID = 1) > 0 and ix(P(X)ID = 0) > 0
as the "region of overlapping support". She also describes a method for identifying the
observations that lie in the region in which the density i(P(Xi)ID = 0) (using D = 0
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control group data) at each of the P(Xi) values observed for D, = 1 observations is
calculated. The standard nonparametric density estimator used is reproduced here in
equation (4.3).
(4.3)
where K is a kernel function and hn is the bandwidth parameter. The density esti-
mates at each point are then ranked. From this the 1% or 2% quantile of the positive
density estimates is obtained. A value of P(Xi) with an estimated density greater than
this quantile is considered to reside within the "overlapping region of support". Values
of P(Xi) less than this quantile reside beyond the region of support and Todd (1999)
recommends they be excluded in estimation.
The weakness of this method is that we are again rejecting persons from our sample in a
non-random manner. As we have already discussed it seems likely that for our dataset the
region of non-overlapping support will lie to the right of the propensity score distributions
and as such a method such as we have just recounted would reject mainly high propensity
YTS persons from our sample and hence bias any conclusions which we attempt to draw
from analyses of the matched dataset. Furthermore it is not unreasonable to assume that
these high propensity YTS individuals are the group who require a scheme such as YTS
to help them develop their employment prospects and as such it is the effect of the scheme
on these persons, which we should be most interested in. Clearly rejecting persons of this
type is not desirable given our aim is to uncover the YTS treatment effect on the treated.
Todd (1999) does recognise that the majority of the treatment group could be outside
of the region of overlap, if the model for participation predicted unusually well. The
solution proposed is to re-estimate the propensity scores using an alternative set of X
variables. This solution seems to rely on using a poorer model for YTS participation to
increase the region of overlap. As a result this solution is flawed.
Having stated our reservations as to the validity of any method which proposes to
remove persons from the treatment group for whom there are insufficient controls pos-
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Males with no YTS
Experience
o
Figure 4.6: Cumulative Distributions of Males with YTSI Experience and those without
any YTS scheme experience
sessing a similar YTS scheme propensity before proceeding to match on the remaining
dataset, we now suggest that it is as valid to retain all treatment persons and adjust
our conclusions from analyses carried out after matching on this complete dataset using
the knowledge that there were some poor matches rather than reject treatment persons
non-randomly and make no allowance post match for the bias this has induced.
One way in which we may hope to gain an understanding of the degr e of overlap in
the YTS propensity score distributions is to compare the cumulative distributions of the
propensity scores for the control group and the various YTS sch me participants. It is
recommended that the reader become acquainted with the notion of stochasti dominan e
before proceeding any further. See section 2.7 for an overview of the concept and it'
relevance to the problem we now face.
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Experience
o
Figure 4.7: Cumulative Distributions of Males with YTSII Experience and those without
any YTS scheme experience
If the CDF of the propensity score for YTS participants, F(P(X1)), dominates that of
non-participants, G(P(Xo)), according to second order stochastic dominance and the con-
trol group is not sufficiently large enough to compensate, then we would expect that near-
est neighbour matching, performed using these scores, would produce some poor matche
for those treatment persons with high YTS propensity scores. These high propensity
individuals are the persons whose outcomes we are most eager to examine. The scale of
the problem would be directly related to the "degree" of stochastic dominance and the
sample size shortfall.
Figure 4.6 shows the relative CDFs and their respective 5% confidence regions for the
male control group and males with YTSI experience. Notice how the two CDFs n v r
cross. This indicates that the propensity score distribution for the control group stochas-
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Figure 4.8: Cumulative Distributions of Males with YT Experience and those without
any YTS scheme experience
tically dominates that of the male YTSI participants; the control group's distribution lies
to the left of the YTSI group's distribution. Figure 4.7 contains a similar result for males
with YTSII experience. Hence, it follows that matches produced using the YTSI and YT-
SI! male datasets with the nearest neighbour algorithm may produce some poor match s
for treatment individuals, as there are insufficient controls of high YTS propensity when
the treatment and control groups are of equal size. Our pr -mat h control group is larger
than the pre-match treatment group, but is this sufficient to overcome the problem?
Figure 4.8 contains the CDF of males with a spell on YT against that of tho e with-
out any kind of YTS experience. Here we see that the two CDFs cross. This indicates
that there are sufficient control persons of similar YTS propensity to produce a matched
dataset, which will not suffer from degradation in match quality as th algorithm pro-
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Females with no YTS
Experience
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o
Figure 4.9: Cumulative Distributions of Females with YTSI Experience and those without
any YTS scheme experience
gresses.
Figures 4.9, 4.10 and 4.11 contain CDFs for the various female YTS sub-groupings. As
with the male samples the females with YT experience sub-grouping is the only dataset
for which there are sufficient female controls to match, without degradation, using nearest
neighbour methods and datasets of equal size. Again the question of wheth r the female
control group is sufficiently large to offset this problem arises.
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Figure 4.10: Cumulative Distributions of Females with YTSII Experience and those with-
out any YTS scheme experience
4.3 Implementation of Kernel and Local Linear Match-
ing Methods
Having uncovered a number of issues during our investigations concerning th performanc
of our nearest neighbour matching algorithm we now examin kern 1 based matching
methods. To see a motivation for matching methods as well as an xplanation of th
methods in particular see sections 2.5 and 2.4. Since these methods require one to select
the bandwidth parameter before attempting to match, it follows that th ir performanc
may be sensitive to this choice. As such this section will present our early kernel and
local linear matching method results in terms of their performance and the ramifications
for our understanding of the YTS treatment effect.
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Figure 4.11: Cumulative Distributions of Females with YT Experience and those without
any YTS scheme experience
4.3.1 Kernel Regression Matching Performance
The main strength of the kernel regression matching estimator which we described in
subsection 2.5.2 is that it makes use of all available control group persons (from j =
1, ... ,ne) and weights them in accordance with their similarity to the treatment person
i, as measured by their propensity scores. Unlike the "nearest neighbour" method, the
pool of control individuals does not erode as the algorithm progr ssively er ates matches
for the treatment persons from i = 1 to tu,
During our explanation of the kernel regression matching estimator we introduced th
concept of the bandwidth parameter li«, which the user of the algorithm must select for
themselves and which can influence the accuracy of the subsequent match s produc d.
Many people have proposed methods for choosing hn. Silverman (1986) presents a method
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ations for Differing hn (Males) See Appendix C.2
for the determination of the optimal hn where you select hn to be the width which min-
imises the mean integrated square error under the assumption that the data is Gaussian
and a Gaussian kernel is to be used. This optimal hn is calculated via
h 06 -1/5n = 1. sti, (4.4)
a more robust version of which is
. ( IQR) -1/5= mm s, 1.34 nt (4.5)
However due to the assumptions, such an "optimal" value for hn is not to be considered
as a global solution. For multi-modal highly skewed densities, this width is usually too
wide and can over smooth the density. Also we have chosen to u e the biweight kernel,
as such the above assumption does not hold. Despite this, Silverman (1986) method still
represents a valuable tool when attempting to estimate a value for hn.
Before attempting to use a plug in optimal hn we present t-test results of signifi-
cant treatment effects for any form of YTS schemes by gender without regard for YTS
heterogeneity, for various hn. This specification mirrors that of the early investigations
in chapter 3. These include estimates of the search elasticities as describ d in chapter
77
4.3. Implementation of Kernel and Local Linear Matching Methods
2.2 for the actual treatment and synthetic (kernel derived) control groups. As in sec-
tion 3.3 we have calculated t-statistics to test the null hypothesis Ho : J-tl = J-t2 verses
a two tailed alternative, where J-tl and J-t2 were the mean values of a given elasticity or
expected/reservation wage for those with YTS experience and those without. It is by
rerunning the algorithm for various hn and then carrying out our tests on wages and
elasticities that we hope to capture the variation in matching performance. This process
generated a series of t-statistics. Figure C.1 compares kernel regression matched males
with and without any form of YTS experience. In it we present a plot of these t-statistics
as h« was varied between 0 and 1. The z-axis represents the variation in hn from 0 to
1. The y-axis depicts the t-statistic values for the differences between treatment and syn-
thetic controls of wages/elasticities produced using the values of hn• Therefore, the yellow
plot lines represent the movement of these t-statistics for each wage/elasticity pair as hn
increases. The wages/elasticities to which the yellow lines belong are indicated to the
right of the figure. The red area represents the area of no significant difference between
a synthetic control person and their treatment counterpart. Hence yellow plots, which
reside beyond this region, indicate the presence of a treatment effect. Those plots, which
move from the area of significant difference to that of no significant difference or vis-versa,
are difficult to interpret. Even those plots which remain significant over the range of hn
may experience a change in the magnitude of the significance as hn increases. Hence the
size of the treatment effect can be hard to discern.
Notice that both the treatment effects on the reservation and expected wages move in
and out of significance as hn increases. Overall though it is interesting to note that none
of the plots deviates alarmingly over the range of hn• Hence if one was to take a value
of hn and from it generate a matched sample from which one could create a table such
as Table 3.4, section 2.5 which was produced using the nearest neighbour algorithm, one
would draw broadly similar conclusions to those of Table 3.4. If you recall, the expected
and reservation wage effects on this male sub-sample were shown to be insignificant after
nearest neighbour matching, whilst the elasticities of the reservation wage and hazard
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the Percentage Differences Between Treatment and Synthetic Elasticities for Various hn
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with respect to a change in the benefit level were shown to exhibit an effect in line with
that which we see in Figure C.1 for all values of b« after kernel regression matching.
The elasticity of the hazard with respect to a change in the arrival rate of job offers
(exponential wage offer distributional assumption) also moves in line with the nearest
neighbour result for males. These results are evidence of the robustness of our results to
differing matching methods.
Figure C.2 presents the way in which the magnitudes of the differences between
treatment and synthetic wages/elasticities vary over hn for the same male sub-sample
as Figure C.1 using kernel regression matching. Here we have standardised the treatment
wages/elasticities to 1. Hence, a synthetic control wage/elasticity with a value great r
than 1 indicates that the wage/elasticity increased after treatment. Once gain there ar
no large fluctuations in any of the male plots over the range of hn-
Figure 4.14 contains the female sub-sample counterpart to Figure C.l. The ffects of
all variations of YTS combined on this female sub-sample would appear to b far more
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sensitive to our choice of hn than was the case for the male sub-sample. A number of
the elasticities move into the region of no significance for values of hn > 0.2. Again a
comparison with the findings of Table 3.4 is of interest.
Our nearest neighbour matched females produced a set of results, which differed from
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those of their male counterparts. However not all the differences are replicated by the
kernel regression matched female sample. Firstly, the kernel regression matched females
exhibit a wage effect post treatment, in that both the expected and reservation wages are
lower for those who undertook a period of any YTS treatment. This was also the finding
of the nearest neighbour analysis. However, the elasticities of the reservation wage with
respect to the benefit level and the arrival rate of job offers or the hazard with respect to
the arrival rate (exponential wage offer distributional assumption) failed to move in line
with the nearest neighbour results. A look at the results for the local linear regression
matched female sub-sample may help to reconcile these findings. As with Figure C.2,
Figure 4.15 highlights the need to uncover some evidence as to what the correct value
of hn should be; the magnitude and significance of the measured treatment effects vary
substantially over the range of hn• The expected and reservation wages are effected by
as little 4% or as much as 7% whilst the nearest neighbour wage estimate pairs both
experienced a drop of around 3%. The elasticity of the reservation wage with respect to
a change in the arrival rate of job offers also agrees with the nearest neighbour algorithm
result of Table 3.4 with a percentage change of between 0% - 5% over the range of hn.
However, as seen in Figure 4.14 the elasticity of the hazard with respect to the benefit
level under both wage offer distributional assumptions also indicates a treatment effect
although the nearest neighbour result of Table 3.4 refutes this.
4.3.2 Local Linear Regression Matching Performance
As with the kernel regression matching estimator, the local linear regression matching
estimator weights everyone in the non-participating sample by their similarity to each
treatment person. However the local linear estimator has a number of advantages over
the previous method. Subsection 2.5.3 provides a description of these advantages.
Figure 4.16 contains the t-test results for the same male sub-sample as that used for
Figure C.l. We performed local linear regression matching for various values of hn• As
with our analysis of the kernel density matching results a comparison with the nearest
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Fluctuations for Differing h., (Males) See Appendix C.2
neighbour matching results of Table 3.4 is of interest.
Notice how for all values of hn the local linear method revealed no significant treatment
effects on the reservation and expected wages of males. This result mirrors that of Table
3.4 in which we saw no significant wage effects for men who experienced any form of YTS.
The elasticities of the hazard with respect to the benefit level under both the Pareto
and Exponential wage offer distributional assumptions remained highly significant for
all values of hn. The result of Table 3.4 also indicated the presence of a hazard effect
following a benefit change for either wage offer distributional assumption. The elasticity
of the reservation wage with respect to the benefit level and the elasticity of the hazard
with respect to the arrival rate of job offers remain significant for all values of hn. These
results were also seen in Table 3.4. However the elasticity of the reservation wage with
respect to the arrival rate is only significant for values of hn such that 0.25 < hn > 0.65.
Interestingly, this elasticity was not significant in the analysis of Table 3.4. Perhap this
suggests that the correct bandwidth, hn, lies in the region 0.25 > hn < 0.65. This result
highlights the importance of the selection of hn. Even if we put aside th mov ment of
this one elasticity in and out of significance, it remains the case that the magnitude of
the significance of all the parameters we have estimated varies with hn and as a result
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it is difficult for us to arrive at a prediction of the size of the treatment effect on each
parameter.
We can again examine the way in which the magnitudes of the treatment effects
vary by standardising the estimated synthetic parameters by their treatment parameter
counterparts. Figure 4.17 contains plots of the predicted synthetic search elasticities
and reservation/expected wages for the male sub samples after standardisation. The
reservation and expected wage rates of the male sample remain fairly stable over the
range of hn; they are close to 1 as was indicated by their t-statistic plots of figure 4.16.
The elasticity of the reservation wage with respect to the arrival rate of job offers for
persons with treatment is 4%(approx.) greater for all hn. The elasticities of th hazard
with respect to the benefit level, or the arrival rate under both the Pareto and exponential
wage offer distributional assumptions experience a treatment effect of around 6% - 10%
over the range of hn after treatment as opposed to the kernel density plots of Figure
C.2 which moved by 5% - 10% and the nearest neighbour estimates of Table 3.4, which
exhibited a treatment effect of around 5% for both these elasticities. Here we seth
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elasticity of the reservation wage with respect to the benefit level exhibits a treatment
effect of around 11% - 15%. This compares with the kernel density plots of Figure C_2
that suggested the effect between 20% - 30%. The nearest neighbour method produced
a pair of elasticities, which indicated a reduction of the responsiveness of the reservation
wage by around 7.4%.
As the reader will recall, our comparison between the t-test results for the nearest
neighbour matched females by all types of YTS participation against those obtained fol-
lowing a match performed using the kernel density matching algorithm suggested that
alternative matching methods could result in differing conclusions. This result contra-
dicted the evidence from the male analysis, where both algorithms produced results of a
similar nature. Our local linear matched male sample also produced t-test results akin to
those of our previous analysis. What of the female local linear results?
Figure 4.18 contains the t-test results for females with and without any form of YTS
experience, after local linear matching. Once more we compare our results to those of Ta-
ble 3.4. Within Figure 4.18 we observe a wage effect for persons with any YTS xperience.
Both expected and reservation wages are reduced for women with such xperience. As
with the kernel density matching analysis, t-tests between the wage estimates of women
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with and without a spell on YTS after nearest neighbour matching (Table 3.4) produced
the same result. The elasticities of the reservation wage with respect to both the benefit
level and the arrival rate of job offers are significant for some values of hn (see their plots
on Figure 4.18). This is also true for the elasticity of the hazard with respect to the
arrival rate of job offers (exponential wage offer distributional assumption). The female
results of Table 3.4 show these three elasticities to be significantly altered in the same
direction as part of this local linear matching analysis. Hence the local linear regression
matching algorithm produces elasticities and wage estimates for synthetic control per-
sons that are significantly different from their YTS treatment person counterparts in line
with the results we saw in the nearest neighbour case. This result contradicts some of
the t-test evidence of the female kernel density matched sub sample. In Figure 4.14 we
saw the elasticities of the hazard with respect to the benefit level under both wage offer
distributional assumptions and that of the reservation wage with respect to the arrival
rate of job offers were significant for values of hn > 0.25. Only the kernel density analysis
indicated a significant change for the hazards with respect to the benefit level.
Figure 4.19 depicts the female elasticity/wage plots standardised as before. Both the
reservation and expected wages experience a treatment effect of around 2% - 5%. This
compares to the kernel density plots of Figure 4.15, where we saw a change of around
4%-7% and the point wage estimates of the nearest neighbour matching algorithm (Table
3.4), where there was an effect of around 2% - 4%. The elasticity of the reservation wage
with respect to a change in the benefit level (Figure 4.18) varies by 5% - 8%, whilst
the kernel density analysis (Figure 4.15 not demonstrate the presence of a significant
treatment effect and the nearest neighbour estimates of Table 3.4 indicated an effect
of around 9%. The elasticity of the hazard with respect to the arrival rate of job offers
(exponential wage offer distributional assumption) after local linear matching experienced
a change of 3% - 4%, no significant effect under the kernel analysis of Figure 4.15 and
around 6% following a nearest neighbour matching procedure, Table 3.4.
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in the Percentage Differences Between Treatment and Synthetic Elasticities for Various
hn (Females) See Appendix 0.2
4.4 Choice of the Bandwidth Parameter
As has been highlighted by the various figures for t-statistic and standardised elastic-
ity /wage estimates, the selection of the kernel bandwidth parameter hn can have an
important bearing on the nature and magnitude of any YTS treatment effects we un-
cover using the kernel density or local linear matching methods. It is ther fore of great
importance that we arrive at a method of choosing a reasonable value for hn given the
dataset upon which we are to match. The unique nature of our analysis complicates this
task. It is not possible to generate a value of hn prior to running the algorithm (kernel or
local linear). Hence we propose a bootstrapped iterativ procedure as a solution to thi
problem.
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4.4.1 Bootstrap Sampling
As we have said, we needed a method for estimating a sampling distribution from which we
could obtain an estimate and standard error for the bandwidth parameter, hn' used in the
kernel based matching methods as described in sections 2.5.2 and 2.5.3. Our solution was
of an ad-hoc nature and relied on some aspects of bootstrap sampling. Before we describe
the algorithm we used, we present a brief discussion of bootstrap sampling methods.
The population distribution of any statistic can be approximated by the distribution
of that statistic derived from the bootstrap samples. If we have a dataset containing
N individuals, then a single run of the bootstrap samples N people from the N person
dataset with replacement. It follows that some of the original people may appear on
multiple occasions whilst others not at all. Hence, each bootstrap sample contains a sub
sample of sample population individuals, many of whom appear more than once.
Having generated this new dataset we can estimate statistics of interest, in this case
the job search elasticities and wage rates. This procedure is can then be repeated, each
time generating a new set of estimates. Finally, we will arrive at a dataset of estimated
statistics.
Bootstrapping relies on the validity of the asumption that the observed distribution
is a good approximation of the population distribution. For this procedure to produce
good estimates, this assumption must hold. The accuracy of this estimate of the sampling
distribution is a function of the number of repetitions. As a result, some experimentation
is required to identify the number of repetitions needed.
4.4.2 Estimation of the Optimal Bandwidth Parameter hn
Our solution to the problem of choosing a value for hn is to take the basic local linear
matching algorithm and apply it iteratively to the dataset until the difference between
a generated b« and the previous one is sufficiently small. The algorithm starts with an
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initial value for hn 4.
From this starting point the algorithm generated a matched sample from the dataset,
containing synthetic control persons and their elasticity and wage estimates constructed
from the weights placed on control individuals using the formula of Equation (2.41). It
then used these estimated synthetic elasticity and wage controls to estimate a new value
for hn using an approach akin to that of Silverman (1986), see Equation (4.4). The process
was repeated, except that in subsequent iterations the control group on which Equation
(2.41) placed a set of weights was the synthetic control group" that the weights from the
previous iteration had generated. This continued until the difference between the last two
iteration estimates of hn was sufficiently small",
The main program only passed a random sub sample of size one thousand, of the
sample population of treatment and control persons to the above subroutines. This process
was repeated until it had generated one thousand estimates of hn and their corresponding
synthetic treatment and control elasticities/wages from one thousand intital random sub
samples. An example of the bootstrap iterative code, which produced these estimates, is
given in Appendix B.2.
The choice of the bootstrap sample size (number of iterations) was made after an
analysis of the evolution of our estimates for b« as the bootstrap sample size increased.
Table 4.1 presents this analysis for males with YTSI experience. Figure 4.20 contains the
corresponding plots of the estimates of hn, which each of the one thousand bootstrapped
iterations of the local linear regression algorithm produced. Notice that the majority
of the values lie around the overall bootstrapped estimate of 0.041. At the same time
the standard deviation of the estimates settles around 0.013. Plots of the bootstrapped
iterative estimates of hn for all the other versions of the YTS scheme, both male and
4During our analyses we chose to employ an initial value of hn = 0.5. The choice of which was entirely
arbitrary. In tests, the algorithm was not found to be sensitive to alternate initial values for hn
IiSpecifically the Synthetic control group propensities
6When the difference between two successive estimates of hn $ 0.005 the iterative procedure was
terminated and the current values for the synthetic estimates of the elasticities and wages were recorded.
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female were of a similar form, with most iteration estimates of hn around the overall
Size of Bootstrap Sample
5 10 25 50 75 100 150 200 500 1000
Table 4.1: The Evolution of Bootstrapped Estimates of hn as the Size of the Bootstrap
Sample Increases for Males with YTSI Experience
For every variable estimated we now possessed a distribution. As the bootstrap sample
size was increased so we were able to observe the shape of these distributions form. Figures
C.7 to C.9 contain the distributions for the synthetic control elasticities and wages as the
sample size increased from 5 to 500 (Males with YTSI experience). One can observe the
distributions settling down to a bell curve shape as the number of iterations rises to 500.
The male treatment group elasticity/wage distributions by YTS type are reproduced
in Figure C.lO. The corresponding distributions for matched male controls by YTS type
(bootstrap sample of 1000 iterations) are presented in Figure C.11. Notice that the
tails of all the distributions for synthetic matched male controls are longer than those of
the male treatment group elasticity and wage distributions. This result arises because
bootstrap samples are taken with replacement, therefore the proportion of outliers in the
bootstrap sample may be higher than in the original one. Hence bootstrap distributions
may have heavy tails, which can result in inflated variance estimators. This property
may be manifest in the standard deviations reported in Table 4.1. Two similar sets of
distributions for the female treatment and control groups by YTS type are reproduced in
Figures C.12 and C.13. As with the male sample, the tail ends of the femal synthetic
control distributions are longer than those of the female treatment group elasticity and
wage distributions.
For each YTS treatment type and for both sexes we had generated a bootstrapped
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Figure 4.20: Estimates for the Value of hn Using Bootstrapped Iterative Local Linear
Regression Matching (Males YTSI)
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sample of size one thousand for hn. This allowed us to draw the resulting bootstrapped
average value for hn on graphs of the t-statistic and normalised elasticity/wage estimates
and hence draw some conclusions as to the direction and magnitude of YTS treatment
effects on the various job search elasticities/wages.
4.4.3 The Bootstrapped Iterative Optimal Bandwidth Parame-
ter, h., and it's Implications for Our Interpretation of the
Treatment Effect Analysis (Males)
Figure 4.21 contains the t-statistic plots of elasticities/wages for YTSI males and their
synthetic controls, where 0 < hn < 1. It also includes a vertical yellow line which
indicates the position of the bootstrapped iterative estimate of hn for this dataset. Notice
the difference in the plots when compared to those for all YTS types which we saw in
Figure (4.16).
As with our analysis of the kernel and local linear results for the combined YTS
samples, the interpretation of the results produced by the matched samples of each YTS
type is aided by a return to the nearest neighbour results obtained using the same datasets.
Table 4.2 contains the mean elasticity and wage estimates which are calculated from their
distributions which we obtained using the bootstrap iterative procedure when estimating
hn• T-test results are also presented here and test for significant differences between the
means of the treatment and corresponding control groups. Table 3.5 contains the nearest
neighbour matched results for the same male datasets. Figure 4.21 contains the local linear
t-test plots from the male YTSI sample and may be compared to the plots of Figures C.1
and 4.16. The difference is striking. Whereas the plots of the later two figures were
broadly comparable, those of the former exhibit some marked differences. This highlights
the heterogeneity, which was hypothesised and then evidenced by the results of Chapter
3 subsection 3.4.1. Firstly we see that Figure 4.21 and Table 4.2 columns 1 and 2 suggest
the presence of a wage effect for males with YTSI experience. Both the reservation wage
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Figure 4.21: Local Linear Regression Matching Performance as Measured by t-statistic
Fluctuations for Differing hn (Males YTSI) See Appendix C.2
and expected wages of these individuals undergo an effect, which sees them lowered as a
result of the scheme. The results of Table 3.5 indicated that there may be some evidence
for a wage effect, in that the reservation wage, post treatment was significantly lower to
that for those without treatment at the 10% level. Table 3.5 also indicated that YTSI had
no affect on any of the job search elasticities of interest. This result is largely repeated
in this local linear analysis. Table 4.2 suggests that only the elasticity of the hazard with
respect to the benefit level under the exponential wage offer distributional assumption
exhibits a significant effect post treatment. However, an examination of the t-test plot
for this elasticity in Figure 4.21 shows that the test statistic lies near the area of no
significance. This combined with the fact that the elasticity of the hazard with respect
to the benefit level under the Pareto distributional assumption is insignificantly different
post treatment suggest that results of the male YTSI analysis are similar to those of the
nearest neighbour study of Chapter 3.
Figure 4.22 contains the t-test plots for the elasticities and wages of treatment/control
persons following local linear regression matching on the male YTSII dataset. A look to
the values of the t-test statistics calculated at the bootstrap iterative optimal estimat
of the bandwidth, hn, shows evidence of more substantial treatment effects for those
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with YTSII experience. All five elasticities of interest are affected by a spell on YTSII.
The elasticities of the reservation wage with respect to a change in the benefit level or
the arrival rate of job offers are lower for scheme participants. The magnitudes of the
elasticities of the hazard with respect to a change in the benefit level (both wage offer
distributional assumptions) or a change in the arrival rate of job offers are also reduced. All
these effects are well within the area of significant difference. As with our analysis of the
male YTSI treatment effects, Table 4.2, columns 3 and 4 contain the mean elasticity and
wage values and t-test results for both the treatment and control groups after matching
at the bootstrap iterative optimal value for hn• These results are comparable to those of
Table 3.5 columns 3 and 4 following a nearest neighbour matching procedure. Recall that
the results of Table 3.5 had suggested that there did indeed exist a treatment effect for
these elasticities. All were lowered by a similar order of magnitude.
Again there appears to be a consistency in the results regardless of the matching
procedure used. However the results of Table 3.5 also led us to conclude that there was
no evidence to support the suggestion of a wage effect post YTSII treatment. In contrast,
Figure 4.22 and Table 4.2 do indicate that there may be a reservation wage effect. Here we
see reservation wages rise for those with YTSII experience. Although the plot of Figure
4.22 for the t-test statistic of the reservation wage effect does cross into the area of no
significance for values of 0.4 > hn < 0.7. This result (as are others) is therefore reliant on
the assumption that our optimal value for hn is a correct one.
Figure 4.23 presents the t-test plot results for the male YT dataset after local linear
matching for various values of hn• Both the expected and reservation wage t-test plots
remain insignificant over the whole range of hn and are therefore insignificant at the
optimal value for hn• Table 4.2, columns 5 and 6 reflect this result with the mean wage
values calculated after local linear regression matching with a bandwidth of hn producing
insignificant t-test statistics. This corresponds to the nearest neighbour matching results
of Table 3.5, columns 5 and 6, where we saw no evidence for the existence of a wage effect
following a spell on YT.
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Figure 4.22: Local Linear Regression Matching Performance as Measured by t-statistic
Fluctuations for Differing hn (Males YTSII) See Appendix C.2
The t-test plots for the elasticities of the reservation wage with respect to the benefit
level and the hazard with respect to the arrival rate of job offers Figure 4.23 indicate a
large treatment effect for YT participants, which produces the result of lowering these
elasticities for the treated (see also Table 4.2). This is in contrast to the results of Table 3.5
(nearest neighbour matching), which gave no evidence for a YT treatment effect for these
job search elasticities. The t-test and mean value estimates after optimal hn local linear
regression matching for both elasticities of the hazard with respect to the benefit level
(Figure 4.23) indicate that these elasticities experience a reduction in magnitude following
a spell on YT. The result of Table 3.5 after nearest neighbour matching mirrors thes
findings. However, the elasticity under the exponential assumption was only significant
at the 10% level. The plot of Figure 4.23 for the elasticity crosses into the ar a of no
significance for 0.4 > hn < 0.7. Perhaps this can help to explain the nearest neighbour
result.
Lastly, we see that the t-test plot for the elasticity of the hazard with respect to a
change in the arrival rate of job offers (exponential wage offer distributional a umption)
is significant at the optimal value for hn. The elasticities' mean values (treatm nt and
control) indicate a reduction in this elasticity post YT treatment. The result of Table
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Figure 4.23: Local Linear Regression Matching Performance as Measured by t-statistic
Fluctuations for Differing hn (Males YT) See Appendix C.2
3.5 following a nearest neighbour matching procedure led us to conclude that there was
insufficient evidence for the existence of a treatment effect for this elasticity post YT.
How can these two results be reconciled? As with the analysis of both elasticities of the
hazard with respect to the benefit level, we see that the plot for the t-test statistics of
the elasticity (Figure 4.23) lie on the boundary of the area of no significance and in fact
cross this boundary for some values of hn. This might explain the ambiguity between the
results following different matching procedures.
We now turn our attention to the magnitude of the treatment effects upon the job
search elasticities and wages following spells on the various versions of YTS. Figure 4.24
contains the standardised plots of treatment to control elasticites/wages following the local
linear regression matching of Figure 4.21 and Table 4.2, columns 1 and 2 (males with YTSI
experience). Again the vertical yellow line represents the point of the bootstrap iterative
optimal hn. Compare Figure 4.24 with the plots of Figure 4.16 to see the differ nt results
we obtain once we allow for YTS scheme heterogeneity. The pr sence of the optimal
value for hn allows us to compare the magnitude of various YTSI treatment effects at
this point against those of the nearest neighbour analysis (Table 3.5. Table 4.3, column
1 and 2 contain the significant elasticity and wage differences pre and post treatment
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Figure 4.24: Local Linear Regression Matching Performance as Measured by Fluctuations
in the Percentage Differences Between Treatment and Synthetic Elasticities for Various
hn (Males YTSI) See Appendix C.2
following a spell on YTSI as estimated from nearest neighbour and local linear regression
matched data respectively. Hence we see that the treatment effect on the reservation wage
after a spell on YTSI is such that males reduce their reservation wages by around 2.7%
(nearest neighbour result) or 3.8% (local linear result). The local linear regression male
YTSI subset also indicated a treatment effect of around 3.3% for both the expected wage
and the elasticity of the hazard with respect to the benefit level (exponential wage offer
distributional assumption).
Figure 4.25 and Table 4.3, columns 3 and 4 allow us to compare the magnitudes of the
treatment effects after a spell on YTSII. This scheme affects all the elasticities and there is
also evidence of a wage effect. These results are present in both the nearest neighbour and
local linear regression analysis. The evidence suggests that the elasticity of the reservation
wage with respect to the benefit level for males with a spell on YTSII is lowered by betw n
16% (nearest neighbour result) and 15% (local linear result). This is a marked effect, which
exists well beyond the area of no significant difference. Both the lasticiti of th hazard
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Figure 4.25: Local Linear Regression Matching Performance as Measured by Fluctuations
in the Percentage Differences Between Treatment and Synthetic Elasticities for Various
hn (Males YTSII) See Appendix C.2
with respect to the benefit level experience a treatment effect of 7.2% (Pareto wage offer
distributional assumption) and 4.7% (exponential wage offer distributional assumption)
for the nearest neighbour analysis. Whilst the same elasticities experience effects of 10.7%
and 9.5% respectively with the local linear regression analysis. Again these are highly
significant results. The elasticity of the reservation wage with respect to the arrival rate
of job offers underwent an effect of around 7.7% under the nearest neighbour analysis and
6.4% for the local linear procedure. Finally, we see the elasticity of the hazard with respect
to a change in the arrival rate of job offers reduced by 10.6% (nearest neighbour) and 9.3%
(local linear ). On the whole we have observed a consistency of both the significant effects,
which the two matching methods have uncovered, and the magnitudes of thes effects. All
the significant effects were of a similar magnitude when compared with th corresponding
results for the alternate matching procedure.
Figure 4.26 and Table 4.3, columns 5 and 6 contain evidence for the magnitude of the
significant treatment effects for males with YT experience using the local linear matching
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Figure 4.26: Local Linear Regression Matching Performance as Measured by Fluctuations
in the Percentage Differences Between Treatment and Synthetic Elasticities for Various
hn (Males YT) See Appendix C.2
algorithm. The plots within Figure 4.26 remain broadly constant over the whole range of
h«. We again concentrate on the effects as calculated at the estimated optimal value for h.;
We see more significant effects than we uncovered using the nearest neighbour algorithm
(Table 3.6. The nearest neighbour analysis suggested a significant treatment effect for the
elasticity of the hazard with respect to the benefit level (either wage offer distributional
assumption) of 7.5% and 8.2% respectively. Whilst our local linear regression analysis
suggests effects of 8.8% and 6.3% respectively. As with our previous analysis of the
effects for males with spells on YTSI or YTSII these effects are of similar magnitude
regardless of the method of matching used.
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Jlog~ 0.173905 0.179581
JJOgA (0.000935) (0.000628)
Jlogh + -0.409242 -0.448803
Jlogb (0.010636) (0.001615)
-0.317484
(0.009659)
Jlogh ++ 0.273052
JlogA (0.001065)
Table 4.2: Elasticities for Matched Men Using the Local Linear Algorithm with Boot-
strapped Estimate for hn
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CJlogh ++
CJJogb
CJlogh ++
CJIOgA
7.1%
Table 4.3: Comparative Magnitudes of Significant Treatment Effects by Various YTS
Types for Matched Men Using Both the Nearest Neighbour and Local Linear Algorithm
with Bootstrapped Estimate for hn
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4.4.4 The Bootstrapped Iterative Optimal Bandwidth Parame-
ter, h., and it's Implications for Our Interpretation of the
Treatment Effect Analysis (Females) See Appendix C.2
We now move on to investigate the treatment effects, which the various forms of YTS had
on the women within our sample. Figure 4.27 contains the t-test statistic plots for the
elasticities and wages of females with and without YTSI experience. These plots should
be compared to those of Figure 4.18 (all YTS types combined).
Once more, the vertical line represents the point at which the plots cross the optimal
bootstrap iterative hn. Table 4.4, columns 1 and 2 contain estimates of hn and compar s
to the nearest neighbour results of Table 3.6 suggested that the effect of a spell on YTSI for
the female subgroup was purely a wage reduction. The local linear regression matching
technique also uncovers this wage effect. However, we now observe a set of la ticity
effects. Firstly, the elasticity of the reservation wage with respect to the benefit I vel ris s
following a spell on YTSI this is also true of the elasticities of the hazard with resp et to
the benefit level (both wage offer distributional assumptions), which increase in magnitud
post treatment. As does the elasticity of the hazard with respect to the arrival rate of
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job offers. All of these elasticity effects are only uncovered using the nearest neighbour
algorithm.
Figure 4.28 contains the t-test statistic plots for females on YTSII for the range of
values of hn, having employed a local linear regression matching algorithm. Only the
plots for both the elasticities of the hazard with respect to a change in benefit level lie
beyond the area of no significance. The results of Table 4.4, columns 3 and 4 reveal
that the evidence points to a reduction in these two elasticities when we employ a local
linear regression approach. Previously, the results of Table 3.6, following the nearest
neighbour algorithm had failed to produce any evidence of a YTSII treatment effect for
female scheme participants.
Turning to look at YT scheme effects for females, we se that th t-test statistic
plots of Figure 4.29 remain fairly constant for the plots, which exist beyond th area of no
significance. Table 4.4, columns 5 and 6 present the estimated mean elasticities and wag s
as calculated at the yellow vertical line of Figure 4_29and compares to the results of Table
3.6, columns 5 and 6. The nearest neighbour analysis of Table 3.6 pointed to th existence
of a number of YT treatment effects on the female sub sample. We saw a wag effect in
that the reservation wage was seen to fall after a spell on YT. This result is repeated at
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the (10% level) within the results of Table 4.4. We had also discovered evidence for the
existence of a rise in the elasticity of the reservation wage following a spell on YT. -It
was seen to rise. This too is repeated within the local linear regression setting. Using
local linear regression matching we also see a rise in the elasticity of the reservation wage
with respect to the arrival rate of job offers after a spell on YT. -This we also saw for the
nearest neighbour matched female dataset. The evidence for a YT effect on the elasticity
of the hazard with respect to the benefit level is mixed. The local linear matching results
reveal a drop in the elasticity (exponential wage offer distributional assumption), but this
is only significant at the 10% level. In contrast the nearest neighbour analysis produced
an effect on the elasticity (Pareto wage offer distributional assumption) that seem d to
indicate a rise post treatment. These results conflict on another and are difficult to
reconcile. Lastly, we observe (Table 4.4) a rise in the elasticity of the hazard with respect
to the arrival rate of job offers. The nearest neighbour findings (Table 3.6) mirror this
result.
We now examine the magnitude of the various YTS treatment ffect we have uncov-
ered. Figure 4.30 contains the standardised treatment effect plots over the range of hn for
the YTSI female sub sample compares to that of the combined YTS plots of Figure 4.18.
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The approximate size of the significant treatment effects for this YTSI female dataset
as calculated at the yellow vertical line of Figure 4.30 are presented within Table 4.5,
columns 1 and 2. The nearest neighbour algorithm produced a modified dataset from
which the treatment effect on the expected and reservation wages was a reduction of 7.6%
and 8.6% respectively. Whilst matched data from the local linear procedure suggests that
these wages were reduced by 8% and 8.8% respectively. The local linear dataset analysis
also contains evidence for the existence of some treatment effects for the elasticities of
interest. The elasticity of the reservation wage with respect to the benefit I v I under-
went an increase of 8.6%. The two versions of the elasticity of the hazard with resp ct
to the benefit level increase in magnitude by 5.4% (Pareto) and 4.5% (expon ntial). The
elasticity of the hazard with respect to the arrival rate of job offers also incr a d by 4.9%.
Figure 4.31 contains the standardised treatment effects plot for women following a
spell on YTSII. The approximate treatment effects as evaluated at th optimal bandwidth,
hn' are reproduced within Table 4.5, columns 3 and 4. The neare t neighbour r sults of
104
4.4. Choice of the Bandwidth Parameter
(Jl 1.000
o.t5
.cc:
>-
~ 0.980
Q)
.!!l
Cil
Eoz
0.990
Alternate Values of h,
r.:--:-:----:-:-:----,---=--;-:-~
0.970
0.960
0.950
Figure 4.31: Local Linear Regression Matching Performance as Measured by Fluctuations
in the Percentage Differences Between Treatment and Synthetic Elasticities for Various
hn (Females YTSII) See Appendix C.2
Table 3.6 contained no evidence for the existence of any effects on the job search elasticities
and wages. However, these results conflict with those we observe within the local linear
regression setting to the extent that we see an effect on both versions of the elasticity of
the hazard with respect to a change in the benefit levels.
Figure 4.32 contains the standardised plots of the treatment effect upon the elasticities
and wages of interest for females with YT experience. Table 4.5, columns 5 and 6 contain
the magnitudes of those effects, which we found to be significant (as calculated at th
optimal value for hn). We uncover some evidence for the existence of a wage eff ct.
The reservation wage was subject to a reduction of around 2.8% following a sp 11on
YT. However, this result was only significant at the 10% lev l. Analysis of the n ar t
neighbour matched dataset Table 3.6, columns 5 and 6, had revealed a res rvation wage
effect of 6.9%. The elasticity of the reservation wage with respect to a chang in th b n fit
level is subject to a large treatment effect of around 56.4%. The near st neighbour analy i
had indicated an effect of around 22.5%.
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Figure 4.32: Local Linear Regression Matching Performance as Measured by Fluctuations
in the Percentage Differences Between Treatment and Synthetic Elasticities for Various
hn (Females YT) See Appendix C.2
The elasticity of the reservation wage with respect to a change in the arrival rate of
job offers leapt by around 8.4% following a spell on YT (local linear regression matched
dataset) and 17.5% (nearest neighbour matched dataset). Again the direction, if not the
magnitude of the treatment effect was consistent irrespective of the matching m thod em-
ployed. As we saw during our analysis of the results for the differing specifications of the
elasticities of the hazard with respect to a change in the benefit level are not consi tent
across the alternate matching methods. The elasticity under the Pareto wage offer dis-
tributional assumption seems to experience no treatment effects when using 10 al lin ar
regression matching. Yet the analysis of the nearest neighbour match d data ugge t a
rise of around 13.2%. In contrast, the local linear regres ion analysi sugg ts a fall in th
elasticity under the exponential wage offer distributional assumption of 4.1%. There is no
evidence for such an effect within the nearest neighbour analysis. Finally, th la ticity
of the hazard with respect to a change in the arrival rate of job off r s ms to rise by
around 13.8% within the local linear regression matching analysi and 31% within th
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nearest neighbour matching analysis.
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alogb
-0.506171
(0.008997)
0.174638 0.173309
(0.004213) (0.000542)
dlogh +
dlogb
-0.465501
(0.008105)
I_I 1-
, ..,
I I I: , ... a .
• • •_I 1- :..I-... ; , , ... e;. • •Sample Size 362 362 629 629 299 299
Btstrap h, 0.038565 0.026783 0.036960
+ Pareto Assumption, ++ Exponential Assumption
logh ++ -0.3981 -0.380909
d logb (0.007434) (0.000911)
-0.380466
(0.000669)
alogh ++
dlog).
0.266983
(0.001038)
0.292431
(0.000880)
Table 4.4: Elasticities for Matched Women Using the Local Linear Algorithm with Boot-
strapped Estimate for hn
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alogh ++
alogb
alogh ++
alogA
Table 4.5: Comparative Magnitudes of Significant Treatm nt Effe ts by Various YTS
Types for Matched Women Using Both the Nearest Neighbour and Lo al Lin ar Algorithm
with Bootstrapped Estimate for ti;
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4.5 Context and Implications of Results
This chapter began with some thoughts on the ideal pre-match dataset. Using a pair of
stylised distributions (Figure 4.1) we suggested that our pre-matched dataset might in
fact resemble the situation we outlined in Figure 4.1 Case 2. If Case 2 did approximate our
dataset, then we hypothesised that a nearest neighbour matching method would produce
progressively poorer quality matches as the algorithm proceeded. Our analysis of Figures
4.2 and 4.4, where we presented the actual propensity score distributions for the male and
female combined YTS datasets concluded that there was a subset of high YTS propensity
treatment individuals for whom there were insufficient corresponding high propensity
control persons. Further to this regard, we presented a pair of plots (Figures 4.3 and 4.5)
depicting the average distances between nearest neighbour matched pairs as the algorithm
progressed". Emphasis was placed on the implications of these results for any conclusions,
which we might draw from any analysis on a matched dataset of this type.
We called into question the practice of dropping treatment persons from the sample
non-randomly, for whom there were no controls in possession of sufficiently similar YTS
propensity scores. We concluded that rejecting anybody from our dataset on a non-
random basis would lead to a situation where an effort to remove the bias caused by a
lack of high quality matches would in itself induce a secondary bias through the removal
of mainly high propensity treatment persons. It was also noted that these high propensity
persons were exactly the kinds of individuals, which the schemes were designed to benefit.
As such the treatment effects on this subset of YTS participants was of great interest to
us.
Section 4.2.1 touched on the concept of stochastic dominance and how an examination
of the cumulative distributions of treatment and control groups' YTS propensity scores
could allow us to predict whether a dataset would produce a good matched dataset with
few poor matches (in terms of distance between YTS propensity scores within matched
7See Chapter 2 section 2.5.1 and Appendix C, section C.l for a full exposition of the matching
algorithm used.
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pairs). There was a brief examination of the CDFs for the subsets of interest for our
study. Only the male and female YT datasets proved to have sufficient high propensity
controls from which to construct a complete nearest neighbour matched dataset without
degradation in quality.
4.5.1 Results
Section 4.3.1 introduced some early evidence for the existence of treatment effects on
the job search elasticities and wages for men and women who had any kind of YTS
scheme experience using a kernel regression matched dataset. We commended the kernel
regression algorithm for its use of the whole control group when synthesising each new
control person. However, we tempered our optimism for the performance of the algorithm
with a cautionary look at the nature of the bandwidth parameter, hn, which needed to
be chosen before running the algorithm. In an effort to demonstrate the problems of
bandwidth selection we began to present t-test results for the significance of treatment
effects over the range of 0 < hn < 1 (see Figures such as C.1). These plots showed the
need for some method of selecting a value for hn for each dataset which would allow the
algorithm to generate a matched sample from which to draw some conclusions as to YTS
treatment effects. The Silverman (1986) optimal method of hn selection was discussed.
During the analysis of t-test results we returned to the equivalent nearest neighbour
matching results, Table 3.4 Section 3.4, to consider whether these two matching schemes
had produced synthetic datasets on which testing indicated the presence of similar treat-
ment effects. We concluded that for the male dataset the results of t-tests even without
a value of hn on which to settle, were broadly in line with those which we saw within the
nearest neighbour setting. However kernel regression matching, using the female dataset,
over the range of hn led to a set of t-test plots which were harder to interpret. We saw
large fluctuation in the t-test statistics especially for values of hn in the range 0.2 - 0.4.
We again returned to the nearest neighbour matching results of Table 3.4, Section 3.4 in
an effort to discover whether the pattern of treatment effect was consistent across match-
111
4.5. Context and Implications of Results
ing methods for the female dataset. We consistently uncovered evidence of a wage effect
on the treated, irrespective of the algorithm used; both methods suggested the presence
of a reduction in wage expectations post scheme, for females. However, evidence for a
treatment effect on the elasticities of job search was inconsistent and therefore difficult to
interpret. It was suggested that a local linear regression analysis might help to uncover
the truth and allow us to form a consistent picture.
We also took time to consider the magnitudes of any significant treatment effects,
which we found. Again we had to acknowledge that without a method to select a value
for hn we would have to present plots for the movement of treatment effects as hn varied.
Figures C.2 and 4.15 presented the ways in which the magnitudes of the treatment effects
for males and females varied over the range of hn•
Section 4.3.2 then examined the t-test results for the same combined YTS datasets
after having performed local linear regression matching. A comparison between the male
t-test plots of Figure 4.16 and the nearest neighbour t-test results of Table 3.4 concluded
that there was a consistency of treatment effect for all matching algorithms we employed.
However the elasticity of the reservation wage with respect to a change in the benefit
level crossed beyond the area of no significant difference for some values of values of hn• If
b« did reside within the area where this elasticity was significant, then this result would
conflict with that of the nearest neighbour analysis. As had been suggested during our
analysis of the results for the female kernel regression matched dataset, the equivalent
female local linear regression matched dataset produced t-test results which were broadly
in line with the results of the nearest neighbour analysis of Table 3.4. This cast doubt on
the validity of the kernel regression results.
Again we examined the ways in which significant YTS treatment effects varied over
the range of hn. Figures 4.17 and 4.19 contained plots of the magnitudes of the treatment
effects on the various elasticities/wages, as revealed using local linear matching. These
highlighted the need for a single optimal value of hn.
Section 4.4.2 introduced a solution to our bandwidth selection problems. We formu-
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lated the idea of a bootstrap iterative optimal value for hn' with the method of Silverman
(1986) at its heart. We demonstrated the convergence of the bootstrap estimates (Male
YTSI sub sample). As the size of the bootstrap sample increased, the estimated mean of
the bandwidth parameter settled to a given value whilst the bootstrap standard deviation
tended to zero. Plots of the sample distributions for the various elasticities and wages
were also shown to converge.
Subsection 4.4.3 saw us concentrate all further analyses solely on test results produced
using local linear regression matching. No more use was made of the kernel regression
algorithm. We now re-introduced the notion of presenting results by YTS type. Again,
there was evidence to support the hypothesis of YTS scheme heterogeneity.
Figure 4.21 presented the t-test statistic plots for the YTSI male sub sample after
local linear regression matching. All further plots now contained a vertical yellow line
to indicate the location of the bootstrap iterative value for the optimal hn• Elasticity
and wage treatment effects were considered using their bootstrap iterated sample distri-
butions", The results within Table 4.2 were comparable to those of Table 3.5, subsection
3.4.1. Table 4.3 contained the magnitudes of all significant treatment effects for males
with YTSI experience, as estimated using both the nearest neighbour and local linear
regression matched datasets.
Results suggested that males with YTSI experience lowered their reservation wages
by between 2.7% and 3.8% (depending on the matching algorithm used) after exiting
to another labour market state. This indicates that YTSI produced the wage effect for
males which some advocates of this initial incarnation of the scheme had hoped. The
scheme appeared to cause participants to reappraise their earnings expectations and as
such price themselves into work. The local linear analysis also suggested a similar effect
on the expected wage, in which this important employment prospects indicator was also
reduced. Furthermore the local linear regression results contained some evidence for
the existence of a reduction in the elasticity of the hazard with respect to a change
8See Appendix C, Figures C.1O to C.I3
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in the benefit level (exponential wage offer distributional assumption) for males with
YTSI experience. Again, this was good news in some political quarters as this result
indicated that scheme participants' job search strategies became less sensitive to benefit
level rises post treatment. These results seem to reflect some of the historical opinion
regarding the nature of the overall YTSI scheme effect. Recall from our introduction in
Chapter 1, that YTSI grew out of a previous Government training scheme, YOP (Youth
Opportunity Program), which was an attempt to address what was generally considered
to be a temporary excess supply of youth labour. However, as the 1980s began, the
numbers of unemployed youngsters continued to climb. This led to the introduction of
YTSI, which encouraged participants to learn general transferable skills, which employers
might find of use. If YTSI succeeded in improving the skills base of its participants then
we might expect to see some of the elasticity effects which we have discovered evidence
of. At the same time the scheme also attempted to suppress reservation wages and there
is evidence that it was successful in this regard.
The local linear regression algorithm produced a male YTSII matched dataset with
some interesting t-test results. Unlike YTSI, YTSII seemed to lead to an upward appraisal
of male participants reservation wages. This result suggests that this second incarnation
of the scheme had a wage effect which was the antithesis of one of the original aims of the
scheme (to lower wage expectations post participation). The nearest neighbour analysis
had failed to uncover such an effect.
Results of t-tests for the possible existence of treatment effects on elasticities caused
us to conclude that males with YTSII experience possessed a set of elasticities whose
magnitude was reduced as a result of the scheme. These results mirrored those of the
nearest neighbour analysis. Males with a smaller elasticity of the reservation wage with
respect to a change in the benefit level will as a consequence be less sensitive to a rise
in the benefit level. Allowing policy makers to raise the benefit level, thereby improving
claimants' standards of living without so much of a rise in the numbers of claimants. A
fall in the magnitude of the elasticity of the hazard with respect to a change in the benefit
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level would also have contributed to this effect.
The way in which one interprets the reductions in the elasticities of the reservation
wage and hazard with respect to a change in the arrival rate of job offers depends on
whether the economy was successful in generating increasing numbers of jobs during the
period in which males began to exit YTSII. If the arrival rate of job offers was rising during
this period, then YTSII would be regarded as having a detrimental effect as it depressed
males' receptiveness to the increasing arrival rate of offers. Whereas if the rate of arrival
fell then the treatment effect would ensure that the hazard was slow to fall. Conversely,
it is desirable for the reservation wage to fall rapidly when the arrival rate of jobs falls
and rise slowly when it climbs. Interestingly, this schemes introduction coincided with a
fall in the numbers of young people leaving school and an economic boom''; the YTSII
male wage effect would have acted to counter the upward pressure these labour market
conditions would have placed on reservation wages. The depreciation in the elasticity of
the reservation wage with respect to the arrival rate of job offers would also have acted
to counter these conditions and maintain scheme participants competitiveness within the
job market. However, the falling elasticity of the hazard of exiting unemployment would,
under these conditions, lead to a smaller rise in response to an increase in the arrival rate
of job offers.
Evidence for the existence of a male YT treatment effect was more pronounced within
the local linear regression matching algorithm. The elasticities of the reservation wage
and hazard with respect to a change in the benefit level and that of the hazard with
respect to the arrival rate of job offers all experienced a fall in magnitude following a
spell on YT. As YT matured the economy lurch back into recession, which in turn had a
negative effect on the job prospects for schoolleavers. Under such conditions within the
labour market, YT would have caused the hazard of exiting unemployment to decline at a
reduced rate for its male participants. This may be interpreted as a positive result, given
9Appendix C, Figure C.5 contains plots of the evolution of several key labour market indicators over
the time period of all YTS incarnations
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the Governments wish that the scheme should aid the unemployment to work transition
process.
Discussion then moved to the effects of each YTS incarnation on the female scheme
participants. As we had discovered during the nearest neighbour matched data analysis
of Section 2.5 the YTSI, YTSII and YT treatment effects for women uncovered using
local linear regression matched datasets were very different to those uncovered for the
corresponding male samples.
As with the male analysis, test results for the female YTSI sub sample using both
nearest neighbour and local linear regression matched data revealed the presence of a
lowering in both expected and reservation wages post participation. Again YTSI had
some success at pricing the young into jobs. However, results for the treatment effects on
the job search elasticities indicated that YTSI female participants had search elasticities
of greater magnitude. Hence, female participants sensitivity to a change in the benefit
level rose after treatment. Given that the economy was in recession as YTSI matured
and those exiting the scheme were facing reduced job prospects and in the light of these
findings any rise in the benefit level would have caused those females with YTSI experience
to become uncompetitive within the job market at an increased rate to non-participants
in the scheme.
Results for the treatment effects of YTSII showed that females were affected only
through a reduction in the magnitude of both specifications of the elasticity of the hazard
with respect to a change in the benefit level. The probability of participants exiting
unemployment during this period would therefore be less responsive to any rises in the
benefit level. There was no evidence for a wage effect. These results where found to be
in line with those of the nearest neighbour analysis of Section 2.5.
Finally, we investigated the effect of YT on females within our dataset. There was
some evidence for a wage effect post treatment. The reservation wage was seen to fall.
-The last incarnation of YTS did appear to price women into work. Evidence for the effect
of YT on elasticities was mixed. The elasticities of the reservation wage with respect to
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changes in either the benefit level or arrival rate of job offers increased post treatment.
Given the unhealthy state of the labour market at the time when those who undertook
a period of YT training were finishing their training it is reassuring to uncover evidence
of increased sensitivity of the reservation wage with respect to the arrival rate of job
offers as those with scheme experience would have acted quicker to adjust their wage
expectations downward as conditions deteriorated. Evidence for a rise in the elasticity of
the hazard with respect to a change in the arrival rate of job offers was also uncovered.
With the arrival rate falling, with probability females with YT experience exiting from
unemployment would have fallen at a greater rate than that of non-participants.
4.5.2 Random Exclusions: A Solution?
Figures 4.3 and 4.5 demonstrated that our fears for the performance of the nearest neigh-
bour algorithm were well founded. As a run of the algorithm progressed the average
distance between matched propensity scores began to rise. Interestingly this rise was not
gradual; the average distance between propensity score matches for both male and female
matching runs rose sharply towards the end of the process.
Conventional nearest neighbour matching methods would not have led to a degradation
in match quality. However, this high level of match quality would have been maintained
by excluding people from the treatment group for whom there was no control person left
whose propensity was sufficiently similar. We cannot countenance the use of such meth-
ods. The nature of the dataset, which we uncovered during our prematch examination
of stochastic dominance of treatment and control group propensity score distributions
indicated that there might be a lack of support in the right tail of these distributions.
Figures 4.3 and 4.5 did not reveal whether the poor matches were distributed throughout
the matched treatment persons or concentrated in one area (Most likely to the right of
the propensity score distribution). The plot in Figure 4.33 depicts the actual distance
between the propensity score of matched male couples. The distances are ordered along
the x-axis by the size of the propensity score of the treatment person in the matched
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Figure 4.33: Matching Performance from Lowest Treatment Prop nsity to High st Treat-
ment Propensity (Males)
couple. Notice how the quality of the matches remains high for tr atm ent p rsons with
propensity scores under 0.4. However, as w had feared it is amongst the high prop nsity
(0.5 and greater) treatment people that most of the poor matches oc ur.
Our study seeks to uncover the true natur of th YTS tr atm nt ffo t. B y n 1 this
goal we are interested in the effect of the schm on high pI' P nsity person, sine th
literature suggests that it was these young, low skill d individuals'" for wh m th shin
was introduced to help!': As such we w re cone rn d that tra itional mat .hing In tb cl
might introduce a bias which could prev nt us from un v ring th tru Y S tr atrn nt
effect. If our nearest neighbour algorithm had b n adapt d to in lud alip r x lusi ns,
the majority of rejections would have occurred at th high proj nsity nd of th p
laThe Probit models which produced th propensity score for both mal and f males in Tabl .4
indicate a relationship between academic underachiev merit at 16 and high r PI' p nsity to patti ipato in
YTS.
llSee Chapter 1 for an outline of YTS inception.
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Figure 4.34: Theoretical Basis for Random Exclusions
treatment people.
We sought a solution to the above problem. There are variations of the nearest neigh-
bour algorithm, which include returns of controls to the unmatched pool from the matched
pool to counteract the lack of support. These methods raise a number of questions. Firstly,
how many times should a single control person be available for matching? Twice, three,
ten times? If no limit is placed on the number of possible rematches then analyses on the
matched sample may lead to conclusions, which are over reliant on a handful of multiple
matched high propensity control persons. Secondly, what is the criteria for the return of
matched controls to the unmatched control pool. Should they be automatically returned
to the pool after matching with a treatment person, or should they be excluded until
such time as there are no control persons in the unmatched pool with a propensity, which
lies within the caliper of a treatment person, upon which the full pool of matched and
unmatched controls would become available for matching? Beyond these examples lies a
large array of variations. The implications for the nature of the matched dataset, which
might result are difficult to predict. We have chosen to examine the performance of just
one example of the nearest neighbour algorithm with a view to a comparison with the
results from kernel density and local linear regression matching methods.
We suggest that rather than allow the algorithm to drop treatment persons or resample
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controls non-randomly, it is more sensible to randomly drop persons from the treatment
group until the control group offers sufficient support for nearest neighbour matching to
occur without degradation in match quality. Figure 4.34 contains two stylised frequency
distributions. Let F(x) represents the control group's propensity score frequency distri-
b~tion and G(x) that of the treatment group. We breakup G(x} into three areas, A, B
and C. A represents the area of poor support. Our twin goals are to minimise region
A whilst not introducing a bias into the dataset. A method based on caliper exclusions
would be successful in the first requirement but would fail to meet the second. A random
reduction in numbers from the combined areas under the curve, G(x), would see the size
of all three areas fall, without altering the ratios of each area to the others. Therefore, we
would be.minimising area A whilst adhering to the requirement that no new bias should
enter the dataset. Of course there is a downside to such an approach. Random reductions
in the size of the treatment group mean that not only are people dropped from area A
(as with caliper exclusions) but also from areas Band C. As such, standard errors will
rise with the result that it becomes harder to identify specific treatment effects. As an
example, if the ratio of area A to the combined area of Band C was 1 to 2, then for every
1 person which caliper exclusions would drop from area A, a random exclusion method
would need to drop a similar person from area A, that person plus another 2 from the
combined area of Band C.
It should be noted at this point that there are those who do not consider non random
exclusions to be a problem. They argue rightly, that the Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983)
result does not require us to maintain the original "shape" of the treatment group in
order to remain valid. This is indeed the case. Since all that it gives us is a framework
of assumptions in which the propensity scores of the treatment group and control group
persons are accurate predictors of the degree of similarity between any two persons plucked
from the two groups. As such, even a dataset with a treatment group, the numbers of
which have been reduced non-randomly to account for a lack of support, will still produce
a well matched dataset. This also is true. However, any further tests on this dataset
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will only identify the treatment effect on those treatment people contained within it. this
effect cannot be interpreted as the average treatment effect on the treated.
We are presented with a trade off. Caliper exclusions reduce poor matches but in-
troduce bias into the dataset. Whilst random exclusions could also reduce poor matches
whilst not introducing bias but the smaller size of the resulting matched dataset might
make it difficult to uncover treatment effects.
4.6 Conclusions
The alternative to trying to develop the nearest neighbour algorithm further was to step
sideways and employ a kernel based matching method. Such schemes take advantage of the
whole dataset when generating each synthetic control person. Sample size is maintained,
since there is no need to drop persons from the treatment group. However we saw evidence
of the weaknesses of such methods. Firstly, the strength gained from the use of all of the
control group can also develop into a weakness when most of the contribution to the
synthetic controls comes from a handful of prematch controls. Secondly, the choice of
the bandwidth parameter was shown to be crucial to the performance of the matching
process. We produced results which showed variations in perceived YTS treatment effects
when the bandwidth was varied between 0 and 1. Comparisons with elasticity and wage
rate results from the nearest neighbour analyses suggested that conclusions drawn from
datasets produced using differing matching algorithms can vary.
We suggest that the ability of the nearest neighbour and kernel based methods to
produce well matched datasets is jointly dependent on the structure of the unmatched
dataset and the inherent strengths and weaknesses of the algorithms themselves. It is
not enough to simply perform these algorithms and present results as though the act of
matching has removed the problem of self-selection whilst not introducing a secondary
bias. The researcher must ask himself, what is the question I wish to answer? And will
this procedure produce a dataset which might allow me to address it?
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Chapter 5
Labour Market State Transition
Processes
In this section we present a modified version of the Burdett et al. (1984), Kiefer and
Neumann (1979), Mortensen (1986) and Neumann (1984) paper in which we model indi-
viduals' search and decision problems when faced with moving between unemployment,
YTS training and work. Their formal model may be modified to consider all these states
simultaneously although it requires some careful adaptation and reinterpretation. First
we outline the model then we review the implications of the model for our empirical data
problems.
We proceed to estimate the unemployment to work transition process using unmatched,
nearest neighbour matched and local linear matched datasets. We examine the consis-
tency of transition model results and find some evidence to support our earlier findings
as to the sensitivity of kernel matching methods to the choice of bandwidth.
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5.1 A Three State Model of Training, Unemployment
and Work Transitions
Let Uj be utility in state j = N, T, U where N denotes the state of employment, T denotes
the state of training and U denotes the state of unemployment. Assume that each state
has associated with it a utility which may be determined as follows.
UN = Z+fl
UT = a+f2 (5.1)
and
Uu = b
where Z is the unconditional mean wage and individual attributes exogenously determine
flJ a is a training allowance paid by employers to trainees and b is the unemployment
benefit level (which is fixed).
This model is a reasonable approximation to what may be observed empirically in the
labour market. Young people get jobs which will have wage levels influenced by their level
of human capital. However this process is stochastic and may depend greatly on extra-
neous factors, unobservables or even luck. Likewise the determination of the allowance
paid by an employer when training is partly fixed in the sense that there is a government
minimum level of such payments. (See Data Appendix for details). However, in practice
it is left up to the employer to pay what they deem appropriate to trainees. We can see
from the distribution of this training allowance in our data graphed in Figure C.4 that a
substantial minority of employers choose to pay more than the statutory minimum. From
the viewpoint of the individual this discretionary component of the training allowance is
stochastic.
Assume individuals get random draws of wage offers and training allowance offers from
a cumulative probability distribution function F(flJ f2) which is known to workers. In
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addition assume that the arrival of such offers follow a Poisson process with parameters
8N and 8T respectively. Burdett et al. (1984) show that given state j, future optimal
decisions are characterised by
(5.2)
The analogue of the reservation wage property in this model is in terms of acceptance
sets of doubletons (El! E2)' The position can be represented in Figure 5.1. This figure
shows the areas of acceptance sets Aj associated with the three labour market states of
unemployment, training and work. Conditional on the individual's draw on El and E2
this will determine which region in the diagram they fall into and hence the choice of
the optimal state. The borders in the diagram provide the threshold levels between the
different labour market states. Burdett et al. (1984) fully explore the analogue of this
model for the states of unemployment, work and out of the labour force. They describe the
comparative statics associated with changing levels of human capital on the acceptance
sets which carryover to our modified structure.
Burdett et al. (1984) use the model to motivate a reduced form estimation of state
to state transitions in terms of cause specific hazards. However, in their data they have
no information on reservation wages and they ignore the potential simultaneity between
unemployment duration and reservation wages. This study does not have these limita-
tions. The next section makes use of our data on reservation wages in the reduced form
estimation of the transition equation of moves between unemployment and work.
5.2 Analysis of Duration Data using Hazard Func-
tions
A person who positions themselves within the labour market may at some point during
their working life experience a period of unemployment. These periods are referred to
as spells. A single spell can be thought of as the length of time from the entry into
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Figure 5.1: The 3-State Model of Labour Force Participation
unemployment until the person exits to another labour market state or the measurement
is taken. Measurement of spell length can occur before the individual has exited.
During the course of this section we will highlight the use of Hazard functions when
attempting to analyse survival data. Data for the duration of each YTS participants' sp 11
of unemployment can be thought of as a set of survival data. An individual survives in the
state of unemployment for the duration of their spell before exiting to a new state, such
as employment. The hazard is defined to be the probability of a person exiting to uch a
state. If measurement occurs before an exit is achieved then we have a censored dataset.
The yeS data which we will be investigating contains many individuals who were still
unemployed at the time of the survey. All such people have a spell which continues up
to the end of the survey and perhaps beyond. Any model should explicitly allow for the
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fact that the data are censored.
Let spell length be denoted by random variable T, with continuous probability distri-
bution f(t), where t is a realisation of T. Then the cumulative probability is
F(t) = it f(s)ds = Pr(T s t). (5.3)
The Survival Function is defined as the probability that the spell is of length at least t,
that is
S(t) = 1- F(T) = Pr(T ~ t). (5.4)
When dealing with unemployment duration data the Hazard function maybe thought
of as the conditional probability of an individual making a transition out of unemployment
in a small interval of time (t, t + Oi) given that they have been unemployed for at least t
periods. Ifwe assume that the hazard is some function of t and denote it by A(t) then we
have
h( ) _ u Pr(t ~ T < t + OiIT ~ t)t - 1m .
6t-+O 8t (5.5)
From the definition of conditional probability, we have
P (T r IT ) _ Pr[(t ~ T ~ t + 8t) n (T ~ t)]r t < < t + ut ~ t - Pr(T ~ t)
Pr[(t ~ T ~ t + 8t)]
- Pr(T ~ t)
F(t + 8t) - F(t)
- Pr(T ~ t)
Therefore,
h(t) = lim F(t + 8t) - F(t) 1 = f(t) = f(t) . (5.6)
6t-+O 8t Pr(T ~ t) 1- F(t) S(t)
There exists a direct relationship between the hazard and the probability distribution
of T. This can be demonstrated via use of the Integrated hazard function
H(t) = it A(u)du = it f(u) duo
o ol-F(u)
(5.7)
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Rearranging we arrive at
1- F(t) = e-J~>.(v.)du.
Parametric models of the above have the advantage of simplicity but the restrictions
imposed via their structural implications leads to possible distortions of the estimated
hazard rates. Cox (1972) proposes a semi-parametric Proportional Hazard (PH) model
which has the advantage of fewer restrictions. The model specifies that
(5.8)
where Ao is the baseline hazard and captures individual heterogeneity. This can be viewed
as an individual specific constant. Hence the proportional hazard model does not include a
constant term. The partial likelihood estimator allows us to estimate f3 without requiring
estimation of Ao. The conditioning operation is used to remove any heterogeneity. Central
to the proportional hazards framework is this notion that all direct dependence of the
hazard on duration is captured in the baseline hazard and so differences across individuals
at duration point t depend on t only through regressor variation over time. If the regressors
remaining constant over time, then so does the factor of proportionality. The direct
dependence on t encapsulated by the baseline hazard can be thought of as a measure of
any economic processes whose actions are not contained within the regressor function.
Suppose the sample consists of K exit times, Ti, ... ,TK. For any time Ii, we define
the risk set R; to consist of all individuals whose exit time from unemployment is at
least Ii. The risk set with respect to any time T consists of all those individuals who
remain unemployed prior to that time. For individual j in risk set R;, tj ~ Ii. Then the
probability that an individual exits at time Ti given that one individual exits at time is
ePIXi
Pr(tj = IiIR;) = L: f3lx • (5.9)
JERi e j
The conditioning has removed the heterogeneity. Under the simplest situation of one exit
per period and no censoring, the partial log-likelihood is
1nL = i: {f3fXi -log (L ef3IXi)}.
1=1 \jERi
(5.10)
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When m; individuals exit at time ti, the contribution to the log-likelihood is just the sum
of the terms for each of these individuals.
In the absence of any information on the baseline hazard, only the order of the dura-
tions provides us with information about our unknown coefficients. The partial likelihood
framework allows us to easily accommodate our censored yeS dataset.
The job search/unemployment duration literature contains many variations on the'
basic unemployment duration model described above. An earlier study of the Restart
Survey data by Dolton and O'Neill (1995) used a multiple exit framework. They distin-
guish between exits to employment, training and those into a state of non-participation
in the labour force. Under a competing risks framework the exit time ti is characterised
by both a censoring indicator and an exit type indicator. K mutually exclusive and ex-
haustive exit types let C represent the exit type. At any given time the exit process in
terms of K transition intensities is defined to be
h ( ) _ I' Pr{t ~ T < t + 6t, C = kiT ~ t)k t - 1m 6 .
6HO t
{5.11}
The total hazard rate h{t) then equals the sum of all K transition intensities at time t,
that is h{t) = Ef=1 hk{t).
5.3 The Unemployment to Work Transition Process
for the yeS Data
Research which makes use of empirical Two Stage Least Squares methods to analyse
unemployment durations is limited by the analysis of only uncensored durations. Using
the three state model introduced above in section 5.1, a more flexible empirical approach of
the kind adopted by Burdett et al. (1984) and Gritz (1993) is possible. More specifically
it is feasible to estimate transition functions between any pair of states in the model
outlined in the previous section.
The approach taken by Burdett et al. (1984) is to estimate such a transition between
128
5.3. The Unemployment to Work Transition Process for the yeS Data
the states U and N using assumed exogenous regressors and predicted wages. The pre-
dicted wage regressor is included to capture the possible effects of changing human capital
or labour market employment prospects. Burdett et al. (1984) did not have reservation
wage or expected wage information in their data (and it is unclear how they may have
used it had it been available). In addition, the Burdett et al. (1984) paper was not
concerned with evaluation of a government training programme on the unemployment to
work transition.
5.3.1 Evidence from Cox Proportional Hazard Models Using an
Unmatched YCS Dataset
As with previous chapters we again concentrate on the dual goals of uncovering the nature
of the YTS treatment effect, whilst offering a critical assessment of the methods which
we employ. As such we are only interested in datasets which include both treated and
control/untreated observations. A dataset which excludes either one of these is lacks the
necessary data to evaluate the counterfactual, which is vital to the determination of the
YTS effect. Although the 3-state model allows for us to estimate transition equations for
the any state to any other, we shall concentrate on the unemployment to work transition
process and attempt to uncover any changes in this mechanism for those who have ex-
perienced a spell on YTS. The YTS to unemployment/work transition process is of less
concern to us as it does not represent an opportunity to investigate the YTS treatment
effect since there are no persons without YTS experience within such a dataset.
Again, we consider the YTS treatment effect to be different for the sexes. Hence, as
with earlier work we present results for males and females separately. Table 5.1 contains
proportional hazard model results estimated using male and female unmatched samples.
The model specification allows us to concentrate on the YTS treatment effect whilst
at the same time examine the robustness of the results to the dataset and matching
procedure being used. Only individuals whose labour market state diary contained a
period of unemployment which was characterised by an exit to work or censored were to
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be considered. With this in mind, the male sample consists of 1303 individuals and the
female 1142 sample.
Looking at the results for ethnicity first; we included a number of dummy variables
to represent the various categories of ethnicity from which, persons responded that they
originated. The category 'White' was used as the reference group. We find no evidence
to support the hypothesis that an individuals ethnic origin has an effect on the U to N
transition process. Results for the effect of education suggest that, for both sexes, the
probability of exiting from unemployment into work is enhanced for those with a higher
level of educational attainment at 16. Of course, this represents our prior beliefs, since we
would expect that, other things being equal, those with higher previous attainment will
be more attractive to prospective employers. The size of the effect seems to be greater for
females. Perhaps this is a reflection of the different kinds of jobs which the two sexes were
likely to do during the period of study. It seems to suggest the females were more likely
to take work which required the individual to have attained a higher level of educational
qualification. Large numbers of males still had the option to undertake unskilled work,
requiring no previous qualifications.
The next two effects we observe are only present for the male sample. LEA unem-
ployment is seen to be negatively significant for males making the U to N transition.
The lack of a significant effect for the female sample is perhaps another reflection of the
area of the job market into which they were likely to enter. Women have traditionally
found work in the service sector, and it is this area of the economy which emerged the
healthier after the recession of the early 1980s. Expansion of the sector, combined with
lower labour force participation rates amongst women could have acted to reduce the
effect of unemployment rates on the female U to N transition process. Those males who
had previously applied for a job are more likely to make the transition.
As with the models for the propensity score and the reservation wage we include a
number of regional and cohort dummies. The reference groups being the "North" and
cohort 1 respectively. A number of effects were observed in the estimated model.
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The natural extension to the model outlined by Burdett et al. {1984}is to explicitly
include a term in this reduced form estimation which attempt to capture the 'threshold
utility' levels that a person in unemployment might have for entering the states of work or
training. According to the 3-state Burdett model described above such reservation levels
on the rewards for entering these states will explicitly influence the size of the acceptance
sets for entering one of these other two states. Hence this logic suggests that the predicted
reservation wage could be used to proxy for these reservation utility levels. Clearly it is
necessary to use predicted levels of these reservation levels, since not every person in the
data had occasion to report each of these values. These predictions are based on the
reduced form estimations reported in Table C.5 in the Data Appendix. This variable
is included in the unmatched dataset as a regressor in the estimated equations reported
in Table 5.1. We see from this that the coefficient of the reservation wage variable is
insignificantly different from zero in both the U to N transition equations ..
Lastly, we consider the YTS treatment effect as measured in unmatched samples.
Unlike in Chapter 3, we make immediate allowance for the heterogeneity of YTS. This
seems reasonable given the evidence we uncovered for the differing effects of the three YTS
incarnations during the work that followed. The months prior to the beginning of each
individuals unemployment spell were scanned for the presence of any YTS spells. Once a
spell was found we checked its' start date to determine which version of the scheme the
participant had undertook and then set a dummy variable for that version of the scheme
to 1, or 0 otherwise. The reference group were those individuals who had not experienced
YTS.
Results indicate that males who undertook a period of YTSI were less likely to find
work in any subsequent unemployment spell within the period of study. There was no
evidence for such an effect amongst the female sample. This may be the result of a lack
of females who undertook YTSI. Evidence for the effect of YTSII is consistent across the
sexes. Both males and females are less likely to make the transition from U to N during
a period of unemployment if they had previously experienced a spell of YTSII. Neither of
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the coefficients of YT experience for males or females are seen to be significant.
All of these results seem to support anecdotal evidence for the stigmatisation of those
who had participated in both YTSI and YTSII by prospective employers. Whilst perhaps
the lack of a negative effect for YT is the result of an improvement in both the scheme
and employers perception of it following the introduction of vocational qualifications to
the programme. However, much as with the early results for Chapter 3 these results were
obtained using a dataset which had not been adjusted to make allowance for self-selection
into YTS. We propose to examine the robustness of these findings to adjustments made
using alternative methods of matching.
5.3.2 Evidence from Cox Proportional Hazard Models Using a
Nearest Neighbour Matched YCS Dataset
We now move on to consider Cox proportional hazard models, estimated using matched
datasets. We just run a Cox partial ML estimator on a single dataset containing nt
treatment cases and the same number of matched controls.
Before the matching process could begin the correct subsample of the dataset needed
to be selected. As with the estimation of the U to N transition model using unmatched
samples, only persons whose labour market state diary contained a spell of unemployment
which was either censored or exited to work were considered. These individuals were
separated by sex. The resulting two datasets were then cut to only include those persons
with a complete set of U to N transition model dependent variables. Nearest neighbour
Mahalanobis matching of the type already used in Chapter 31 was then performed. This
process culminated in the production of male and female matched datasets. The number
of treatment and control individuals now present were equal within each gender. Hence,
we now had a male dataset which contained a treatment group of 572 persons and a
matched control group consisting of a single individual for each of these, for a grand total
of 1144 men. The female matched sample now consisted of 540 treatment and 540 control
1See section 2.5 for an explanation of the method and its assumptions.
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persons for a total dataset of 1080 women.
Results for the estimation of the U to N transition using the matched datasets are
presented in Table 5.2. As with the results for unmatched samples we find no evidence
for the existence of an effect on the transition of those males and females who responded
that they were from an ethnic background other than white.
In contrast to the results for the unmatched male sample we now observe a positive
effect for the number of YTS training places. This may indicate that in areas where YTS
provision was high the number of high quality placements was correspondingly higher and
as such many males participants in YTS were effectively apprentices and may have been
unaware of their YTS status. The lack of a effect for YTS provision for the female U
to N transition again suggests that the mechanisms by which YTS affected males and
females are different. It would be helpful to know the breakdown of YTS provision by
employment sector. It could be that in areas with high YTS provision, the majority of
that provision was in sectors where the work force was traditionally dominated by male
workers. We could also postulate that YTS provision was of less use to the female labour
force. This appears to run parallel to the initial purpose of the YTS scheme which was,
at least in part, a measure designed to fill the gap in young male training vacated by the
declining manufacturing sector and its' system of apprenticeships.
Our a priori belief for the existence of a negative unemployment effect for both males
and females was only partially realised when we estimated the U to N transition models
for the unmatched dataset. LEA unemployment proved to be negatively significant for the
male transition process. We observe this effect for the nearest neighbour matched dataset
with a similar magnitude. We now also see weak evidence for the existence of a regional
youth unemployment rate effect. The coefficient of this variable is negatively significant
at the 10% level for the male sample. Once again there is no evidence to support the
hypothesis of a female unemployment rate effect. Once again we see a positively significant
coefficient for those males who had previously applied for a job, the magnitude of which
corresponds to that seen using unmatched samples.
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Although all of the significant regional and cohort effects which we previously observed
appear here, with the same signs and similar magnitudes, a number of new effect are also
present. Cohort dummies 4 and 5 are now significant at the 10% level. An examination
of the unmatched sample shows these two coefficients to have been bordering on this level
of significance previously. Interestingly the coefficient of 'Yorkshire and Humberside' for
males is now significant at the 5% level. There was no evidence for such an effect when
using unmatched samples.
Once more reservation wages fail to capture the "threshold utility" levels that a person
in unemployment might have for entering the state of work. As such, we find no evidence
for an effect on the U to N transition for males or females when using the reservation
wage as a proxy for individuals "threshold utility".
Evidence for the YTSI, YTSII and YT treatment effects remain consistent with the
findings for the unmatched dataset. Again, we see a negative effect for males who expe-
rienced YTSI, although this is now only significant at the 10% level. A look back to the
same coefficient in Table 5.1 for males reveals that the previous result was borderline sig-
nificant at the 5% level, indicating that this result is still consistent. All three significant
effects are of similar magnitudes to those of the unmatched sample.
5.3.3 Evidence from Cox Proportional Hazard Models Using a
Local Linear Matched YCS Dataset
We now present results from of Cox proportional hazrd models using local linear matched
datasets. Hence the male sample contains nt males from the treatment group and nt
"averaged" matched control people. These datasets were created using the local linear
method as described in subsection 2.5.3.
We now propose to take the concept of the synthetic control group a stage further.
Before we could attempt an analysis using a local linear regression matched dataset, we
needed to work through the problems which arise as a result of the lack of covariate
data following a conventional local linear matching procedure. In the same way that we
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had generated synthetic elasticities and reservation/expected wages'' using the weights as
calculated using Equation (2.41) we were now able to generate synthetic values for all
the covariates which we would need to proceed with a Cox Proportional Hazard Models
analysis of a local linear regression matched dataset. In essence we had created a set,
of size nt (the number of persons in the treatment group), of synthetic control persons
who "possessed" synthetic values for their covariates calculated from a combination of the
unmatched control group covariates and the local linear regression weights matrix. The
variables were now ready for use in our Cox Proportional Hazard Models analysis.
As with the presentation of the local linear matching results for the YTS treatment
effects on job search elasticities and wages we suggest that results can be sensitive to the
choice of the kernel bandwidth parameter, hn• In an attempt to observe any fluctuations
in the magnitude and significance of the coefficients we present our results over the range
of hn• Chapter 4 contained a series of plots for the migration of job search elasticities and
wages as the bandwidth parameter, hn, varied. We now present our results for the local
linear matched dataset U to N transition model in a series of plots (Figures 5.2 to 5.7)
for each of the key variable coefficients over the range 0.1 ::; hn < 1. Each of these plots is
constructed such that hn is represented by the x-axis. There are then two y-axes; the left-
hand y-axis measures fluctuations of the coefficient, whilst the right-hand y-axis measures
fluctuations in the t-stat for that coefficient. The blue plot line represents the coefficient
and the red plot line represents it's t-stat. The range of the t-stat axis which we report
covers only the region 0 to 0.1, since this corresponds to the area in which a coefficient is
significant. Hence it does not appear on the graph in Figure 5.2 if it falls outside of this
range. Regions of the y-axis over which the red line is missing correspond to regions of no
significance. At the same time we present Table 5.3, a model evaluated using a dataset
matched at the iterative optimal bandwidth for the purposes of comparison with Tables
5.1 and 5.2.
Examination of the results in Table 5.3, for the male local linear matched sample
2See subsection 4.4.2 for an explanation of how this was done.
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reveals that, as with those for the unmatched and nearest neighbour datasets, there is
no evidence for the existence of any ethnicity effects. Plots of the coefficients for the
variables "Black", "Asian" and "Other Ethnic Origin" , over the range of hn are presented
in Figure 5.2. All three reveal that although the magnitudes of the coefficients vary over
this range, at no point do any of them become significant. Results for the female dataset
contrast with those seen using the two previous female samples. Unlike the results for the
unmatched and nearest neighbour matched female datasets, the U to N transition model
estimated at the optimal bandwidth using the female local linear matched sample contains
evidence suggesting that female Asians and those who placed themselves in the category
"Other Ethnic Origin" are less likely to move from unemployment to work. Figure 5.5
contains the plots for the coefficients of these two variables over the range of hn• Notice
just how sensitive some of these results can be to the choice of hn• Taking the plot for
the coefficient of "Asian" first we observe that the negatively significant result in Table
5.3 is only significant over the approximate range 0 < hn < 0.2, after which, a movement
of the coefficient causes it to enter the region of no significance, where it remains for the
approximate range 0.2 < h-. < 1. The sudden shift in the red t-stat line between hn = 0.2
and hn = 0.3 is testament to the sensitivity of this coefficient to the kernel bandwidth.
Both the unmatched and nearest neighbour matched male and female datasets pro-
duced models with significant positive coefficients for the education score at 16. Table 5.3
shows that the coefficient of the variable 'Education Score at 16' for local linear matched
males, calculated at the optimal bandwidth parameter, is insignificant. The plot of this
coefficient in Figure 5.2 shows that although it's magnitude varies over the range of hnl
at no point does it become significant. In contrast, the results for the female education
score variable in Table 5.3 are consistent with previous findings. Unemployed females with
higher educational attainment do appear to find it easier to make the transition to work.
The plots of this coefficient and it's t-stat contained in Figure 5.5 are interesting in that
the variable remains significant over the range of hn, with the value of the t-stat remaining
close to 0 at all times. However, we do observe some fluctuation in the magnitude of the
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coefficient around the region hn = 0.2 to 0.5.
Results for the local labour market variables within the male local linear matched
sample are stronger than those seen when estimating the two previous male U to N
transition models. The coefficient of the variable for regional YT provision within the
unmatched sample was insignificantly different from zero. The same coefficient, when
estimated using the nearest neighbour male sample was positively significant. Once again
we observe a positive significance for this variable. The plot for this coefficient and it's
t-stat is contained within Figure 5.3. The red t-stat line is present for low values of
the bandwidth before moving outside of the range of significance as the magnitude of
the coefficient begins to fall. Higher values for the bandwidth lead to a matched dataset
which produces a model in which magnitude of this coefficient begins to rise again. As this
happens we see the red t stat line return to the area of significance. Any conclusions as to
the effect of regional YT placement provision on the rate of males making the transition
from unemployment to work made using these results would be dependent on the choice
of the kernel bandwidth.
Neither of the two previous datasets produced a model which contained a significant
result for the effect of regional YT provision on the female U to N transition. Results
for the female local linear matched dataset both support and contradict these findings.
Again this is due to fluctuation in the magnitude and in consequence the t-stat of the
coefficient of this variable. Figure 5.3 contains the plots for this variable. The coefficient
is insignificant until hn > 0.35, at which point, the red t-stat line appears and remains
until hn = 0.5 It the reappears for hn > 0.65. Clearly both the male and female local
linear matched samples are extremely sensitive matching specification.
Evidence from models estimated using the unmatched and nearest neighbour datasets
had suggested a relationship between male LEA unemployment rates and the rate of
exit from unemployment to work. Results for females had failed to uncover any such
connection. The coefficient of LEA unemployment for male and female U to N transition
models are now seen to be negatively significant at the optimal bandwidth. A look at
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both the male and female plots for the coefficients and t-stats of this variable, in Figures
5.3 and 5.6, show that both are significant over the entire range of hn• Notice also that
the form of the variation in the magnitude of these coefficients for both males and females
is the same; most of the variation occurs around the 0.2 < li« < 0.4.
Previous results had not indicated a link between youth unemployment rates and the
transition of unemployed males and females into work. The male transition model using
local linear matched data now contains a negatively significant coefficient for this variable.
Figure 5.3 contains the plot for this coefficient. As hn increases, so the magnitude of the
coefficient falls until around hn = 0.3, when it ceases to be significant. Results for the
female local linear matched dataset were in line with those using the two previous datasets.
The variable "Ever Applied for a Job" had shown mixed results for the unmatched
and nearest neighbour matched datasets. It's coefficient was positive for males using
"both. Neither model had suggested such a relationship for female job seekers. Figure 5.3
contains the plot for the male coefficient of this variable. At no point does the red t-stat
line appear. In contrast, the female coefficient plot of Figure 5.6 shows the coefficient
become negatively significant around hn = 0.3.
We do not present a full investigation of the migration of the coefficients of the regional
and cohort dummy variables since these were only included to control for variations in
the dataset resulting from differing local labour market conditions and temporal changes
in the economic environment into which, young school leavers were exposed.
As was stated at the beginning of this whole section, we included a predictor of reser-
vation wages with the hope that it might capture the 'threshold utility' levels that a
person in unemployment might have for entering the states of work or training. The male
and female populations, from all three datasets used, produced U to N transition models
with insignificant coefficients for this variable. However a look at the plot for the male
local linear matched sample, in Figure 5,4, does reveal a move to positive significance for
the coefficient when matching was performed using values of hn > 0,45. At the same time
the coefficient almost doubles in magnitude. The equivalent plot for the female dataset,
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Figure 5.7, contains no regions of significance.
We now consider the effect of all three versions of YTS on the U to N transition.
Taking the coefficient of YTSI· first, Table 5.3 shows this to be negatively significant for
males and insignificant for females at the optimal bandwidth. These results reflect those
for the unmatched and nearest neighbour samples. The plot for the male YTSI coefficient,
Figures 5.4, indicates that the effect is strongly negatively significant over the entire range
of hn• However, it's magnitude does decline as hn rises. The female YTSI coefficient plot
contains no evidence for a significant female YTSI effect.
As with YTSI, results for YTSII are in line with previous findings. Results suggest
that the unemployed of either sex, with YTSII experience, were less likely to exit to work.
In contrast to the male YTSI coefficients, the magnitude of the effect grows as n« rises.
The female effect reduces in magnitude as hn rises.
Finally, we consider the effect of YT on the U to N transition. None of the three male
datasets uncovered an effect for YT. Figure 5.4 contains the plot for the coefficient of this
variable reveals that this remains the case over the whole range of hn• The unmatched and
nearest neighbour models did not suggest a relationship between female YT experience
and the time to exit from unemployment into work. Table 5.3 suggests that females with
a spell on YT maybe less likely to exit. The plot for this coefficient contains reveals that,
as with several of the results in this subsection, this result is sensitive to the choice of hn.
We do not observe the red t-stat line around the region of 0.25 < hn < 0.45.
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Males Females
Regressors U-7N Standard U-7N Standard
Error Error
Black -0.3010644 0.4655724 -0.2622033 0.2825738
Asian 0.0991228 0.2796618 -0.1381936 0.2774568
Other Ethnic Origin 0.1086571 0.1736851 -0.2241836 0.1844621
Education Score at 16 0.0175384 0.0062921 0.0239475 0.0060667
Regional YT Places 7.177268 5.012926 4.351977 5.279642
LEA Unemployment -0.0321242 0.0115167 -0.0113013 0.011341
Regional Youth -1.92945 1.69107 -1.778768 1.809986
Unemployment
Ever Applied for Job 0.1863709 0.0781305 0.0335759 0,0719602
Yorkshire & Humberside 0.1959552 0.1370854 0.1474534 0.1369818
East Midlands -0.270313 0.1174874 0.2945252 0.1173168
East Anglia -0,0621847 0.1978639 -0.0019859 0.2173162
Greater London 0.2214141 0.1863598 0.1502816 0.2081107
South East -0.1656823 0.2522709 0.3690366 0.2470798
South West 0.6610613 0.3731564 0.8151292 0.3753839
West Midlands 0.0876336 0.252259 0.4720825 0.2615014
North West 0.0728373 0.2121285 0.4301338 0.2295347
Wales -0.0167016 0.1376586 0.2759921 0.1586849
Cohort 2 0.0171707 0.1443004 -0.0230942 0.1514039
Cohort 3 0.0279374 0.1697276 0.138981 0.1867366
Cohort 4 0.303183 0.1902795 0.3244546 0.2078507
Cohort 5 0.2839207 0.251272 0.4290856 0.2696632
Cohort 6 -0.2695125 0.2106865 0.2074527 0.1957924
Predicted log of Wage -0.1231428 0.6758956 0.0048022 0.7800348
YTS I before -0.3204607 0.1620362 -0.1159314 0.2008059
Unemployment Spell
YTS II before -0.3412091 0.1095644 -0.3723779 0.1198777
Unemployment Spell
YT before Unemployment 0.1821303 0.2574848 0.107904 0.2484242
Spell
'l 96.77 102.44
Pseudo R;l 0.0059 0.0073
Log Likelihood -8149.1472 -6994.4895
Sample Size 1303 1142
Table 5.1: Cox Proportional Hazard Model for th U to N Mal and ' mal Tran iti n
Process (Unmatched Dataset)
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Males Females
Regressors U7N Standard U7N Standard
Error Error
Black -0.3348777 0.4686046 -0.2061529 0.3401145
Asian 0.0989408 0.2809493 -0.178762 0.2779017
Other Ethnic Origin 0.0809268 0.1811238 -0.2476814 0.1873954
Education Score at 16 0.0140513 0.0066223 0.0234838 0.0062533
Regional YT Places 11.31041 5.712521 2.576579 5.412354
LEA Unemployment -0.0292295 0.0124654 -0.0127602 0.0116797
Regional Youth -3.381178 1.985636 -0.545921 1.937689
Unemployment
Ever Applied for Job 0.2071765 0.0855468 0.0384625 0.0734508
Yorkshire & Humberside 0.2881552 0.1433614 0.1556714 0.1399598
East Midlands -0.3123568 0.1285754 0.3177136 0.1204551
East Anglia 0.0146096 0.2180934 -0.0336035 0.2210286
Greater London 0.3838412 0.2098404 0.1570495 0.2121221
South East 0.033044 0.2785128 0.3473323 0.2533353
South West 0.8652406 0.4236607 0.7421164 0.3827568
West Midlands 0.2963857 0.286848 0.4571354 0.2651298
North West 0.2365539 0.2344751 0.4081132 0.2347613
Wales -0.026711 0.1481314 0.2927429 0.1623819
Cohort 2 -0.0395245 0.150275 0.0067976 0.1531237
Cohort 3 0.0250025 0.1925307 0.183334 0.1916085
Cohort 4 0.3065541 0.2116407 0.3669918 0.2129891
Cohort 5 0.2722826 0.2592821 0.5043142 0.2751833
Cohort 6 -0.2860503 0.2244709 0.2338126 0.199947
Predicted log of Wage -0.0072393 0.7043089 0.1485837 0.7982437
YTS I before -0.2888603 0.1635088 -0.1216007 0.2013769
Unemployment Spell
YTS II before -0.354268 0.110578 -0.3704267 0.1203834
Unemployment Spell
YT before Unemployment 0.1674214 0.2668467 0.1245818 0.2494195
Spell
e 97.71 96.00
Pseudo R:.! 0.0069 0.0073
Log Likelihood -7001.4393 -6555.4162
Sample Size 1144 1080
Table 5.2: Cox Proportional Hazard Mod 1 for th Mal and mal U t N 'an iLi 11
Process (Nearest Neighbour Match d Dataset)
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Males Females
Regressors U-7N Standard U-7N Standard
Error Error
Black -0.6415866 0.4848389 0.0345284 0.5073386
Asian 0.538299 0.4043378 -1.825117 0.6301077
Other Ethnic Origin -0.1539133 0.3232332 -0.8306165 0.3378005
Education Score at 16 -0.0114904 0.010881 0.0542092 0.01028
Regional YT Places 14.22831 6.238399 11.88717 8.663363
LEA Unemployment -0.0677621 0.0179002 -0.0684307 0.0172047
Regional Youth -6.988046 2.752259 1.81104 2.913894
Unemployment
Ever Applied for Job 0.0822098 0.1376205 -0.0280611 0.142718
Yorkshire & Humberside 0.212276 0.1529093 -0.5604344 0.1900364
East Midlands -0.4488667 0.195606 -0.255107 0.175739
East Anglia 0.150119 0.227893 -0.2014418 0.3239725
Greater London 0.1219509 0.1644689 0.0454197 0.3114626
South East -0.5371308 0.3598346 1.175755 0.3863077
South West 0.631213 0.4044976 0.5719454 0.6021811
West Midlands 0.3146283 0.2142097 0.119334 0.4039506
North West 0.07504 0.2412238 0.2270781 0.3585024
Wales 0.0698121 0.1880825 -0.2758991 0.2592864
Cohort 2 0.3719814 0.1476243 0.9178647 0.2370152
Cohort 3 -0.3499463 0.1637918 1.496143 0.2713786
Cohort 4 0.1761424 0.2219662 1.55833 0.3213547
Cohort 5 -0.0492508 0.3314125 1.657248 0.3899189
Cohort 6 -0.5645457 0.2921989 1.876665 0.2847118
Predicted log of Wage 1.163237 0.8785303 0.000667 1.379391
YTS I before -0.685633 0.1695052 -0.1007095 0.215254
Unemployment Spell
YTS II before -0.6487357 0.1299508 -1.12893 0.1427642
Unemployment Spell
YT before Unemployment 0.1497676 0.3258626 -0.6500879 0.3035491
Spell
x2 231.56 268.53
Pseudo R2 0.0166 0.0206
Log Likelihood -6843.473 -6374.1187
Sample Size 1144 1080
Table 5.3: Cox Proportional Hazard Mod 1for th Mal and mal U t N 'an, iti 11
Process (Local Linear Matched Dataset)
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Figure 5.3: Coefficients of Independent Variables in the Cox Proportional Hazard Model
for the Male U to N Transition Process (Local Linear Matched Dataset)
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Figure 5.5: Coefficients of Independent Variable in the Cox Pr portional Hazard Mod I
for the Female U to N Transition Process (Lo al Lin ar Mat h d Data t)
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Figure 5.6: Coefficients of Independent Variable in the Cox Proportional Hazard Mod 1
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Figure 5.7: Coefficients of Independent Variables in th Cox Proportional Hazard Mod 1
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5.4 Conclusions
First examination of the results contained within this chapter might lead one to believe
that matched datasets produce transition model results which differ from those estimated
from unmatched datasets. Furthermore, datasets adjusted using differing matching algo-
rithms can produce results which are not consistent. This last statement is of particular
concern when we consider that these matching methods are designed to solve the same
problem. Namely to remove self selection bias from the data.
If we begin by comparing the unmatched dataset and the two matched datasets, then
we can conclude that both matched datasets produce a transition model which is different
to that for the unmatched sample. The question is, can we attribute this to the removal
of self selection bias, or is it the result of a new bias introduced during the processes of
matching? Furthermore, is it possible to obtain consistent results when employing two or
more matching methods?
The answer to the question of consistency between the results for the two matched
datasets in Tables 5.2 and 5.3 is partially addressed by the coefficient/t-stat plots for
the transition model estimated using data matched with varying bandwidths using the
local linear method. A variable such as the youth unemployment rate, was seen to be
significant at the 10% level when using the male nearest neighbour matched dataset. The
same variable was significant at the 5% level using the optimal bandwidth local linear
dataset. However the coefficient plot over the range of hn offered evidence to explain the
change in this result, as it revealed that as hn increased, so the level of significance for this
effect fell. A similar series of circumstances is seen for the female dataset with regard to
the variable for Asian descent. Inconsistencies in the result for the variable "ever applied
for a job" are also partially explained by movements in and out of significance for the
female coefficient plot.
We included the predicted reservation wage with the hope that it would capture the
threshold utility levels between the different labour market states. However neither table
contained a significant coefficient for this variable. This however is not the end of the
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story. The male plot for this coefficient shows us that as the bandwidth rises so a positively
significant coefficient emerges.
Finally, we see that the female nearest neighbour dataset produced a model which did
not contain a significant result for the YT variable. This was in contrast to the findings
for the model estimated using the optimal bandwidth local linear matched data. Yet
again, an examination of the plot for this female coefficient reveals that it moves in and
out of significance over the range of hn.
When considering the nearest neighbour algorithm separately we conclude that wider
callipers lead to convergence in the coefficients of models run using these matched datasets.
This follows intuitively since as the caliper width approaches 1, the set of controls which
can be matched approaches the total number of controls. Similarly, as the bandwidth of
a kernel based method approaches 1, so the set of controls to be weighted for the creation
of a synthetic match approaches the total number of controls.
A deeper examination of results from the two matching regimes has shown us that
many of the their apparent differences are less visible as the bandwidth of the kernel rises.
We would suggest that this is a reflection of our adjustment of the nearest neighbour
algorithm to not exclude anyone from the treatment group, even if they lacked support,
since this is akin to widening the bandwidth for the local linear algorithm Hence, results for
the local linear dataset converge to those of the nearest neighbour data as hn increases.
In conclusion, we have evidence to suggest that given a suitable framework, differing
matching algorithms of the type considered in this work, can produce results which are
consistent with one another.
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Conclusions
In the introduction to this work we broached two points for discussion. Firstly, we asked
what was the YTS treatment effect. We wondered whether the scheme, in its different
versions, had succeeded in meeting the Governments requirements of it. Secondly, we
acknowledged some of the difficulties inherent in an empirical study of this question and
introduced the concept of matching as an answer to the problem of self selection into
YTS. When using matching methods it is important to question of the performance of
these algorithms and whether consistent results could be produced when using them.
6.1 On the Question of Matching Algorithm Perfor-
mance and Consistency
If all matching methods produced the same matched dataset, there would be no need
for researchers to use any but the simplest, most convenient method. In reality, since
each method of matching gives rise to a different "quasi-control" group it is important to
compare them. The methods which we have considered during this work all have their
strengths and weaknesses. The nearest neighbour algorithm benefited from the fact that it
matched real people to one another. As well as being intuitively simple, nearest neighbour
methods produce matched samples containing individuals with full sets of covariates. A
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feature which greatly simplifies any analysis which might follow. However, with datasets
containing areas of poor support and depending on whether we choose to match in spite of
this or exclude those without support, such algorithms can produce either poor matches
or biased datasets. Kernel based algorithms such as the kernel and local linear methods
have the advantage that they reuse the dataset by weighting individuals within the control
set by how similar they are to each person in the treatment set. The Achilles heal of
such methods lies in the need for researchers to select the bandwidth parameter prior to
matching. Silverman (1986) has suggested the use of an optimal bandwidth. However, the
nature of the dataset which we employed made this difficult to estimate. Kernel methods
also suffer from the need to synthesise the covariates which we wish to employ in our post
match analyses.
The results which we have presented during the course of this work provide evidence to
suggest that we cannot rely on matching methods as "magic box" solutions. The nature of
each dataset can exacerbate the various weaknesses of each method. Rendering it unwise
to perform a match with a given algorithm. It can never be enough to simply submit a
dataset for input to an algorithm and then perform an econometric analysis on the output.
Although the Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) result of Chapter 2, section 2.4 provides
a theoretical framework that justifies methods that match using propensity scores, the
assumptions which underpin it, especially those which relate to the observation of a
complete set of X variables, for the whole of the sample are limiting given the nature of
real world data. Clearly, propensity score models, containing X variables which capture
the nature of the propensity for treatment are needed. However, the greater the number
of independent variables used, in a model for propensity, the smaller the sample available
to us. This is especially true of exogenous variables such as local labour market data,
which are difficult to accurately merge with the endogenous data obtained from survey
respondents. The tradeoff which a researcher must face may determine the stress to which
assumptions are subjected.
We have also highlighted the issue of "region of overlapping support". We tackled
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the question of whether a researcher must make choices about the omission of persons
whose propensity scores lie outside of the region. We voiced our concern for results ob-
tained using datasets matched with some treatment persons excluded. We demonstrated
that given that exclusions for non-overlapping support were likely to occur without uni-
form probability throughout the group, it followed that any treatment effect subsequently
uncovered would represent the effect for those treatment persons who remained in the
sample and not the effect for the dataset as a whole. Such exclusions did not effect the
validity of the Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) result. However, in most cases the researcher
must be aware that their actions lead to an exclusion bias, which can prevent them from
answering the question they most frequently pose, 'What is the mean treatment effect on
the treated?'
6.2 On the Question of YTS Performance
We began our study of the YTS treatment effect in Chapter 3, with the belief that the
males and females YTS experience had been very different. In order that we might capture
these differences all subsequent analysis was performed separately for males and females.
As was acknowledged during our early analysis of the YTS treatment effect grouping
together of all YTS types obscures the differences between these schemes. We identified
three incarnations of the scheme which we labelled YTSI, YTSII and YT, and proposed to
treat them separately during our investigations into the YTS treatment effect. From that
point on, we considered these to be three kinds of YTS treatment effect. This gave us the
opportunity to chart the progress of each scheme to determine whether later incarnations
were more or less successful than their predecessors.
Early work considered the treatment effect on reservation/expected wages and various
job search elasticities. Results for the nearest neighbour matched datasets were less
dramatic than those for the unmatched sample. Perhaps suggesting that there had been
a self selection bias present in the unmatched dataset. We found strong evidence for the
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presence of a YTS treatment effect.
Chapter 4 began to question the ability of the nearest neighbour algorithm to produce
consistently good matches throughout the evolution of a matching 'run'. We demon-
strated the degradation in match quality as a match progressed. We introduced the
kernel and local linear methods of matching and investigated the YTS treatment effect on
the reservation/expected wages and various job search elasticities using datasets matched
with these methods.
Finally, Chapter 5 introduced the 3-state labour market model as a theoretical frame-
work for the labour market state transition process. Given the government's original
desire to train the young so that they might become more attractive to employers seeking
skilled workers, we choose to concentrate on the unemployment to work transition. Cox
proportional hazard models were then estimated for this transition. The effects of YTSI,
YTSII and YT were captured through the inclusion of dummies for whether individuals
had experienced a spell on such a scheme prior to their spell of unemployment.
6.2.1 The YTSI Effect
Taking the results for reservation/expected wages and the various job search elasticities
first, the unmatched male dataset suggested a strong YTSI treatment effect. YTS was seen
to depress expected wages whilst having mixed effects on the magnitudes of the various
elasticities. However, we suggest that these results were the product of the inherent
pre-scheme differences between those who had participated in YTSI and those who did
not.
The effect of YTSI on wages and job search elasticities, as revealed in male and
female nearest neighbour and local linear matched samples, was minimal. We uncovered
some evidence to suggest the presence of a downward effect on wage expectations for
both genders. Other things being equal this would have increased the chances of YTSI
participants finding work post scheme. Results for the local linear matched male sample
also suggested that YTSI had increased the magnitude of several job search elasticities.
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Results from the male unmatched and matched datasets, for the unemployment to
work transition process, suggested that YTSI had a detrimental effect on the probability
of exiting from unemployment into work. This suggests a failure of the scheme in it's
attempt to improve the employment prospects of participants and is evidence for the
"scaring" which some have suggested such schemes can lead to. With reference to the
previous paragraph, "other things" were clearly not equal. Female transition models
estimated using all three datasets offered no evidence for a YTSI effect on the probability
of transition.
6.2.2 The YTSII Effect
The effect of a spell on YTSII for males and females as estimated using the unmatched
sample and measured on wages and job search elasticities was, as with the YTSI effect,
mixed. Male reservation wages were seen to rise whilst the elasticities of both genders
were reduced for scheme participants. As with our discussion of the YTSI effect, some of
these "effects" may be the result of self selection bias.
Results for the nearest neighbour and local linear matched male samples suggest that
there are a number of YTSII treatment effects on job search elasticities. Some desirable
and some not so. The elasticities of the reservation wage to the benefit level, arrival rate
of job offers are lower for those with YTSII experience. Indicating that these males were
less likely to price themselves out of the labour market following changes in benefits or
job vacancies. Results for the elasticities of the hazard with respect to benefits indicated
that males with YTSII experience were more willing to take a job than those without as
benefits rose. However, results for the elasticity of the hazard with respect to vacancies,
was adversely effected by YTSII. This indicates that even when the number of positions
on the market rose, those with YTSII experience lost out to those without. Evidence that
YTSII may also have "scared" its participants.
The female nearest neighbour dataset produced estimates of control persons wages and
elasticities which were insignificantly different from those of participants. The local linear
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female sample produced job search elasticities for the hazard with respect to benefits which
suggested that female YTSII participants were less likely to remain unemployed following
a rise in benefits. This scheme seems to have reduced female participants dependence on
benefit payments through a maintenance of their willingness to take on a job in the face
of rising benefits.
Transition models for unemployment to work for males and females using unmatched
and matched samples revealed that, as with YTSI, its successor reduced the prospect of
future employment on its participants. It seems that the desirable movements in many of
the elasticities which we observed were not enough to offset the reduction in the hazard
with respect to the arrival rate of offers. Again, evidence points to "scaring" of those with
YTSII experience leading to employers choosing not to employ those, of either gender,
with a work history containing a period on the scheme.
6.2.3 The YT Effect
The final incarnation of YTS, YT was much vaunted due to it's emphasis on the attain-
ment of vocational qualifications. As such it is interesting to see whether this recognition
of new skills allowed those with experience of YT to demonstrate to employers the en-
hanced skill level which they obtained from the scheme.
The unmatched male wage and elasticity results indicated that men with YT ex-
perience had higher required higher wage rates and reduced magnitudes of the various
elasticities. There was little evidence for a female YT treatment effect. As with both
previous scheme analyses we considered there to be a self selection bias component to
these results.
Nearest neighbour matched male samples produced evidence of a wage effect. It
appears that males with YT experience had higher mean wage expectations. This result
was not replicated using the local linear male sample. If present, then there was some
evidence to suggest that this effect was offset by a reduction in the elasticity of the
reservation wage with respect to the benefit level. Both matched male datasets produced
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results for the elasticities of the hazard with respect to benefits showing that the rate
of reduction in the hazard was lower for those with YT experience. The results for the
elasticity of the hazard with respect to vacancies differed in direction of significance across
matching methods.
The female nearest neighbour matched dataset gave a value for reservation wages of
those women with YT experience which was significantly lower than for those without.
However, reservation wages are more sensitive to benefits and the number of job vacancies.
Also, we uncovered some evidence to suggest that those women with YT experience were
less likely to leave the state of unemployment as benefits rose. Finally, we see that the
hazard with respect to the benefit level was is larger post scheme. Perhaps this is evidence
of the value of the qualifications which YT participants could now achieve.
Turning to the YT effect on the unemployment to work transition process we find no
evidence for a YT effect on the likelihood of males making the transition. This might
help to explain the mixed results for the male elasticity of the hazard with respect to
vacancies. Suggesting that YT succeeded in convincing employers of the value of a spell
on YT. The evidence for the YT effect on females within the dataset suggests that they
were less likely to exit the state of unemployment and into work following a period of YT.
It seems that the rise in the elasticity of the hazard with respect to vacancies was not
enough to offset the rise in reservation wages for scheme participants.
6.3 Final Remarks
Our concluding remarks of Chapter 3 voiced some reservations for the performance of
matching methods. We noted that such procedures, when used correctly, could be a
powerful tool. Much of the work that followed was concerned with the examination of
these methods. It was hoped that by subjecting them to the full range of their specification
we might identify a consistency in the YTS treatment effect. Results have shown us the
danger of matching as a "magic box" solution and the importance of the careful use and
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appraisal of the different matching algorithms. Despite the problems highlighted using
different matching methods, we believe that their use in a non-experimental setting did
allow us to better understand the YTS effect and when used carefully could do the same
for a range of econometric bias reduction problems.
158
Bibliography
Ashenfelter, O. (1978) Estimating the Effect of Training Programs on Earnings. The
Review of Economics and Statistics, 47-57.
Ashenfelter, O. and Card, D. (1985) Using the Longitudinal Structure of Earnings to
Estimate the Effect of Training Programs. The Review of Economics and Statistics,
648-660.
Bradley, S. (1995) The Youth Training Scheme: a critical review of the evaluation litera-
ture. International Journal of Manpower, 16(4), 30-56.
Burdett, K., Kiefer, N., Mortenson, D. and Neumann, G. (1984) Earnings, Unemployment
and the Allocation of Time over Time. Review of Economic Studies, L1, 559-578.
Card, D. and Sullivan, D. (1988) Measuring the Effect of Subsidised Training Programs
on Movements in and out of Employment. Econometrica, 497-530.
Chapman, P. and Tooze, M. (1987) The Youth Training Scheme in the United Kingdom.
Aldershot: Avebury.
Cochran, Z. and Rubin, Z. (1973) Controlling bias in observational studies. Sankyha, (35),
417-446.
Courtney, G. and McAleese, I. (1991) The Youth Cohort Study, report on Cohort III
Sweep 3, 18-19 Year Oids in 1989. In The Employment Department Research and
Development Paper, no. 66, Sheffield.
159
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Crosslin, R. and Stevens, D. (1977) The Asking Wage -Duration of Unemployment Rela-
tion Revisited. Southern Economic Journal, 43, 1298-1302.
Deakin, B. M. (1996) The Youth Labour Market in Britain: The Role of Intervention.
Cambridge: University Press.
Dolton, P., Makepeace, G., Hutton, S. and Audas, R. (1999) Making the Grade: Edu-
cation, the Labor Market and Young People. Work and Opportunity Series, Joseph
Rowntree Foundation: Work and Opportunity Series.
Dolton, P., Makepeace, G. and Treble, J. (1992) The Wage Effect of YTS: Evidence from
YCS. Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 41(4), 444-453.
Dolton, P., Makepeace, G. and Treble, J. (1993) The Economics of Youth Training in
Britain. Economic Journal, 103, 1261-1278.
Dolton, P., Makepeace, G. and Treble, J. (1994) The Youth Training Scheme and the
School to Work Transition. Oxford Economic Papers, 46, 629-657.
Dolton, P. J. and O'Neill, D. (1995) Unemployment Duration and the Restart Effect:
Some Experimental Evidence. The Economic Journal, 106(435),387-400.
Gorter, D. and Gorter, C. (1993) The Relation between Unemployment Benefits, the
Reservation Wage and Search Duration. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics,
55(2), 199-214.
Gritz, R. (1993) The Impact of Training on the Frequency and Duration of Employment.
Journal of Econometrics, 21-51.
GSS (1996) Youth Cohort Study: Trends in the Activities and Experiences of 16-18 Year
ou« England and Wales 1985-1994. HMSO.
Heckman, J., Ichimura, H., Smith, J. and Todd, P. (1997) Matching as an Econometric
Evaluation Estimator: Evidence from Evaluating a Job Training Program. Review of
Economic Studies, 64(4), 605-654.
160
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Heckman, J., Ichimura, H., Smith, J. and Todd, P. (1998) Matching as an Econometric
Evaluation Estimator. Review of Economic Studies, 65(2), 261-294.
Jones, S. (1988) The Relationship between Unemployment Spells and Reservation Wage
as a Test of Search Theory. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 103, 741-765.
Kiefer, N. and Neumann, G. (1979) An Empirical Job Search Model with a Test of the
Constant Reservation Wage Hypothesis. Journal of Political Economy, 87, 89-107.
Lancaster, T. and Chesher, A. (1983) An Econometric Analysis of Reservation Wages.
Econometrica, 51(6), 1661-1676.
Lechner, M. (1999) Earnings and Employment Effects of Continuous Off-the-Job Training
in East Germany After Unification. Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 17(1),
74-90.
Lynch, L. (1983) Job Search and Youth Unemployment. Oxford Economic Papers, 35(4),
595-606.
Main, B. and Shelley, M. (1988) School Leavers and the Search for Employment. Economic
Papers, 40, 487-504.
Mealli, F., Pudney, S. and Thomas, J. (1996) Training Duration and Post-Training Out-
comes: A Duration-Limited Competing Risks Model. The Economic Journal, 106,
422-433.
Mortensen, D. (1986) Job search and Labour Market Analysis. In Handbook of Labour
Economics (ed. R. Ashenfelter, O. & Layard), vol. II.
Narendranathan, W. and Elias, P. (1993) Influences of Past History on the Incidence of
Youth Unemployment: Empirical findings for the UK. Oxford Bulletin of Economics
and Statistics, 161-185.
Rosenbaum, P. and Rubin, D. (1983) The Central Role of the Propensity Score in Obser-
vational Studies for Causal Effects. Biometrica, 70, 41-50.
161
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Rubin, D. (1977) Assignment of Treatment Group on the Basis of a Covariate. Journal
of Educational Statistics, 2, 1-26.
Silverman, B. (1986) Density Estimation for Statistics and Data Analysis. London: Chap-
man and Hall.
Taylor, R. (2000) Here Today, Gone Tomorrow .. An Empirical Analysis of Attrition and
Recal Bias in Labour Market Data. Ph.D. thesis, University of Newcastle.
Todd, P. (1999) A Practical Guide to Implementing Matching Estimators. Internet, San-
tiago, Chile. IABB.
Van Den Berg, G. (1994) The Effects of Changes of the Job Offer Arrival rate on the
Duration of Unemployment. Journal of Labor Economics, 12(3),478-498.
162
Appendix A
A.I Fortran Code for Extracting Unemployment Du-
rations from Labour Market State Diary Data
c Program to calculate unemployment durations for those
c who exit to a full time job with laststate indicator
c
c
double precision wagel,wage2
integer id,sweep,x(116),i,j,ndur,lstytdur,m,lststate,ytstart
open(7,file='trans3.txt')
open(8,file='trans4e.res')
do 10 i=1,1000000
x(1)=-99
read(7,*,end=11) id,wagel,wage2,sweep,(x(j),j=2,l15)
x(116)--99
lststate=-9
m-l
do 20 j=l,116
call duration(x,m,ndur,lstytdur,lststate,ytstart)
vrite(8,200) id,ndur,lstytdur,lststate,ytstart
if (ndur.lt.O) goto 10
20 continue
10 continue
200 format (5il0)
11 stop
end
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subroutine duration(x,m,ndur,lstytdur,lststate,ytstart)
integer i,j,k,x(116),ndur,xx,xxx,lstytdur,lststate,m,ytstart
lstytdur=O
lststate=O
ytstart=O
do 10 i=1,115-m
xx=x(m+i)
if «(xx.eq.l).or.(xx.eq.2».and.(x(m+i+1).eq.5» goto 20
10 continue
ndur=-99
return
20 m=m+i
do 30 j=1,m-1
xx=x(m-j)
if «xx.ne.l).and.(xx.ne.2» then
lststate=xx
if (xx.eq.8) then
do 25 k=l,m-j-l
xxx-x(m-j-k)
if (xxx.ne.8) then
lstytdur-k
ytstart=m-j-k+l
goto 40
end if
25 continue
end if
goto 40
end if
30 continue
40 ndur-j
return
end
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B.l Fortran Code for Nearest Neighbour Matching
Procedure
c Program to match treatment and control group individuals
c with similar covariate structures: First estimate a Probit model for YTS
c participation (I did this in STATA). There is a switch in STATA which cau
c ses the PROBIT command to also produce the covariance matrix from the mod
c el. -You'll need this. Including the constant I had 26 variables in my
c PROBIT
c
double precision prpensty,covarmtx(26,26),data(26)
t ,disc,lc(100000),uc(100000),dvar,betas(26)
t ,datat(26),datac(26),lpt(100000),lpc(100000)
& ,dist,mindist,eucldist,mineucl,rub2(100000)
integer dopid(100000) ,ytsindic(100000) ,i,j,k,ytstart(100000)
& ,totcalip,l ,dopidt(100000),dopidc(100000) ,ytstartt(100000)
& ,ytstartc(100000),nt,nc,exclude(100000),calipmtx(100000)
& ,excludet(100000),excludec(100000),m,nearest,match(100000)
t ,o,nearcalp,p,q,label(100000),rubl(100000),r
c Covariance matrix must be complete (not just the bottom half)
c Covariance matrix is then stored in covmatrix.txt
open (7,file-'covmatrix.txt')
do 10 i-1,26
read(7,.) (covarmtx(i,j),j-l,26)
print ., 'hello',i
c Covariance matrix is now read into the 2-D array, covarmtx(i,j)
10 continue
close(7)
c The estimates of the betas from the PROBlT model are stored in
c thebetas.txt. There are 26 of these. Just list them one after the other
open (7,file-'thebetas.txt')
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read(7.*) (betas(i),i-l.26)
close(7)
print *. (betas(j).j-1,26)
c The betas vector is now read into the array. betas(j)
c
c The variables for each person in turn are then read in using the file
c thedata.txt. This file must list the variables for each person in the
c same order as they are for the covariance matrix and betas.
c I used the STATA command:
c outfile «dopid. propensity. yts participation indicator. ytstart date
c (could just leave this set to 1 since the algorithm never used it.).
c a variable for indicating when a person has been matched (Set exclude-O)
c and names of variables in order used for PROBIT» using thedata.txt
open (7.file-'thedata.txt')
nt-O
nc-O
do 20 i-1.3905
read(7.*) dopid(i),prpensty.ytsindic(i).ytstart(i)
& .exclude(i).(data(j).j-l,25)
c Now read in the data
data(26)-ldO
print *, dopid(i),prpensty.ytsindic(i),ytstart(i)
& ,exclude(i),(data(j),j-l,26)
c The data is now read into the matrix data(j).
if (ytsindic(i).eq.l) then
nt"'nt+1
dopidt(nt)-dopid(i)
ytstartt(nt)-ytstart(i)
excludet(nt)-exclude(i)
do 15 j-l,26
datat(j)-data(j)
continue
disc-OdO
15
40
30
dvar-OdO
do 30 j-1,26
disc-disc+betas(j)*datat(j)
do 40 k-l,26
dvar-dvar+covarmtx(j,k)*datat(j)*datat(k)
continue
continue
lpt(nt)-disc
print *, disc,dvar
lc(nt)-disc-1.645*dsqrt(dvar)
uc(nt)-disc+1.645*dsqrt(dvar)
else
nc-nc+l
dopidc(nc)-dopid(i)
ytstartc(nc)-ytstart(i)
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excludec(nc)-exclude(i)
do 16 j-l,26
datac(j)=data(j)
16 continue
disc==OdO
do 31 j==1,26
disc=disc+betas(j) *datac(j)
31 continue
Ipc(nc)=disc
print *, disc
end if
20 continue
print *, nt,nc
close(7)
do 47 p=l,nt
label (p)=p
47 continue
ifail=O
call g05ehf(label,nt,ifail)
do 49 q==l,nt
rub1(q)=dopidt(label(q»
rub2(q)-lpt(label(q»
49 continue
dopidt==rub1
Ipt-rub2
do 52 p==l,nc
label (p)==p
52 continue
ifail=O
call g05ehf(label,nc,ifail)
do 54 r-1,nc
rub1(r)-dopidc(label(r»
rub2(r)-lpc(label(r»
54 continue
dopidc-rub1
Ipc-rub2
do 50 i-1,nt
write(6,987) i
987, format('Person ',i3)
totcalip-O
do 60 1-1,nc
if (excludec(I).eq.1) goto 60
if «lpc(l).ge.lc(i».and.(lpc(l).le.uc(i») then
totcalip-totcalip+1
calipmtx(totcalip).l
end if
60 continue
print *, totcalip
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if (totcalip.eq.O) then
mindist-1d10
do 80 m-l,nc
dist-(lpc(m)-lpt(i».(lpc(m)-lpt(i»
if «dist.lt.mindist).and.(excludec(m).eq.O» then
mindist-dist
nearest-m
end if
80 continue
match(i)=nearest
excludec (nearest)Kl
end if
if (totcalip.eq.l) then
nearest-calipmtx(l)
match(i)=nearest
excludec(nearest)-l
end if
if (totcalip.ge.2) then
mineucl-1d10
do 90 o-l,totcalip
eucldist-(lpc(calipmtx(o»-lpt(i»
& *(lpc(calipmtx(o»-lpt(i»
print ., eucldist
if (eucldist.lt.mineucl) then
mineucl-eucldist
nearcalp-o
end if
90 continue
print ., nearcalp
nearest-calipmtx(nearcalp)
match(i)-nearest
excludec(nearest)-l
end if
print ., nearest
50 continue
c Matches are now output
open (7,file-'trainmatch.res')
open (8,file-'contlmatch.res')
open (9,file-'bothmatch.res')
c trainmatch.res contains the matched YTS participants
write(7,*) (dopidt(j), j-l,nt)
c contrlmatch.res contains the matched YTS non-participants
write(8,.) (dopidc(match(j»,j.l,nt)
c bothmatch.res contains the matched YTS participants followed by the
c matched non-participants
c
c The first dopid number in trainmatch.res has been matched to the first
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c dopid number in contrlmatch.res
write(9,*) (dopidt(j), j-l,nt)
write(9,*) (dopidc(match(j»,j-l,nt)
close(7)
close(8)
close(9)
200 format(il0,i4,3d25.15)
11 stop
end
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B.2 Fortran Code for Local Linear Regression Boot-
strap Iterative Procedure
c Program to match treatment and control group individuals
e with similar covariate structures (for men) using local
c linear regression with t-test for treatment/control
e differences. HO: m1.eq.m2 vs H1: m1.neq.m2
c
c Takes random samples of 1000 individuals from all control
e persons and YTSI treatment individuals. Repeats this process
c 1000 times and produces the Bootstrapped estimates of job search
c elastieites from these samples.
e
e The main program reads in the data and then generates the Boot-
e strapped random samples. These are then passed to the subroutine
c genh.
c
double precision prpensty(5000),ebyb(5000),ebyl(5000)
& ,bprpnsty(1000),bebyb(1000) ,bebyl(1000) ,bphbyb(1000) ,behbyb(1000)
& ,behbyl(1000),bnewrw(1000),bnewew(1000),booth
& ,phbyb(5000),ehbyb(5000),ehbyl(5000),newrw(5000),newew(5000)
& ,totnewew,tsynewew,tnewewt,relnewew,synnewew,newewtpl
& ,totnewrw,tsynewrw,tnewrwt,relnewrw,synnewrw,newrwtpl
& ,totebyb,tsyebyb,tebybt,relebyb,synebyb,ebybtpl
& ,totebyl,tsyebyl,tebylt,relebyl,synebyl,ebyltpl
& ,totphbyb,tsyphbyb,tphbybt,relphbyb,synphbyb,phbybtpl
& ,totehbyb,tsyehbyb,tehbybt,relehbyb,synehbyb,ehbybtpl
& ,totehbyl,tsyehbyl,tehbylt,relehbyl,synehbyl,ehbyltpl
& ,tsrnewew,tssnewew,sdrnewew,sdsnewew
& ,tsrnewrw,tssnewrw,sdrnewrw,sdsnewrw
& ,tsrebyb,tssebyb,sdrebyb,sdsebyb
& ,tsrebyl,tssebyl,sdrebyl,sdsebyl
& ,tsrphbyb,tssphbyb,sdrphbyb,sdsphbyb
& ,tsrehbyb,tssehbyb,sdrehbyb,sdsehbyb
& ,tsrehbyl,tssehbyl,sdrehbyl,sdsehbyl
integer p,newid(4500) ,ytsindic(4500) ,nall,sampn,samp(1000)
& ,bnewid(1000),bytsindc(1000),bootnumb,o
open (7,file='kernelmytsi.txt')
open (8,file-'newrwewytsi.txt')
bootnwnb=1000
booth-0.9
sampn==1000
nall-3384
do 20 p=t ,nall
read(7,.) newid(p),prpensty(p),ytsindie(p),ebyb(p),ebyl(p)
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t ,phbyb(p),ehbyb(p),ehbyl(p)
read(S,*) newrw(p),newew(p)
print *, newid(p)
20 continue
close(7)
close(S)
open (3,file='booti.res')
open (8,file='bootlocalytsim.res')
open (7,file='bootlocalytsim2.res')
call g05CCF
do 24 o=1,bootnumb
ifaU-O
call G05EJF(newid, naIl, samp, sampn, ifail)
do 23 p=L, sampn
bnewid(p)-samp(p)
bprpnsty(p)-prpensty(samp(p»
bytsindc(p)-ytsindic(samp(p»
bnewrw(p)-newrw(samp(p»
bnewew(p)-newew(samp(p»
bebyb(p)-ebyb(samp(p»
bebyl(p)-ebyl(samp(p»
bphbyb(p)-phbyb(samp(p»
behbyb(p)=ehbyb(samp(p»
behbyl(p)-ehbyl(samp(p»
23 continue
call genh(bnewid,bprpnsty,bytsindc,bebyb,bebyl
t ,bphbyb,behbyb,behbyl,bnewrw,bnewew,sampn,booth
t ,relnewew,synnewew,newewtpl,relnewrw,synnewrw,newrwtpl
t ,relebyb,synebyb,ebybtpl,relebyl,synebyl,ebyltpl
t ,relphbyb,synphbyb,phbybtpl,relehbyb,synehbyb,ehbybtpl
t ,relehbyl,synehbyl,ehbyltpl
t ,sdrnewew,sdsnewew,sdrnewrw,sdsnewrw
t ,sdrebyb,sdsebyb,sdrebyl,sdsebyl
t ,sdrphbyb,sdsphbyb,sdrehbyb,sdsehbyb
t ,sdrehbyl,sdsehbyl)
print *, booth
totnewew-totnewew+relnewew
tsynewew-tsynewew+synnewew
tnewewt-tnewewt+newewtpl
tsrnewew-tsrnewew+sdrnewew
tssnewew-tssnewew+sdsnewew
c *************************************
totnewrw-totnewrw+relnewrw
tsynewrw=tsynewrw+synnewrw
tnewrwt-tnewrwt+newrwtpl
tsrnewrw-tsrnewrw+sdrnewrw
tssnewrw-tssnewrw+sdsnewrw
c *************************************
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totebyb-totebyb+relebyb
tsyebyb=tsyebyb+synebyb
tebybt-tebybt+ebybtpl
tsrebyb=tsrebyb+sdrebyb
tssebyb-tssebyb+sdsebyb
c *************************************
totebyl-totebyl+relebyl
tsyebyl-tsyebyl+synebyl
tebylt-tebylt+ebyltpl
tsrebyl-tsrebyl+sdrebyl
tssebyl-tssebyl+sdsebyl
c *************************************
totphbyb-totphbyb+relphbyb
tsyphbyb-tsyphbyb+synphbyb
tphbybt-tphbybt+phbybtpl
tsrphbyb-tsrphbyb+sdrphbyb
tssphbyb-tssphbyb+sdsphbyb
c *************************************
totehbyb=totehbyb+relehbyb
tsyehbyb-tsyehbyb+synehbyb
tehbybt-tehbybt+ehbybtpl
tsrehbyb-tsrehbyb+sdrehbyb
tssehbyb-tssehbyb+sdsehbyb
c *************************************
totehbyl-totehbyl+relehbyl
tsyehbyl-tsyehbyl+synehbyl
tehbylt-tehbylt+ehbyltpl
tsrehbyl-tsrehbyl+sdrehbyl
tssehbyl=tssehbyl+sdsehbyl
c *************************************
write (8,*) '***********'
write (7,*) '***********'
24 continue
totnewew-totnewew/l000
tsynewew-tsynewew/l000
tnewewt-tnewewt/l000
tsrnewev-tsrnewew/l000
tssnewev-tssnewew/l000
c *************************************
totnewrw-totnewrw/l000
tsynewrw-tsynevrw/l000
tnewrwt-tnewrwt/l000
tsrnewrv-tsrnewrw/l000
tssnewrw-tssnevrw/l000
c *************************************
totebyb-totebyb/l000
tsyebyb-tsyebyb/l000
tebybt=tebybt/l000
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tsrebyb-tsrebyb/l000
tssebyb-tssebyb/l000
c *************************************
totebyl-totebyl/l000
tsyebyl-tsyebyl/l000
tebylt-tebylt/l000
tsrebyl=tsrebyl/l000
tssebyl-tssebyl/l000
c *************************************
totphbyb-totphbyb/l000
tsyphbyb-tsyphbyb/l000
tphbybt-tphbybt/l000
tsrphbyb-tsrphbyb/l000
tssphbyb-tssphbyb/l000
c *************************************
totehbyb-totehbyb/l000
tsyehbyb-tsyehbyb/l000
tehbybt-tehbybt/1000
tsrehbyb-tsrehbyb/l000
tssehbyb-tssehbyb/1OOO
c *************************************
totehbyl-totehbyl/l000
tsyehbyl-tsyehbyl/l000
tehbylt-tehbylt/l000
tsrehbyl-tsrehbyl/l000
tssehbyl-tssehbyl/l000
c *************************************
write (3.*) totnewew.tsynewew.tnewewt
write (3.*) tsrnewew.tssnewew
write (3.*) totnewrw.tsynewrw.tnewrwt
write (3.*) tsrnewrw.tssnewrw
write (3.*) totebyb.tsyebyb.tebybt
write (3.*) tsrebyb.tssebyb
write (3.*) totebyl.tsyebyl,tebylt
write (3,*) tsrebyl,tssebyl
write (3,*) totphbyb,tsyphbyb,tphbybt
write (3,*) tsrphbyb,tssphbyb
write (3,*) totehbyb,tsyehbyb,tehbybt
write (3,*) tsrehbyb.tssehbyb
write (3,*) totehbyl,tsyehbyl,tehbylt
write (3.*) tsrehbyl,tssehbyl
close (3)
close(S)
close (7)
11 stop
250 format(ld25.10)
end
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c The subroutine genh calls varoius other functions which
c generate the values of h (the bandwidth parameter for
c the kernel) and the matches themselves.
subroutine genh(newid.prpensty,ytsindic,ebyb,ebyl
t ,phbyb,ehbyb,ehbyl,newrw,newew,nall,booth
t ,relnewew,synnewew,newewtpl,relnewrw,synnewrw,newrwtpl
t ,relebyb,synebyb,ebybtpl,relebyl,synebyl,ebyltpl
t ,relphbyb,synphbyb,phbybtpl,relehbyb,synehbyb,ehbybtpl
t ,relehbyl,synehbyl,ehbyltpl
t ,sdrnewew,sdsnewew,sdrnewrw,sdsnewrw
t ,sdrebyb,sdsebyb,sdrebyl,sdsebyl
t ,sdrphbyb,sdsphbyb,sdrehbyb,sdsehbyb
t ,sdrehbyl,sdsehbyl)
double precision prpnstyc(5000),prpensty(6000)
t ,ebyb(5000),ebyl(5000),phbyb(5000),ehbyb(5000),ehbyl(5000)
t ,newrw(5000),newew(5000)
t ,ebybt(2000),ebylt(2000),prpnstyt(2000),s
t ,phbybt(2000),ehbybt(2000),ehbylt(2000)
t ,ebybc(4000),ebylc(4000),sumkernl,kernel,weighsum
t ,phbybc(4000),ehbybc(4000),ehbylc(4000)
t ,weight(500,3500),synebybc(4500)
t ,synebylc(4500),syphbybc(4500),syehbybc(4500)
t ,syehbylc(4500),smkpdfsq,smkpdiff,pdiff
t ,kpdiffsq,kpdiff
t ,newrwt(4500),newewt(4500),newrwc(4500),prpdif(500,3500)
t ,newewc(4500),synewrwc(4500),synewewc(4600),sqprpdif(4500)
t ,diffebyb(4500),diffebyl(4500),difphbyb(4500),hidiff,oIdhi
t ,difehbyb(4500),difehbyl(4500),difnewrw(4500),h,hsize
& ,difnewew(4500),mdifebyb,diffsq(4500),sd,t,ntplus,sumdiff
t ,sdifebyb,totdiff,sumdifsq,sdp,tplus,meandiff ,meanact ,meansynth
& ,ssknl,sskn12,sumnum,spls,sumkern,sumkern2,numerat(4500),booth
& ,sumprpi,meanprpi,sumsqpdf,stdevdfi,hi,synprpyc(4600),samp(1000)
t ,relnewew,synnewew,newewtpl,relnewrw,synnewrw,newrwtpl
t ,relebyb.synebyb,ebybtpl.relebyl,synebyl,ebyltpl
t ,relphbyb,synphbyb.phbybtpl.relehbyb.synehbyb,ehbybtpl
t ,relehbyl.synehbyl.ehbyltpl,stderact,stdersyn
t ,sdrnewew.sdsnewew,sdrnewrw,sdsnewrw
t ,sdrebyb,sdsebyb,sdrebyl,sdsebyl
& ,sdrphbyb,sdsphbyb.sdrehbyb,sdsehbyb
t ,sdrehbyl,sdsehbyl
integer i,p,j,k,newid(4500),ytsindic(4500) ,naIl
t ,newidt(4500),newidc(4500),iter
t ,nt,nc
h-O.OOldO
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nt=O
nc-O
do 21 p=l,nall
if (ytsindic(p).eq.l) then
nt=nt+l
newidt(nt)=newid(p)
prpnstyt(nt)=prpensty(p)
newrwt(nt)-newrw(p)
newewt(nt)-newew(p)
ebybt(nt)-ebyb(p)
ebylt(nt)=ebyl(p)
phbybt(nt)=phbyb(p)
ehbybt(nt)=ehbyb(p)
ehbylt(nt)-ehbyl(p)
else
nc=nc+l
newidc(nc)-newid(p)
prpnstyc(nc)-prpensty(p)
newrwc(nc)=newrw(p)
newewc(nc)-newew(p)
ebybc(nc)-ebyb(p)
ebylc(nc)-ebyl(p)
phbybc(nc)-phbyb(p)
ehbybc(nc)-ehbyb(p)
ehbylc(nc)=ehbyl(p)
end if
21 continue
print *, nt,nc,h
do 30 i-l,nt
do 32 j=l,nc
prpdif(i,j)·prpnstyt(i)-prpnstyc(j)
32 continue
30 continue
sumprpi-OdO
do 37 j-l,nc
sumprpi-sumprpi+prpnstyc(j)
37 continue
meanprpi-sumprpi/nc
do 40 j-l,nc
sqprpdif(j)-(prpnstyc(j)-meanprpi)*
& (prpnstyc(j)-meanprpi)
40 continue
sumsqpdf-OdO
do 42 j-l,nc
sumsqpdf·sumsqpdf+sqprpdif(j)
42 continue
stdevdfi-sqrt(sumsqpdf/(nc-l»
hi-l.0S*stdevdfi*(nc**(-0.2»
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hi=booth
print *, 'hi:',hi
iter=1
print *, 'iteration:', iter
write (7,300) iter
write (7,250) hi
call mksynth(newrwc,newewc,ebybc,ebylc,phbybc
t ,ehbybc,ehbylc,synewrwc,synewewc,synebybc,synebylc,syphbybc
t ,syehbybc,syehbylc,synprpyc,prpnstyc,prpnstyt,hi,nt,nc)
call passhi(prpnstyt,synprpyc,nt,nc,hi)
write (7,250) hi
iter=2
hsize-0.005
hidiff=1
do while «hidiff.gt.hsize).and.(iter.lt.101»
print *, 'iteration:', iter
write (7,300) iter
write (7,250) hi
oldhi=hi
call mksynthx(newrwc,newewc,ebybc,ebylc,phbybc
t ,ehbybc,ehbylc,synewrwc,synewewc,synebybc,synebylc,syphbybc
t ,syehbybc,syehbylc,synprpyc,prpnstyc,prpnstyt,hi,nt,nc)
call passhi(prpnstyt,synprpyc,nt,nc,hi)
hidiff-sqrt«oldhi-hi)*(oldhi-hi»
iter-iter+1
end do
totdiff-OdO
meanact-OdO
meansynth-OdO
meandiff-OdO
sumdifsq-OdO
sdp-OdO
tplus-OdO
booth-hi
write (3,*) booth
type *;' *******.* ••***••****••****•••*.*******.***.*.* •••*.
t•••••••••*••••*.*••*,
type ., ' Local Linear Regression: hi -',hi,'
t I'
type .,' ••••• *.*••••••••••••••• *••*•••••••••••••••••••• ***.
t···***·· •••*•••*.*.*,
t-stat
treatment
I '
Synthetictype
"
. ',
type .,' ••••••••••••••••• *•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
t***··* •••••••••••• **,
type
"
. ',
I '
call ttesting(newewt,synewewc,nt,totdiff,meandiff,sumdifsq
176
B.2. Fortran Code for Local Linear Regression Bootstrap Iterative Procedure
t ,sdp,tplus,meanact,meansynth,stderact,stdersyn)
relnewew=meanact
synnewew=meansynth
newewtpl=tplus
sdrnewew-stderact
sdsnewew=stdersyn
call ttesting(newrwt,synewrwc,nt,totdiff,meandiff,sumdifsq
t ,sdp,tplus,meanact,meansynth,stderact,stdersyn)
relnewrw=meanact
synnewrw=meansynth
newrwtpl=tplus
sdrnewrw=stderact
sdsnewrw-stdersyn
call ttesting(ebybt,synebybc,nt,totdiff,meandiff,sumdifsq
t ,sdp,tplus,meanact,meansynth,stderact,stdersyn)
relebyb=meanact
synebyb=meansynth
ebybtpl=tplus
sdrebyb=stderact
sdsebyb-stdersyn .
call ttesting(ebylt,synebylc,nt,totdiff,meandiff,sumdifsq
t ,sdp,tplus,meanact,meansynth,stderact,stdersyn)
relebyl=meanact
synebyl-meansynth
ebyltpl-tplus
sdrebyl-stderact
sdsebyl-stdersyn
call ttesting(phbybt,syphbybc,nt,totdiff,meandiff,sumdifsq
t ,sdp,tplus,meanact,meansynth,stderact,stdersyn)
relphbyb=meanact
synphbyb=meansynth
phbybtpl-tplus
sdrphbyb-stderact
sdsphbyb-stdersyn
call ttesting(ehbybt,syehbybc,nt,totdiff,meandiff,sumdifsq
t ,sdp,tplus,meanact,meansynth,stderact,stdersyn)
relehbyb-meanact
synehbyb=meansynth
ehbybtpl-tplus
sdrehbyb-stderact
sdsehbyb-stdersyn
call ttesting(ehbylt,syehbylc,nt,totdiff,meandiff,sumdifsq
t ,sdp,tplus,meanact,meansynth,stderact,stdersyn)
relehbyl-meanact
synehbyl=meansynth
ehbyltpl-tplus
sdrehbyl-stderact
sdsehbyl-stdersyn
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type *, ' ***************************************************
&********************'
return
200 format(i10,i4,3d25.15)
250 format(1d25.10)
300 format(i3)
end
c The subroutines mksynth and mksynthx generate the synthetic wages
c and elasticites.
subroutine mksynth(newrwc,newewc,ebybc,ebylc,phbybc
& ,ehbybc,ehbylc,synevrwc,synewewc,synebybc,synebylc,syphbybc
& ,syehbybc,syehbylc,synprpyc,prpnstyc,prpnstyt,hi,nt,nc)
double precision diff(4500),actual(4500),synth(4500)
& ,ssknl,sskn12,sumnum,sumkern,s,kernel,hi,numerat(4500),weighsum
& ,synewrwc(4500),synewewc(4500),synebybc(4500),synebylc(4500)
& ,syphbybc(4500),syehbybc(4500),syehbylc(4500),nevrwc(4500)
& ,newewc(4500),ebybc(4500),ebylc(4500),phbybc(4500)
& ,ehbybc(4500),ehbylc(4500),prpnstyc(4500),prpnstyt(4500)
& ,weight(400,3500),synprpyc(4500),sumkern2,spls
integer i,j,k,nt,nc
do 150 i-1,nt
ssknl-OdO
sskn12-0dO
sumnum-OdO
do 160 j-1,nc
sumkern-OdO
sumkern2-0dO
do 154 k-1,nc
s-(prpnstyc (i)-prpnstyt (k»/hi
spls-prpnstyc(k)-prpnstyt(i)
kernel-15*(s*s-1)*(s*s-1)/16
sumkern-sumkern+kernel*spls
sumkern2-sumkern2+kernel*spls*spls
154 continue
s-(prpnstyc(i)-prpnstyt(j»/hi
spls-prpnstyc (j)-prpnstyt (i)
kernel-15*(s*s-1)*(s*s-1)/16
numerat(j)-sumkern2*kernel-sumkern*kernel*spls
sumnum-sumnum+numerat(j)
160 continue
weighsum-OdO
synprpyc(i)-OdO
synewrwc(i)-OdO
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synewewc(i)-OdO
synebybc(i)"'OdO
synebylc(i)-OdO
syphbybc(i)-OdO
syehbybc(i)"'OdO
syehbylc(i)"'OdO
do 155 j=l,nc
weight(i,j)-numerat(j)/sumnum
weighsum=weighsum+weight(i,j)
synprpyc(i)-synprpyc(i)+weight(i,j)*prpnstyc(j)
synewrwc(i)-synewrwc(i)+weight(i,j)*newrwc(j)
synewewc(i)-synewewc(i)+weight(i,j)*newewc(j)
synebybc(i)-synebybc(i)+weight(i,j)*ebybc(j)
synebylc(i)-synebylc(i)+weight(i,j)*ebylc(j)
syphbybc(i)-syphbybc(i)+weight(i,j)*phbybc(j)
syehbybc(i)-syehbybc(i)+weight(i,j)*ehbybc(j)
syehbylc(i)-syehbylc(i)+weight(i,j)*ehbylc(j)
155 continue
150 continue
return
300 format(3d25.10)
end
subroutine mksynthx(newrwc,newewc,ebybc,ebylc,phbybc
& ,ehbybc,ehbylc,synewrwc,synewewc,synebybc,synebylc,syphbybc
& ,syehbybc,syehbylc,synprpyc,prpnstyc,prpnstyt,hi,nt,nc)
double precision diff(4500),actual(4500),synth(4500)
& ,ssknl,sskn12,sumnum,sumkern,s,kernel,hi,numerat(4500),weighsum
& ,synewrwc(4500),synewewc(4500),synebybc(4500),synebylc(4500)
& ,syphbybc(4500) ,syehbybc(4500) ,syehbylc(4500) ,newrwc(4500)
& ,newewc(4500),ebybc(4500),ebylc(4500),phbybc(4500)
& ,ehbybc(4500),ehbylc(4500),prpnstyc(4500),prpnstyt(4500)
& ,weight(400,3500),synprpyc(4500),sumkern2,spls
integer i,j,k,nt,nc
do 150 i-l,nt
ssknl-OdO
sskn12-0dO
sumnum-OdO
do 160 j-1,nc
sumkern-OdO
sumkern2-0dO
do 154 k-l,nc
s-(synprpyc(i)-prpnstyt(k»/hi
spls-synprpyc (k)-prpnstyt (i)
kernel-15*(s*s-1)*(s*s-1)/16
sumkern-sumkern+kernel*spls
sumkern2-sumkern2+kernel*spls*spls
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154 continue
s-(synprpyc (i)-prpnstyt (j»/hi
spls-synprpyc(j)-prpnstyt(i)
kernel-15*(s*s-1)*(s*s-1)/16
numerat(j)-sumkern2*kernel-sumkern*kernel*spls
sumnum-sumnum+numerat(j)
160 continue
weighsum-OdO
synprpyc(i)-OdO
synewrwc(i)-OdO
synewewc(i)=OdO
synebybc(i)-OdO
synebylc(i)-OdO
syphbybc(i)-OdO
syehbybc(i)=OdO
syehbylc(i)-OdO
do 155 j-1.nc
weight(i.j)-numerat(j)/sumnum
weighsum-weighsum+weight(i.j)
synprpyc(i)-synprpyc(i)+weight(i.j)*prpnstyc(j)
synewrwc(i)-synewrwc(i)+weight(i.j)*newrwc(j)
synewewc(i)-synewewc(i)+weight(i.j)*newewc(j)
synebybc(i)-synebybc(i)+weight(i.j)*ebybc(j)
synebylc(i)-synebylc(i)+weight(i.j)*ebylc(j)
syphbybc(i)-syphbybc(i)+weight(i.j)*phbybc(j)
syehbybc(i)-syehbybc(i)+weight(i.j)*ehbybc(j)
syehbylc(i)-syehbylc(i)+weight(i.j)*ehbylc(j)
155 continue
150 continue
return
300 format(3d25.10)
end
c The subroutine passhi creates the new value for h (the bandwidth
c parameter of the kernel) from the arguements passed to it.
subroutine passhi(prpnstyt.synprpyc.nt.nc.hi)
double precision prpnstyt(4500).synprpyc(4500).hi
& .fprpdif(1400.3500).fsumprpi.fmeanpri.fsqprdif(4500).fsumsqdf
& .fstdevdf
integer i.j.nc.nt
nc-nt
do 400 i-1.nt
do 410 j-1.nc
fprpdif(i.j)-prpnstyt(i)-synprpyc(j)
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410 continue
400 continue
fsumprpi=OdO
do 420 j"1,nc
fsumprpi-fsumprpi+synprpyc(j)
420 continue
fmeanpri=fsumprpi/nc
do 430 j=1,nc
fsqprdif (j)=(synprpyc (j)-fmeanpri)*
& (synprpyc(j)-fmeanpri)
430 continue
fsumsqdf=OdO
do 440 j=1,nc
fsumsqdf-fsumsqdf+fsqprdif(j)
440 continue
fstdevdf=sqrt(fsumsqdf/(nc-l»
hi=1.06dO*fstdevdf*(nc**(-0.2dO»
print *, 'hi:',hi
return
end
c The subroutine ttesting performs the t-tests for significant
c differences between the actual and synthetic wages and
c elasticites.
subroutine ttesting(actual,synth,nt,totdiff,meandiff
& ,sumdifsq,sdp,tplus,meanact,meansynth,stderact,stdersyn)
double precision diff(5000) ,actual(5000),synth(5000)
& ,totdiff,meandiff,diffsq(5000),sumdifsq,sdp,ntplus
& ,tplus,sumact,meanact,sumsynth,meansynth,difactsq,sumdfasq
& ,difsynsq,sumdfssq,varact,varsyn,stderact,stdersyn
integer i,nt
sumact-OdO
sumsynth-OdO
meanact"OdO
meansynth-OdO
difactsq-OdO
sumdfasq-OdO
difsynsq-OdO
sumdfssq-OdO
varact-OdO
varsyn-OdO
do to i-t,nt
sumact·sumact+actual(i)
sumsynth·sumsynth+synth(i)
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10 continue
meanact=sumact/nt
meansynth=sumsynth/nt
do 20 i=1,nt
difactsq=(actual (i)-meanact) *(actual(i)-meanact)
sumdfasq=sumdfasq+difactsq
difsynsq=(synth(i)-meansynth)*(synth(i)-meansynth)
sumdfssq=sumdfssq+difsynsq
20 continue
varact=sumdfasq/(nt-1)
varsyn=sumdfssq/(nt-1)
ntplus-nt
stderact-sqrt (varact)/sqrt (ntplus)
stdersyn-sqrt(varsyn)/sqrt(ntplus)
sdp·sqrt«varact/nt)+(varsyn/nt»
tplus=(meanact-meansynth)/sdp
write (8,250) meanact,meansynth,tplus
write (8,250) stderact,stdersyn
type *, J I ' I
II; , ' I " '
return
250 format(3d25.10)
end
I'
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Appendix C
C.l Matching Algorithm: Based on Lechner (1999)
1. Estimation of Propensity Score via a Probit Model.
2. Compute vfi and its conditional variance var(VfilV = v) for each observation.
3. Split people into a treatment vector (people with YTS experience) and a control
vector.
4. Randomise the order of observations in both the T and C vectors.
5. Draw the first person in the randomised T vector.
6. Calculate caliper of propensity score for observation in terms of its predicted probit
index, vntfi, and its conditional variance var(VfilV = vnt}.
7. Find observations from C vector (denote these as j) which lie within the caliper.
I.e:
vjfi E [vntfi±CJvar(vntfi)) Where C = 1.65, so that each treatment persons caliper
forms a 90% confidence interval for their propensity score, Vnt~
8. If j ~1 then calculate the above only for those j people within the caliper.
9. Remove the matched individual, j, from C.
10. Repeat until all individuals from treatment vector are matched with a control.
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Figure C.1: Kernel Regression Matching Performance as Measured by t-statistic Fluctu-
ations for Differing hn (Males)
C.2 Interpretation of Charts within Chapter 4
Chapter 4 contains a number of plots which are explained here to avoid repetition.
C.2.1 Charts Representing t-statistic Fluctuations
Figure C.1 compares kernel regression matched males with and without any form of YTS
experience. In it we present a plot of these t-statistics as hn was varied between 0 and 1.
The x-axis represents the variation in hn from 0 to 1. The y-axis depicts the t-statistic
values for the differences between treatment and synthetic controls of wages/elasticities
produced using the values of hn. Therefore, the yellow plot lines represent the movement
of these t-statistics for each wage/elasticity pair as hn increases. The wages/elasticities
to which the yellow lines belong are indicated to the right of the figure. The red area
represents the area of no significant difference between a synthetic control person and their
treatment counterpart. Hence yellow plots, which reside beyond this region, indicate the
presence of a treatment effect.
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Figure C.2: Kernel Regression Matching Performance as Measured by Fluctuations in
the Percentage Differences Between Treatment and Synthetic Elasticities for Various hn
(Males)
C.2.2 Charts Representing Percentage Difference Fluctuations
Figure C.2 presents the way in which the magnitudes of the differ nces betw en tr at-
ment and synthetic wages/elasticities vary over hn for the same male sub-sampl a
Figure C.1 using kernel regression matching. Here we have standardis cl th tr atment
wages/elasticities to 1. Hence, a synthetic control wage/ala ti ity with a valu gr at r
than 1 indicates that the wage/elasticity increased after treatm nt.
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C.3 Data
Un-Mtchd Un-Mtchd Mntched Matched
Males Femolos Molos Fomoles
Regressors Description Mean Mean Moon MBan
Reservation Wage Responses to the question: 'What Is the 96.16908 88.6961 98.75319 88.61614
lowest weekly take home pay you would (0.49596) (0.42353) (0.65670) (0.52228)
consider for a full time iob?'
Expected Wage Responses to the question: 'How much 126.1087 115.8429 126.6414 114.2719
weekly take home pay do you expect to (0.66737) (0.54631) (0.90866) (0.69372)
earn in your next job?
Ethnic Origin White: Respondent is white, 0.081128 0.073842 0.066863 0.069749
Other: Respondent belongs to another (0.27306) (0.26154) (0.24985) (0.25477)
ethnic group.
Education Score at 16 These are education scores calculated from 6.084804 8.661265 4.265467 5.339342
a persons GCSE (or equivalent) results. (9.72350) (9.66383) (5.51636) (6.40732)
The scores are computed as A=5 points,
8=4 points, C=3 points, 0=2 points and
E-1 point.
Maths GCSE 1 Respondent held a GCSE (or equivalent) 0.215931 0.168986 0.086529 0.107367
In Maths at grade C or above. (0.41152) (0.39154) (0.28121) (0.30964)
o Otherwise.
English GCSE 1 Respondent held a GCSE (or equivalent) 0.256618 0.325824 0.139626 0.206505
In English at grade C or above, (0.43682) (0.46873) (0.34668) (0.40488)
o Otherwise.
No. of Siblings The total number of siblings (not a dummy). 1.807843 1.858156 r07325)~ r023119
(1.55990 11.62853 1.69402 1.72236
Career Service Interview 1 Respondent attended a career service 0.141667 0.111181 0.174041 0.142633
interview, (0.34875) (0.31439) (0.37924) (0.34977
o Otherwise.
Live With Parents Respondent lived with parentts). ~.977696 ~.952232 ((0.9729~ ~.93965~
0.14769 0.21330 0.16224 0.23817
YTSI Respondent had a spell on the first 0.083333 ~.075511 ~.16715,~ ((0.1416~
Incarnation of YTS. 10.27642 0.26424 0.37321 0.34696
YTSII Respondent had a spell on the second 0.116667 0.131206 ~.23402~ ~.246473
Incarnation of YTS. (0.32106 (0.33766 0.42349 0.43104
VT Respondent had a spell on YT 0.053922 0.06237 (0.0988~ ~.111a77. (0.22589 (0.24165 0.29649 0.31503
Pred. Training allowance An estimate of the respondents training - ~.99871~ ~.952304
allowance. (- (- 0.18567 O. t4224
Regions North, Yorkshire & Humberside, East - - - -
Midlands, East Anglia, Greater London, (-) (-) (-) (-)
South East, South West, West Midlands,
North West and Wales. North of England Is
used as a reference arOUD.
Cohorts Dummies for Cohorts 1 to 6. Cohort 1 Is
1-) I-~ I-~ I-iused as a reference arOUD.
Exogenous Vllrlables
0.064805 0.064576
(0.03561) (0.03562)
0.083314 0.083677
(0.02429) (0.02434)
233.1733 159.0168
(32.5365) (24.2911)
10.01333 9.922007
(4.13270) (4.14132)
Sample Size 4115 4770 2034 2552
Table C.1: Summary Statisti of th • ur YCS Sub ts , cl in this tudy
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C.4 Figures
ReservationWage
Expected Under 100 125 150 175 200 225 250 Over Total
Wage 27.5 250
Under 27.5 3 10 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 16
100 21 3305 84 35 11 3 4 1 2 3466
125 2 2539 797 16 9 0 1 2 0 3366
150 0 583 832 210 2 4 1 0 1 1633
175 0 133 390 216 85 2 2 0 1 829
200 0 75 135 101 49 29 0 0 0 389
225 0 15 34 49 27 18 11 0 0 154
250 0 18 26 20 40 22 9 10 0 145
Over 250 0 7 16 9 13 12 8 17 18 100
Total 26 6685 2316 657 236 90 36 30 22 10098
Table C.2: The Joint Distribution of R rvati nand Exp t d Wage
Table C.3: The Cohort D ign Stru tu!' f th Y 111'
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Figure C.3: Distributions of both R rvati nand Exp L d Wag s r r It
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Figure C.4: Distributions of both R s rvation and xp t cl Wag. f r 11 h rtf)
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Table C.4: Male and Femal Probit Mod 1 timati 118 f Y arti .ip Li II
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Men Women
Reservation Wages Expected Wages Reservation Wages Expected Wages
Regressors Coet. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error Cocf. Std. Error
Ethnic Origin 10.89702 3.464913 15.45376 4.837764 -0.7331 2.108997 2.938049 2.804193
Education Score at 16 -0.4328 0.219833 -0.48605 0.306934 0.061281 0.124128 0.365425 0.165045
Maths GCSE -0.17245 2.87702 -4.4208 4.016939 2.713062 2.128552 -0.91137 2.830194
English GCSE 2.849834 2.333186 9.246686 3.257629 2.778337 1.661183 -1.79623 2.208765
No. of Siblings 0.062976 0.501925 -0.40546 0.700795 -0.27913 0.330924 -1.02411 0.440008
Career Service Interview 4.612076 1.792269 6.053792 2.502393 -1.34014 1.429507 -0.57241 1.900721
Youth Unemployment -189.823 45.1496 -213.118 63.03854 -123.306 36.04723 -79.8102 47.92961
Regional YT Places 9.139832 122.273 31.0028 170.7193 310.8223 117.4818 51.41146 156.2078
YTSI 33.63028 13.58253 32.92925 18.96413 8.759707 6.803698 -8.38859 9.046426
YTSII 17.21374 6.120887 17.90767 8.546074 4.548775 4.144305 -2.17982 5.510407
YT 67.00084 19.53328 72.06455 27.27267 15.60367 9.103098 -3.72546 12.10379
Average Wages 0.593443 0.139266 0.760058 0.194445 1.300284 0.121493 1.432638 0.161541
Pred. Training Allowance 124.6503 42.01457 136.9275 58.66138 50.7928 25.52927 -6.55406 33.94458
Live With Parents 5.848049 4.619193 8.146328 6.449386 -12.5849 3.478181 -8.12764 4.624706
LEA Unemployment 0.74072 0.30864 0.733179 0.430928 -0.53105 0.193458 -0.85525 0.257228
Yorkshire & Humberside 0.042642 2.994493 2.386416 4.180956 1.958798 2.574407 -1.72809 3.423018
East Midlands -0.72384 3.285392 -1.53823 4.587114 ·8.81026 2.711551 -4.40834 3.605369
East Anglia 14.95051 4.953959 17.77626 6.916791 8.421936 4.315854 1.690732 5.738505
Greater London 2.185735 4.383977 7.481988 6.120975 11.2164 4.23051 6.220016 5.625029
South East 4.912493 5.527611 6.95248 7.717733 0.811709 4.053202 -1.66377 5.389274
South West -49.4123 10.9313 -55.2298 15.26245 -46.3038 7.834674 -49.474 10.41725
West Midlands -26.946 7.719467 -27.5619 10.77804 -34.2984 5.433954 -47.9169 7.225168
North West -0.55041 4.601312 3.317585 6.424421 5.315443 5.193808 -4.91661 6.905862
Wales ·2.69004 3.4771 -0.77979 4.854779 -0.06344 2.72888 1.485483 3.628411
Cohort 2 0.039398 2.642059 ·2.5973 3.688883 0.489976 2.251418 -4.55783 2.993561
Cohort 3 8.467371 11.3175 -1.38315 15.80167 ·10.436 4.52875 -28.9266 6.021578
Cohort 4 3.692701 12.41048 -3.26482 17.3277 -15.523 5.893457 -33.902 7.836138
Cohort 5 -28.5584 10.42568 -32.7629 14.55648 -32.9492 6.141893 -43.1951 8.166468
Cohort 6 -46.5554 5.561294 -56.113 7.764762 -46.6177 5.127124 ·50.3621 6.817196
Constant -541.831 162.2768 -598.091 226.5733 -295.898 119.9743 -22.587 159.5219
F(29,2004) or F(29,2522 9.93 B.05 13.00 12.80
Prob. > F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R 0.1256 0.1043 0.1301 0.1283
Sample Size 2034 2034 2552 2552
Table C.5: Male and Female Regression M d 1 stimati n f r
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